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Abstract  
Nigeria has consistently ranked 6
th
 amongst oil-producing nations of the world but 
despite the enormous revenues from the sale of petroleum resources in the past five 
decades, the country has made little advance in terms of infrastructure, quality of life 
and the human development index. This has been attributed to endemic levels of 
corruption through misappropriation of public funds for private use, most of which 
have been associated with public procurement.  
 
The public procurement process in Nigeria has long been associated with corruption 
which involves misappropriation of public funds for private use. For example, the 
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index reports for 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012 indicate that much of public sector corruption in Nigeria is associated 
with the public procurement process. Between 2010 and 2012, Nigeria’s position on 
the corruption perception index of 183 countries surveyed by the TI, declined by 9 
places to 143, an indication that current initiatives aimed at solving the problem have 
not been effective.   
 
Efforts at improving the practice of public procurement in Nigeria and developing it 
into a reputable profession cannot be successful without considering the more 
fundamental question of the factors that may have made corruption in the process 
resistant to efforts aimed at curbing it. It is this gap that this study hopes to address 
in order to promote transparency in the process of public procurement in Nigeria. A 
total of 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted across four organisations. 
Findings from the interviews were further subjected to verification discussions at 
two other organisations.  
 
v 
 
Drawing from the case study analysis; greed, lack of inbuilt checks and wide 
discretionary powers of procurement officers under the direction of management 
emerged as possible risk factors motivating corruption in the public procurement 
process thus offering an explanation of the vulnerability of the process to corruption. 
Building upon the theoretical debates, public procurement-related corruption in 
Nigeria is contextualised in a framework which proposes a corruption risk-factor 
vulnerability check-list for the management of public procurement in Nigeria to 
achieve verifiable transparency and accountability.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Corruption – which is defined as the abuse of public power for private use and 
benefit (Tanzi, 1998) – has long been associated with Nigeria (Transparency 
International, 2012), the most populous country in Africa with a population of over 
150 million people, 250 languages and over 100 ethnic tribes with abundant natural 
resources such as oil and gas (Ajayi, 1996; Akinyele, 2001; Lalasz, 2006). The 
country has consistently ranked 6
th
 amongst the oil-producing nations of the world 
(World Bank, 2004; Olters, 2007; Olarinmoye, 2010). Despite the enormous 
revenues from the sale of petroleum resources in the past five decades, Nigeria has 
made few advances in terms of infrastructure, quality of life and the human 
development index (World Bank, 2004; DFID, 2010; Transparency International, 
2011). This has been attributed to endemic levels of corruption perpetrated through 
misappropriation of public funds for private use, most of which have been associated 
with public procurement − a motivating and significant factor for this current 
research (Adeniran, 2007; Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Transparency 
International, 2011).  
 
Manifestations of corruption, particularly in the public procurement process (PPP), 
which is the series of distinct processes through which a buyer acquires products, 
services or works (Carpineti et al., 2001), have become so quick to mutate that they 
have been able to defy initiatives and strategies aimed at curbing them. Part of their 
continued success is due to a lack of understanding of the associated underlying risk 
3 
 
factors, hence the need for this research, which aims to identify the risk factors of 
corruption in the public procurement process in Nigeria in order to inform policy 
frameworks that promote transparency in public contract administration (Salisu, 
2000a; Dike, 2005; Ribadu, 2006a; Transparency International, 2011).  
The problem of corruption is reputed to have caused misappropriation in the 
Nigerian national economy to the point of political, social and economic standstill in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when the dictatorial regimes of the military cadres ruled 
Nigeria (Ajayi, 1996; De Graaf, 2007). About $380billion is said to have been looted 
from the Nigerian public treasury and sequestered in private bank accounts both 
within and outside the country during this period and also over the first decade of the 
return to democratic governance in Nigeria (1999-2009) (Transparency International, 
2009; Bakre, 2010). The effect of this has been that over 75% of the country’s 
population live on less than $1 a day and the government is unable to fund many of 
its fiscal budgetary commitments (World Bank, 2004; Fagbadebo, 2007; 
Transperency International, 2009).  
The problem of corruption still featured prominently in the national agenda of post-
military rule in Nigeria, politically, socially and economically, 14 years into the 
country’s adoption of representative democratic governance (Fagbadebo, 2007). 
Because corruption was not properly confronted by way of specific studies to 
examine the factors that may have acted in support of its growth, particularly in the 
public procurement process, the risk factors that perhaps always beset the conduct of 
government business have emboldened the corrupt few to the extent that they have 
flaunted their corruptly-acquired wealth unchallenged − to the consternation of the 
majority who suffer the effects of their corruption (Ajayi, 1996; Fagbadebo, 2007). 
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By 2002, corruption and its perpetrators had become so powerful that some of its 
notable beneficiaries started using their corrupt wealth to acquire political power and 
influence, with the sole aim of further safeguarding and protecting their corruptly-
acquired estate. The implication of this is that corruption became endemic in the 
public procurement process (Boehm and Olaya, 2006; Ribadu, 2006a). Because of 
the widespread level and consequences of corruption in Nigeria which has its root in 
the public procurement process (Olowu, 2001; Makinde, 2003), there is a need for 
applying effort to research and understand the risk factors that underpin its growth 
and spread, as a way of providing informed policy remedies aimed at curtailing it. 
Because the problem is widespread (Ribadu, 2006), studying it would require in-
depth study through case study analysis to provide explanations for corruption across 
the public procurement process in Nigeria and how to curb it.  
The selection of respondents within the case studies was guided by the case studies 
screening process in a multi-case design as advocated by Yin (1993) and Bryman 
(2008). In so doing, three factors were considered, namely: representativeness, 
comparability and the relative knowledge of the respondents on the subject of public 
procurement. Representativeness takes into account whether the case studies are 
truly representative of the problem of corruption in the public procurement process 
in the country in terms of its cross-cutting manifestations in the polity. 
Comparability considers the representativeness of the problem in the case studies 
relative to other cases, while the third factor, requisite knowledge of the respondents 
on the subject of public procurement, looks at the relationship of the respondents to 
the procurement process of the case studies (See table 6).  
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Drawing on the stance of the Impartiality Principle (Kurer, 2005), the research 
adopts an interpretivist ontology, with the assumption that the problem of corruption 
and the meanings it accrues in different social contexts, are continually being created 
through social processes (Bryman, 2009, p. 692). As explained in sections 2., 
wrongdoing (partiality) in relation to the public procurement process in Nigeria is 
adopted as the operative definition of corruption. The role of the researcher is to 
access individuals’ viewpoints and constructions regarding the reality of the content 
of corruption in a given social context (Xin and Rudel, 2004a; Moore, 2008).  
1.2 Corruption and public procurement in Nigeria 
A review of the relevant literature in chapter 2 has shown growing academic interest 
in various aspects of the subject of public procurement-related corruption. This 
reveals the need to define and further develop a holistic understanding and 
explanation of the concept of corruption in relation to public procurement. The 
concept of corruption has been variously defined as: the use of power to profit self 
(Van Roy, 1970); the abuse of discretionary public power for private benefit (Tanzi, 
1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998); and the exercise of lawful authority to influence 
the allocation of rights and privileges in favour of predetermined individuals at the 
expense of others (Colombatto, 2003; Asada, 2010). In relation to public 
procurement, corruption is the appropriation of public goods for private use, in 
violation of extant rules (Søreide, 2002).  
 
In Nigeria, corruption is ‘an act which results in any right, interest, title or privilege 
being illegitimately conferred on any person’ (National Assembly Nigeria, 2000 ) 
and in the context of public procurement, corruption means: 
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“offering, giving, or promising to give, directly or indirectly, to any officer or 
employee of any Procuring Entity or other governmental/private authority or 
any individual a gratuity in any form, an employment or any other thing or 
service of value, as an inducement with respect to an act or decision of, or 
method following by, a procuring Entity in connection with the procurement 
proceeding.” 
(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e) 
 
Common to both of these definitions of corruption presented above is the notion of 
misappropriation (abuse of discretion); therefore, the term corruption for this study is 
defined as ‘partiality and/or abuse of power and/or discretion for profit in the 
exercise of public procurement-related discretion’.   
 
The problem of corruption is a major problem with global ramifications that 
manifests itself throughout the development process (Tanzi, 1998; Transparency 
International, 2010). In Nigeria, corruption has been linked to public office holders 
who misappropriate public funds for private use through the public procurement 
process (PPP) (Ajayi and Abdulkareem, 2010). The return of Nigeria to democratic 
governance in 1999 raised national consciousness about the problem of public 
procurement-related corruption (Fagbadebo, 2007). As a result, two executive 
commissions, namely the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and 
the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) 
were formed by acts of the Nigerian National Assembly and given a clear mandate to 
fight corruption in the country in all its ramifications (National Assembly Nigeria, 
2000;  2004).  
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Many of the reported corruption cases in Nigeria are said to have been perpetrated 
through the public procurement process (Watts and Bassett, 1985; Malgwi, 2004; 
Okogbule, 2006). In three of such cases involving the Nigerian Ports Authority 
(NPA), the Rural Electrification Organisation (REO) of Nigeria and the Universal 
Basic Education Commission (UBEC) of Nigeria, about $1 billion in public funds 
was misappropriated through the public procurement process (Sowunmi et al., 2009; 
Awolusi, 2010; Bakre, 2010). Over the years, corruption has generated a large 
spectrum of negative effects in society and most of the corruption cases reported 
have been perpetrated through the public procurement process (Shehu, 2004; Bakre, 
2010). 
1.2.1 Corruption and the electricity sector in Nigeria 
The electric power sector in Nigeria is divided into rural and urban sub-sectors 
following the passage into law of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2005). This was in response to the acute deficiency in 
electricity supply in rural Nigeria where less than 20% of people have access to 
electricity (Akarakiri, 2002). Specifically, implementation of the Electric Power 
Sector Reform Act 2005 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2005) was intended to achieve 
the objectives of rural electrification in Nigeria. This is done through the 
management of the Rural Electrification Fund it created and for which a sizeable 
sum is required to be set aside annually through budgetary allocations approved by 
the Nigerian national parliament, for implementation of the Rural Electrification 
Strategy and Plan. 
In addition to the pursuit of the implementation of the Rural Electrification Strategy 
and Plan, the Rural Electrification Organisation (REO) also has a mandate to 
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promote and support rural electrification in Nigeria through public and private sector 
participation, with the dual aims of increasing access to electricity and maximising 
economic and social development in the Rural Electrification sector of the Nigerian 
economy. To deliver on its mandate as stated in sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Act 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2005), the REO has the task of providing rural 
electrification services to rural communities in all 774 local government areas
1
 of the 
country, covering a total population of over 150 million people. The realisation of 
the REO’s mandate was, however, adversely affected by the misappropriation of its 
funds in the course of the public procurement process in Nigeria in 2009 (Awolusi, 
2010). 
The federal character principle
2
 requires that all strata of Nigerian society are 
represented in the administration of all federal agencies, the REO included, and that 
the work of the organisation achieves a national spread geographically (Abubakar, 
1998). A case of corruption in the rural electricity sub-sector in Nigeria in 2009 
(Awolusi, 2010) involved hundreds of separate procurement activities for rural 
electrification contracts intended for local government areas across the country. An 
overview shows that because of the importance of electricity to Nigeria, where only 
about 20% of the country’s electric power needs are presently being met, the rural 
electrification initiative involved every area of the country (Awolusi, 2010). Thus, 
reported corruption cases at the Rural Electrification Organisation often involved 
misappropriation of public funds through the public procurement process. Therefore 
corruption cases in the electricity sector are not only representative of the 
procurement process in Nigeria, but also represent all strata of Nigerian society 
                                                          
1
The smallest unit of political administration in Nigeria. 
2
 A Nigerian democratic principle that requires equal representation in all national development 
programmes. 
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including professionals and non-professionals. Unskilled, semi-skilled and 
professional people, such as accountants, lawyers, engineers and civil society 
representatives were involved; data generated is representative of the Nigerian 
society.  
Based on the electric power sector procurement Audit Report in the Nigeria 
Economic and Power Sector reform Program Appraisal Report (AfDB, 2009), many 
procurement activities in the electricity sector were concluded without carrying out 
any tendering process, and evaluation, for any of the 40-plus companies (contractors) 
to whom contracts were awarded in 2009 (Awolusi, 2010). The procurement audit 
revealed that the management, acting in tandem with 20 members of the Nigerian 
parliament, senior officials of the Ministry of Power, and several other actors in the 
organised private sector − in particular, a number of banks − merely generated a list 
of contractors and awarded contracts to them, contrary to the dictates of the Public 
Procurement Act (2007) and other specific procurement regulations (Bureau of 
Public Procurement, 2007b; National Assembly Nigeria, 2007b; Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2008d).  
1.2.2 Transparency in the Public Power Company (PPC) 
Upon the return of Nigeria to democratic governance in 1999, the government 
initiated a privatization policy in the electric power sector (Uwatt, 2004). The policy 
was in response to the problems of acute electric power shortage in Nigeria from the 
1980s to 1990s, caused by the government monopoly and endemic corruption in the 
sector (Ayodele, 2004; Olukoju, 2004; Okafor, 2008). The policy aimed to transform 
the sector from a public monopoly to a private sector-led business that could operate 
profitably without government funding. The government’s ownership of the sector 
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had become unsustainable with the result that the country suffered acute electric 
power shortage which affected both individual and business customers alike (Cubbin 
and Stern, 2006).  
The new national power company was then given the mandate to make available to 
customers electricity of adequate quality for at least 15 hours daily. It was hoped that 
the privatization reform would deliver credible electricity tariffs that would not be 
contested by customers within the billing month (Hall, 2006). As revealed from the 
fieldwork, however, because of corruption, electricity bills in Nigeria can include 
charges for electric power units not consumed. This situation is caused by corruption 
on the part of the electric power company, who can deliberately tamper with records 
of households’ electric power consumption to justify inaccurate billing for their 
service. The reform, which aimed to provide uninterrupted electricity to consumers, 
also had the objective of ensuring accurate readings of all customer meters at least 
once every three months to determine the actual usage of electricity by every 
household (Adenikinju, 2003; Smith, 2007). 
Furthermore, the reform aimed at preparing the Nigerian energy company for 
privatization outlined a process prescribing that all new applications for power 
supply, from the metering to the billing stages, must be completed within four weeks 
from receipt of payment from the customer. This was against the usual practice 
where applications received could take an indefinite period of time to be processed 
(Adenikinju, 2003). The reform also required further measures to prevent abuse of 
the electricity tariff system, namely that an official tariff table for the information of 
all customers was to be published periodically in the national dailies, and customer 
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care centres were to be established in all Business Units and Service Centres.
3
 The 
provision of a minimum of one Customer Care Centre in every Business Unit of the 
PPC was aimed at providing dedicated outlets through which the customers could 
reach the company with complaints and enquiries.  
The power reform policy also mandated the power company to publish contact 
telephone numbers for Customer Care Centre Service Staff, Local Management and 
Headquarters Management, so that aggrieved customers who may be dissatisfied 
services due to corruption in the electric power industry in Nigeria could reach 
relevant staff members with their complaints, in addition to ensuring continuous 
improvement in customer service delivery through periodic reviews of customer 
service benchmarks. The policy, as well-crafted as it sounded, however, did not 
explain what the benchmarks for the reviews were, nor did it state whether the 
customers were entitled to participate in the reviews, providing a potential 
opportunity for corruption. The reality that emerged from the 2011 fieldwork was 
that there has been a failure to implement the policy of providing more customer 
service points to deal with the complaints of customers dissatisfied with quality of 
service and with service tariffs that did not reflect their electricity consumption. The 
PPC had still left its unsatisfied customers without any point of contact where they 
could ventilate their grievances.   
Another important mandate imposed on the PPC for the benefit of the country’s 
consumers of electric power is the compulsory provision of suggestion boxes at all 
service locations for feedback from customers on the company’s service quality. The 
fieldwork of 2011 revealed that these suggestion boxes were provided, as mandated 
by the power reform policy, but none of the feedback boxes were opened throughout 
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The operational units of the power company closest to the customer base. 
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the four weeks of the fieldwork. The power reform policy which led to the creation 
of the PPC also requires that it treat every issue raised by a customer with diligence 
and respect by ensuring that a response is given to all customer service-related issues 
brought to its attention. This aimed at improving communication between the 
Nigerian electric power company and its customers nationally, with a view to 
making the workings of the company more transparent and accountable to customers 
and by extension, the Nigerian public. However, this research revealed that the 
policy has still not taken effect, as customers continued to receive electricity bills for 
periods of time when no electricity was available to them.  
The Public Procurement Process (PPP) has long been associated with corruption in 
the electricity sector in Nigeria. In the on-going case of Federal Government of 
Nigeria v. Nicholas Ugbane and others, contracts totalling over $0.5 billion awarded 
in public funds were misappropriated through public procurement-related corruption 
in the electric power sector in 2009 (Sowunmi et al., 2009; Awolusi, 2010; Bakre, 
2010). Awolusi (2010) added that none of the companies awarded the contracts were 
on the list of pre-qualified companies forwarded by the Ministry, nor were the 
projects advertised in any of the national daily newspapers, as required by the 2007 
Public Procurement Act. Benefiting companies were selected through a selective 
tendering process that led to the award of contracts of a type that is prohibited in the 
Procurement Act. The specifics of the cases indicate that though companies were 
pre-qualified based on the country’s six geo-political zones to give an appearance of 
federal even-handedness, the management failed to provide the criteria and scores of 
the pre-qualification exercise, as required by the Procurement Act 2007, to prove 
compliance with PPP.  
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The procurement audit also revealed that contractors were paid 100% of the contract 
sum in two instalments of 15% and 85% respectively, in complete contravention of 
the public procurement guidelines (National Assembly, 2007). Furthermore, another 
indication of abuse of the procurement process was indicated when a person 
identified in the audit as a single individual signed the contract documents and also 
collected cheques on behalf of nine companies which were the beneficiaries of the 
award of contracts. The records also show that the nine companies not only have the 
majority of their offices in Asaba, the capital city of Delta State in Nigeria, they also 
duplicate an identical telephone number on their company letterheads. Another 
important issue raised was that the nine companies in question also won 21 out of the 
40 contracts awarded, to a value of $1 billion out of the total contract sum of $1.5 
billion. Finally, although the contracts had not yet been executed, the final costs 
requested were paid already in full.  
As it turned out, the companies were fraudulently awarded contracts through the 
procurement process for projects that were unexecuted, suggesting that they used the 
procurement process as a conduit for siphoning public funds for projects that were 
never intended to be realised (Awolusi, 2010).  
An important point in these cases is that even before the contracts were awarded, 
100% of the contract value was paid to some of the companies, in complete 
disregard of the provision of the 2007 Public Procurement Act. The contract sums 
were paid into accounts maintained and operated by the companies in reputable 
Nigerian banks − an indication that this public procurement-related corruption case 
not only involved the public organisations, the national parliament and the Ministry 
of Power, but that the organised private sector, and in particular the banks, were also 
implicated. This realisation reinforces the argument for a strengthening of the 
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process whereby the risk factors exploited for corruption can be identified and 
managed.  
1.3 Research aim 
The aim of this research is to identify risk factors the promote corruption in the 
public procurement process in Nigeria through case studies analysis, with the aim of 
contributing to evidence-based policy frameworks that promote transparency in 
public contract administration.  
1.3.1 Research objectives 
The research aim will be achieved through three objectives, which are to: 
 Review the context and conceptual framework of the PPP in Nigeria   
 Review the practice of PPP with a view to identifying a set of risk factors that 
may explain the vulnerability of the public procurement process to 
corruption; 
 To propose a corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list for the 
management of public procurement in Nigeria.  
1.3.2 Research question 
What are the risk factors that promote corruption in public procurement in Nigeria? 
1.3.3 The scope of the research 
The subject of this research is the PPP which is an important process for the business 
of government in Nigeria. The research focuses on the PPP because there it has, for 
many years, been a significant base for corruption in the country (Transparency 
International, 2011; Ribadu, 2006a).  
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Even though the problem of corruption is a major problem with global ramifications 
and manifest throughout the development process (Tanzi, 1998; Transparency 
International, 2010), in Nigeria, corruption has been linked to public office holders 
who misappropriate public funds for private use through the use of the public 
procurement process (Ajayi and Abdulkareem, 2010). The return of Nigeria to 
democratic governance in 1999 raised national consciousness about the problem of 
public procurement-related corruption (Fagbadebo, 2007a). This post 1999 national 
consciousness led to specific legislative anti-corruption actions in Nigeria that 
established two commissions, namely the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) by Act of the Nigerian National Assembly and with 
clear mandate to fight corruption in all its ramifications in the country (National 
Assembly Nigeria, 2000; National Assembly Nigeria, 2004).  
This research focuses on the issues of corruption and its associated risk factors in 
Nigerian and has not considered issues of any international comparisons with other 
countries approaches to procurement-related corruption. The findings and 
recommendations have also not been benchmarked against those of international 
agencies working in the area of procurement-related corruption. This study, 
therefore, examines the problems of corruption only within the country of Nigeria 
and particularly within the public procurement process, in order to isolate the factors 
that may have made it resistant to past efforts to curtail it, so as to propose a new 
framework that aims at promoting transparency in the process.  
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1.4 The case studies and corruption 
The case studies were selected based on the need to generate a broad mix of data on 
public procurement-related corruption in Nigeria. In all, while three of the case 
studies were selected from public institutions that are tasked with disbursing public 
funds through the public procurement process, two were selected from agencies with 
a mandate to fight public procurement-related corruption in Nigeria − one a civil 
society agency interested in preventing public procurement-related corruption and 
one representing the legal prosecutors of public procurement-related corruption in 
Nigeria.  
Selection of case studies for this study was predicated on the preliminary readings on 
the subject of corruption of public procurement in Nigeria, which indicated a 
significant incidence of reported corruption in relation to public procurement in the 
electric power sector in Nigeria; indeed, this was the sector that ranked highest in 
reported cases of public procurement related corruption (Awolusi, 2010). The 
preliminary readings also indicate weak corresponding efforts, guided by regulators 
and legal prosecutors, at fighting corruption proactively by way of review of policy 
and reactively by way of vigorous prosecution of public procurement-related 
corruption cases. This is indicative of a national resolve to fight public procurement-
related corruption in particular, which is reputed to be the medium through which 
funds meant for the execution of public projects intended to benefit the public is 
diverted by the few in positions of public trust for personal gain (Obayelu, 2007; 
Obuah, 2010a), hence the need to study the risk factors that may have left the 
process vulnerable to corruption. 
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The Rural Electricity Organisation was selected as one of the case studies because of 
its wide mandate for rural electrification-related public procurement using allocated 
public funds. Similarly, the Public Power Company, and indeed, the electric power 
sector in Nigeria which this represents, was selected based on findings from the 
preliminary readings which indicated endemic public procurement-related corruption 
in the sector alongside an immense investment of public funds allocated to improve 
the deplorable electric power situation in Nigeria (Adenikinju, 2003; Olu-Olu, 2006).  
Furthermore, two anti-corruption agencies, namely the Anti-Corruption Commission 
and the Public Procurement Organisation, were selected to feature among the case 
studies in order to generate data on current and past efforts aimed at fighting 
corruption in public expenditure in Nigeria. In addition to the four case studies 
visited during the substantive fieldwork, a supplementary phase of fieldwork was 
also conducted for the purpose of verifying and validating the findings from the 
substantive fieldwork. The supplementary fieldwork involved interviews with 
members of the Governance and Anti-Corruption Reform Organisation, with a 
Central Government procurement department and with a number of prosecutors of 
public procurement-related corruption cases in Nigeria.  
This research has shown that because of the importance of electricity to rural 
development in Nigeria, where less than 20% of electric power needs are presently 
being met, the rural electrification initiative has been planned to involve every rural 
area of the country. To remedy this (more than 80%) deficit in the ability of the 
infrastructure to supply the nation’s electric power needs, the government has 
allocated funds through annual budgetary provisions, the spending of which has been 
the leading source of various cases of public procurement-related corruption over the 
years (Nanka-Bruce, 2010). This enormous budgetary provision, which has been 
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dispensed through the public procurement process, is reputed to have continually 
increased in response to the desperate need for electric power to cope with the 
expanding developmental needs of the country (Ikeme and Ebohon, 2005; Okoro and 
Chikuni, 2007; National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b). This has given rise to a 
corresponding expansion in procurement activities in the rural electrification 
subsector but without any relative increase in provision of electricity to rural Nigeria.  
1.4.1 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. An indicative overview of the research is 
presented in this introductory chapter. Drawing on the background of the study and 
an initial review of the literature, the research aim and objectives were formulated 
and the research question was identified. Also in this introductory chapter, the 
research problem was articulated and the overarching philosophy of the study was 
presented. The research methodology employed for the study was outlined and its 
contribution to knowledge presented in addition to the summary of findings and 
contribution to practice. 
In order to ground the research within a sound theoretical foundation, chapter two 
provides a detailed review of relevant literature on the current state of the debate, 
ranging across issues of definition of corruption, the various strands of arguments on 
the subject of corruption and their common nexus in the Principle of Impartiality to 
the dynamics of corruption in the PPP. By critically examining the literature, the 
research problem, philosophy and methodology are further embedded in theory and 
refined to highlight the revealed gap in knowledge which this research has aimed to 
fill.  
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Chapter three presents a detailed discussion of the choice of the research 
methodology and the rationale through which the adopted research strategy, 
approach, data collection techniques and instruments of analysis are justified. The 
process of designing the research and a presentation on the criteria and process of 
selecting the case studies are also discussed in this chapter, along with the limitations 
of the research method and data collection techniques.  
In chapter four, the context of public procurement in Nigeria is examined. Specific 
issues relating to the stated research objectives and questions are identified and 
presented within the overarching purview of the legal and institutional frameworks 
of public procurement in Nigeria with regard to the Nigerian Public Procurement Act 
2007 and other regulations enacted to simplify or elaborate on specific sections of 
the 2007 Procurement Law.  
Chapter five presents the research findings and also contextualises these theoretically 
to elucidate their implications for the research aim, objectives and question. 
Furthermore, in chapter five, the findings of the research are summarised in order to 
bring out the salient issues regarding the study’s overall contribution to practice and 
knowledge and its implications for public policy. The findings of the research are 
discussed in chapter six. 
Chapter seven concludes the research. Distinctive policy measures and their 
implications for strengthening the PPP against the risk factors for corruption in the 
Nigerian context are also advocated. This concluding chapter to the research also 
draws from the theoretical contributions and practical applications to propose a 
corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list for the management of public 
procurement in Nigeria.  
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Literature review 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
There is growing academic interest in various aspects of the topic of corruption in 
relation to public procurement, with various schools of thought putting forward 
different perspectives to the argument. This chapter interrogates the various 
arguments with a view to identifying a gap in knowledge about the concept of 
corruption to be filled by this research; it also lends itself to defining and developing 
a holistic explanation of the current debates on corruption in relation to public 
procurement.  
2.1.1 Chapter outline 
This chapter is designed to provide a detailed review of theoretical arguments on the 
concept and meanings of corruption, starting with an exploration of the definition of 
the concept of corruption which reveals that the notion of wrong (partiality) is a 
common factor underpinning any definition of corruption (Kurer, 2005). The notion 
of wrong (corruption) in the context of public procurement is then explained in terms 
of the Principle of Impartiality (sections 2.2). This is followed by a review of the 
argument on corruption from the perspectives of various schools of thought. These 
provided a holistic understanding of the meaning and concept of corruption, which 
was then used to explore issues of corruption in public procurement, and is followed 
with a succinct summary in tabular form of the key themes of each section of the 
chapter, the outline content and the key references.  
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2.2 The conceptual framework 
In order to articulate the conceptual framework for the study, this chapter begins 
with the definition of the concept of corruption before exploring the concept through 
the framework of the Impartiality Principle (see section 2.2). Applying the 
Impartiality Principle, the debate on the concept of corruption is explored to 
highlight the deficiencies in the current body of literature and clearly demonstrate the 
gap in existing knowledge by explaining the concept and meaning of corruption in 
the context of the Impartiality Principle. The Impartiality Principle has been found to 
offer the potential to explain corruption from the perspectives of various academic 
debates and to use these to explain the associated risk factors that may have made the 
process of public procurement so vulnerable.  
It has been argued that the Impartiality Principle is the lens through which the 
weaknesses (risk factors) in the social contract of public trust vested in the public 
office – in this study, the public procurement process in Nigeria − can be studied to 
advance anti-corruption policy initiatives (Kurer, 2005). The latter will ensure that 
the process operates with greater transparency to deliver value for the public money 
allocated for the provision of public goods through the PPP.  
2.3 Corruption and Impartiality Principle 
As Jain (2001) stated, given that corruption is a social problem, the most challenging 
aspect for those studying it lies in the difficulty of articulating a working definition 
that captures its meanings. This difficulty has meant that corruption has been defined 
from various perspectives − through national laws (Van Roy, 1970; Jain, 2001); 
public perception (opinion) in the contexts of dishonesty (Colombatto, 2003), 
fraudulent or inequitable behaviours by those in power, typically involving the 
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bribery of public officers (Gardiner, 2002; Heidenheimer, 2002); and in terms of the 
impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principles in society (Philp, 1997; Gardiner, 
2002; Kurer, 2005). From the perspective of Van Roy (1970), it is the use of power, 
whether legitimate or illegitimate, to obtain profit, prestige or confer benefit on a 
person, class or group of people contrary to the applicable laws or standards of moral 
conduct expected of people in leadership positions. According to Tanzi (1998), 
corruption is the abuse of discretionary public power for private use, gain and 
benefit. In the public sector, corruption is said to have occurred when, in the course 
of exercising lawful authority, a government officer manipulates the allocation of 
rights and privileges in favour of some individuals and at the expense of others 
(Colombatto, 2003). In this regard, corruption is construed as encompassing 
transactions where persons constrained by a formal principal-agent relationship take 
advantage of the discretionary power incumbent on them to knowingly confer undue 
advantage to either themselves or to any third party.  
Furthermore, corruption has been explained by Heidenheimer (2002) to exist where 
public officers, in exercising public power or authority, reduce the cost of 
procurement of public services for some customers or contractors or inflate the cost 
at which services are procured by the state, albeit for compensation. What can be 
inferred from this example is the giving and taking of bribes in order to compromise 
extant rules that govern the procurement of specified public goods and services. In 
the context of the political process of nations, corruption involves violations of oaths 
of office which commit the officer to upholding the specific non-discriminatory 
norms governing access to the political process and the allocation of rights, 
privileges and resources within a given socio-political and economic system 
(Gardiner, 2002; Miller et al., 2005). 
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Furthermore, the public officer in receipt of a bribe typically accepts to undertake or 
forego certain official actions in return for compensatory consideration outside the 
remit of the prevailing contractual terms of employment (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Similarly, Compte et al. (2005) have argued that corruption is not the monopoly of 
the public sector. The private sector employee who violates the terms of their 
employment contract or the duties imposed by a fiduciary relationship is as culpable 
of corruption as is the power-abusing public sector employee (Argandoña, 2003; 
Colombatto, 2003). This shows that corruption, defined in its holistic sense, 
permeates society at large although manifesting differently across the public-private 
sector divide − a state of affairs with implications for the common good of society 
(Kurer, 2005). As a result, any research on the subject of corruption must define the 
concept in relation to the particular framework within which the research question is 
contextualised, and logically any research on corruption will thus depend heavily on 
the contextual definition it ascribes to the subject (Lambsdorff and Lambsdorff, 
2007).  
2.3.1 Types of Corruption 
Riley (1998), Doig (1999) and Doig et al. (2005) categorised corruption into petty or 
bureaucratic, grand or political, and systemic or endemic corruption. Explaining 
further, they said that while petty corruption alters the implementation of policies, as 
where civil servants circumvent the strict implementation of extant rules − for this 
study, procurement rules − in exchange for illicit petty financial rewards, by contrast 
grand corruption involves influencing the formulation of laws, regulation and 
policies by politicians and other high-profile officers such as permanent secretaries 
and directors, through such means as revoking licenses and permits or privatising 
public enterprises so as to favour their own interests in gaining economic monopoly 
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for illicit substantial financial rewards (Napal, 2006; Heston and Kumar, 2008; 
Kayrak, 2008).  
Systemic corruption, which is essentially the combination of petty and grand 
corruption and thereby characteristic of the corruption in the public procurement 
process in Nigeria, is said to exist when corruption is an integrated and essential 
aspect of the economic, social and political system (Ensor and Duran-Moreno, 2002; 
Stefes, 2007; Kenny and Søreide, 2008). It is the situation whereby the major 
institutions and processes, such as the procurement process of the state, are routinely 
dominated and used by corrupt civil servants and politicians to create a scenario in 
which most people have no alternative but to deal with corrupt officials (Doig and 
Riley, 1998; Doig, 1999; Doig et al., 2005).  
2.3.2 Impartiality Principle 
The notion of partiality (abuse of discretion) (Tanzi, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1998), which is identified as central to public procurement-related corruption  can be 
explained in terms of the Principle of Impartiality − a strong principle against any 
form of discrimination in the allocation of procurement opportunities made available 
to deserving individuals by the state (Keeley, 1995; Kurer, 2005). The principle 
hinges on the prescription that in allocating public opportunities, the existing rules 
must be followed strictly as laid down, so that none of the parties competing for 
public contract is given undue advantage over the others (Colombatto, 2003; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). Furthermore, the principle has been seen to relate to the 
subject of corruption, in the context of deviation from defined norms for the 
administration of public resources within a given system (Kurer, 2005; Rothstein and 
Teorell, 2008; Rothstein and Eek, 2009).  
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Furthermore, the state, in allocating public contract opportunities through the public 
procurement process, should treat equally those who deserve equal treatment so as 
not to create inequity (Kurer, 2005). This has brought to the fore the realisation that 
to promote transparency in the process of public procurement, none of the companies 
that qualify to bid through the Public Procurement Process (PPP) should be 
discriminated against through a PPP that is inequitable (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). 
Because the Impartiality Principle is founded in opposition to the idea of partiality 
and wrongdoing (Kurer, 2005), it has become a fairly universal concept for 
explaining corruption in relation to accountability, equity and transparency in the 
context of government business − for this research, the PPP (Colombatto, 2003; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2003; Kurer. 2005). Application of the Impartiality Principle to 
the study of corruption in the PPP in Nigeria therefore aims at identifying its risk 
factors in order to develop a corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list for the 
management of the public contract process to promote transparency, equity and 
accountability in the practice of public procurement in Nigeria.  
2.4 The debates on corruption 
The definitions of corruption explored in section 2.3 suggest that the debates on the 
concepts are multifarious, as opposed to being single and/or uniform. As Gillespie 
and Okruhlik (1991) argued, the difficulty in articulating the debate about corruption 
hinges on the variety of social conceptual frameworks within which corruption can 
be situated. Corruption is a social problem and so in articulating its conceptual 
underpinnings, two social research requirements must be satisfied (Bryman, 2009). 
These requirements, according to Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991), are the capacity to 
be cross-culturally generaliseable and to be sufficiently precise to make the concept 
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empirically useful. Over the years, the attempt to articulate a debate on corruption 
that meets these dual requirements of social research has proved controversial 
because different schools of thought have provided different perspective debates to 
the definitions (Elliott, 1997; Gatti, 2004).  
 
What constitutes corruption can be wide-ranging and also varies in different contexts 
(Keeley, 1995; Kurer, 2005). It is therefore important to explore the concept in terms 
of the Principle of Impartiality (see section 2.3.2) and its composites of wrongdoing 
and abuse of trust in order to determine activities that can be regarded as constituting 
corruption, notwithstanding the social, political or cultural context in which they 
may be situated (Kurer, 2005). In this regard, the historical work of Heidenheimer 
(1978), which variously explained corruption from the perspectives of public 
opinion, public office and public interest, and in which deviation from the norm is 
used as a determining principle, cannot be overemphasised. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a general consensus among researchers that corruption involves the 
misuse of public authority to derive private benefits (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991). 
However, because the question as to the criteria to be applied in determining when 
and how public authority is misused is still hotly contested, there is the need to 
conceptualise corruption in terms of a common denominator, such as the Impartiality 
Principle, that can characterise corruption however it is defined, and from the 
perspective of whatever school of thought (Kurer, 2005).  
 
Aidt et al. (2008) opined that many scholars have construed the meaning of 
corruption from the perspective of a violation of the legal codes through which the 
actions of public officers are regulated. The legal code criterion of this explanation 
makes it a fairly straightforward way to identify corruption. However, its public 
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sector bias means that it is inadequate to explain private sector corruption, and thus 
limited in exploring corruption in the public procurement process which 
encompasses both public and private sectors. Other scholars have also premised their 
explanation of corruption on broadly public grounds, basing it on either popular 
public opinion as to what constitutes a corrupt act, or on acts that breach the public 
interest (Otáhal, 2010). This leads the debate on corruption to hinge on an apparent 
breach of open market principles regarding the allocation of scarce resources. In 
articulating the debate on corruption, arguments of the various schools of thought are 
explored.  
 
The next sections explore analyses of the explanations of corruption provided by 
various schools of thought through the lens of the Impartiality Principle, with the 
aim of discovering their common features and their implications for the public 
procurement process. Ultimately the function of this review is to identify gaps in the 
existing body of literature that lead to the research question (‘What are the risk 
factors of corruption in the PPP?’) following which, the analysis of data from case 
studies can be synthesised for appropriate policy recommendations to justify the 
research aim and objectives and also to answer research question for the promotion 
of a regime of transparency, and obviate the negative externalities of public 
procurement-related corruption for the Nigerian people. 
2.4.1 The normative debate 
The normative debate according to Li et al. (2008) views corruption from the 
perspective of deviations from acceptable social norms. Norms are (often implicit) 
standards set for members of a society to conform to and deviations from them will 
attract informal sanctions from other members of society (Kirsch, 2003). Even 
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though such deviations may not attract formal sanctions from the state, informal 
sanctions serve to make violations of moral codes of behaviour repugnant in society 
(Ocampo, 2000; Everett et al., 2006). It is important to understand the normative 
nature of corruption and how efforts to resist it can evolve to become part of the 
norms in the society and this can in turn develop into legal codes that can be 
enforced against offending individuals. As Luo (2005) further emphasised, even 
though violations of social norms do not attract state sanctions, they form societal 
mores that can be coded into law and enforced against erring members.   
 
It is important to consider the impact of constantly changing political environments 
and to consider this in relation to the normative construction of corruption in society 
and the implications of this for the fight against official corruption − as seen in the 
public procurement process (Marong, 2001). Furthermore, the political landscape in 
a country determines not only the emphasis that a particular normative definition of 
corruption will impose, but also has implications for the possibility of its being 
encrypted into official or legal codes, violation of which can attract state sanctions 
(Khan, 1996; Marong, 2001). The above analysis shows that normative connotations 
play an overarching role in determining what behaviours can evolve to become a 
coded corrupt act capable of attracting state sanctions (Windsor and Getz, 2000).  
 
The normative connotations of corruption can be viewed either as deviations from 
expected behaviour in a manner that is contrary to societal morality or actions that 
harm the public interest (Khan, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). While behaviours 
constituting deviations from ethical codes are regarded as contrary to accepted mores 
and frowned upon by society, those that harm societal interests are seen as highly 
improper and attract legitimate criticism (Granovetter, 2005). Both kinds of 
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deviations from ethical norms, whose consequence is harm to the public interest, are 
lacking in strict definitions and so cannot be clearly identified in every case for the 
purpose of prescribing punitive measures (Windsor and Getz, 2000; Warren, 2001). 
As Granovetter (2005) further posited, ethical norms given statutory codifications 
take on the status of legal prescriptions, the violation of which attracts state sanctions. 
2.4.2 The cognitive debate 
According to Granovetter (2005), societal institutions have cognitive characteristics 
which symbolise their business ethics. These characteristics are rules, gestures, 
cultural values and operational frameworks that underpin the way transactions are 
conducted (Li et al., 2008; Webb et al., 2009). The cognitive values that define 
acceptable behaviours for the conduct of organisational business could be framed in 
such a way as to discourage corruption (Messick and Tenbrunsel, 1996; Fisher and 
Lovell, 2008). However, research has shown that organisational rules may also be 
framed in such a way that corruption is inherently permitted as a matter of 
organisational ethics (Grieger, 2005; Webb et al., 2009). Institutional rules can also 
be framed in a way that imposes inordinate obligations on employees who become 
bound to them through their employment (Jain, 2001). In this regard, individuals 
within organisations could engage in acts of corruption not only for their personal 
benefit, but also for the benefit of the organisation (Rose-Ackerman, 2002).  
 
As Moore (2008) explained, the hiring of foreign sales agents to pay bribes to 
potential institutional customers has been a very productive corrupt practice for 
many companies seeking to gain and maintain large market shares internationally to 
further their global expansion drive. This tendency is seen in the Siemens and 
Halliburton bribery case in Nigeria and illustrates how international companies are 
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able to engage a global syndicate of agents to bribe potential customers across 
national borders (Kim and Molleda, 2005; George and Lacey, 2006b). It was 
revealed that the company, through its international agents, secured very profitable 
oil and gas contracts in Nigeria in return for bribing willing Nigerian officials (Geo-
Jala and Mangum, 2000; Schubert and Miller, 2008b). One of the senior executives 
is reported as saying: 
“... from 2002 to 2006 I oversaw an annual bribery budget of about $40 
million to $50 million at Siemens. Company managers and sales staff used the 
slush fund to cosy up to corrupt government officials worldwide. The 
payments, he says, were vital to maintaining the competitiveness of Siemens 
overseas, particularly in his subsidiary, which sold telecommunications 
equipment. It was about keeping the business unit alive and not jeopardizing 
thousands of jobs overnight.” 
 (Schubert and Miller, 2008, p.3). 
From this perspective, the cognitive debate sees corruption as unethical actions 
undertaken or endorsed to advance organisational interests, which may or may not 
directly advance the interests of the individuals undertaking them − hence the need 
for overt institutional policies that promote transparency (Ayres et al., 2007; Moore, 
2008).  
2.4.3 Institutional debate 
From the perspective of the institutional debate, the interactive influence of cultural 
and organisational institutions in society has been shown to have effects on the 
prevalence of corruption (Li et al., 2008; Aidt, 2009). According to this debate, 
corruption is a normative concept construed in terms of a qualitative departure from 
32 
 
the state of being pristine to the state of being bad or corrupted in relation to the 
cultural parameters of the society in question (Robbins, 2000; Lambsdorff and 
Lambsdorff, 2007).  
 
In this regard, the term corruption is associated with decay in societal norms which 
when applied to social institutions such as states, companies and schools or to 
processes such as procurement and electioneering processes, connotes dissonance 
with folkways of central importance accepted without question and embodying the 
fundamental moral views of a group which serve as compelling guides for individual 
and corporate conduct (Theobald, 2002; Aidt et al., 2008). Based on this, the 
institutional debate has maintained that the term corruption describes any transaction 
that is normatively viewed as bad or falling short of society’s moral expectations − 
making their standpoint congruent with the Impartiality Principle (wrongdoing/abuse 
of trust) explanation of corruption (Robbins, 2000; Kurer, 2005).  
 
The thrust of the argument of this debate is that concepts do not exist independent of 
social systems such as public or private organisations, the family and religious 
institutions (Li et al., 2008). By this reasoning, corruption is the result of inequitable 
institutional interactions within or across social systems (Johnston, 1998; 
Heidenheimer, 2002), the result of which is inequity in the manner in which 
opportunities are distributed amongst equally deserving members. The crux of the 
institutional theory arguments relate to the processes through which social 
institutions influence the activities of organisations in society and the effects these 
may have on the possible effects on corruption at the societal level (Collier, 2002).  
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The rule-based regulatory framework, and normative and cognitive process aspects 
of social institutions, depicted by the institutional theorists as overarching in the 
study of institutional corruption, have been variously argued as distinctively 
evolving while at the same time interacting to produce a chain of activities that 
explain varying scales of corruption in various institutional settings (Li et al., 2008). 
2.4.4 Regulatory framework debate 
The regulatory framework debate is an offshoot of the institutional construction of 
the explanation of corruption that derives from the fact that there is a regulatory 
framework, based on legal rules that govern the way in which the business of 
particular institutions is conducted (Damania et al., 2004; Li et al., 2008). While the 
framework prescribes behaviours expected of people vested with the responsibility 
of administering the resources of an organisation through defined processes like the 
public procurement process, it also outlines punishments for behaviours that fall 
short of the framework which are enforced by coercive sanctions of government 
(Cameron et al., 2009). In general, public procurement activities in social institutions 
around the world are designed to operate within defined regulatory frameworks 
meant to check organisational corruption (Li et al., 2008).  
 
To promote equity, the government prescribes various legal frameworks for 
regulating various different aspects of institutions and in particular, the means 
through which they procure goods and services and vice versa (Méon and Weill, 
2010). In order to avoid sanctions, organisations that operate within this framework 
must conform to its stipulations in the conduct of their business. This approach 
advances the breach of a recognised regulatory framework as the defining feature of 
corruption.  
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2.4.5 The organisational corruption debate 
The organisational debate on corruption argues that at the societal level, the 
prevalence of organisational corruption depends on the adequacy of the regulatory 
frameworks and the strictness with which they are observed by the organisations 
operating within them (Luo, 2005). Luo (2005) further argued that corruption is 
driven by organisations that set out to compromise public officials so that they can 
operate outside set regulatory frameworks. Luo (2005)’s explanation hinges on the 
strict observance of anti-corruption framework prescriptions for organisations as the 
panacea for corruption in the face of the competition that arises from the distribution 
of public opportunities through the public procurement process (Findlay and Stewart, 
1991; Gregory, 1995b; Fijnaut et al., 2002). According to Ashforth et al. (2008), 
organisational corruption exists mostly due to profit-driven private and public 
organisations that offer inducements to public officers in order to obtain illicit 
advantage. The authors further explained that organisations in search of illicit 
advantages can be motivated to compromise public officers by offering bribes to 
secure illicit advantages in specific procurement-related transactions − a major 
propensity in the growth and spread of institutional corruption which is becoming 
difficult to eradicate.  
 
Furthermore, the prevalence of corruption within organisations in a society can be a 
reflection of the extent of corruption (Sanyal and Samanta, 2002; Schmidt, 2007), 
especially in third world countries where institutional corruption has been said to be 
partly the result of a cumbersome regulatory bureaucratic system that makes it 
difficult to do business transparently (Transparency International, 2011). It is stated 
that a regulatory environment that imposes unnecessary barriers to business 
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development makes it possible for officials to actively engage in rent-seeking based 
on the corruption opportunities generated. Similarly, Luo (2005) explained that 
uncertainties in national regulatory environments, making it difficult or impossible 
for businesses to obtain the permits and other necessary approvals to enable them to 
operate legally, are an incentive for firms to engage in corruption. 
 
According to Rodriguez et al. (2005), by making laws and regulations for the 
establishment of appropriate institutional frameworks, governments not only 
influence but also dictate the pace of anti-corruption activities in the economy. 
Governments, through appropriate agencies, set the rules that govern their 
procurement process (Erridge and Greer, 2002). Similarly, Kaufmann (1998) has 
said that government rules and institutional frameworks such as the procurement 
process are intended solely for the public benefit, but their implementation has often 
been beset by the underhand presence of corruption which has operated to undermine 
the essence of policy and made it open to abuse for private gain at the expense of 
wider society.   
 
Furthermore, institutional corruption weakens the capacity of institutional 
frameworks to reward merit by awarding public contracts to the most competent 
bidders through the public procurement process (Søreide, 2002). The implications of 
this are that the merit and competence envisaged in the public procurement process 
(Sanchez Graells, 2013; Molina, 2010) are set aside so that the rights and privileges 
emanating from the procurement process are channelled to unmerited organisations 
in exchange for bribes. The proponents of this debate on corruption, who pivot the 
reason for corruption on the compromise of public institutions and/or public officers, 
submit that where these exist, efficient and innovative individuals and organisations 
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are left without any alternative to corruption in seeking contracts and other forms of 
patronage that the state can offer (Tanzi, 1998).  
 
Similarly, Luo (2005) has also argued that a weak organisational environment is an 
incentive to corruption. He further explained that weak institutional environments for 
public procurement, coupled with loose procedural and administrative control 
structures, make the business environment prone to corrupt exploitation. Therefore 
strengthening institutions and providing an operational environment that makes 
abuse of discretion difficult, as Li et al. (2008) stated, can provide a preventative to 
corruption in the context of the regulatory framework of public procurement. 
Ensuring this would make it difficult for public procurement-related discretion to be 
abused in exchange for bribes and other acts of patronage (Wei-dong, 2006).  
 
Political and administrative leadership synergy is needed so that institutional 
structures can constantly evolve in response to dynamics in the procurement process 
that predispose it to corruption (Vann, 2011). As proposed by Xin and Rudel 
(2004b), strengthening institutional environments within which the task of public 
procurement is conducted is a prerequisite for ensuring transparency and maintaining 
integrity, so that the processes are strengthened against partiality.  
2.4.6 The threshold effects debate 
It has been asserted that strengthening state institutions by instilling transparency in 
the processes by which government regulates the economy can be an effective means 
of combating corruption (Lindstetd and Naurin, 2006). This assertion, which has 
been widely researched, has been helpful in articulating the problem in terms of risk 
factors that may have predisposed the public procurement process to corruption 
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(Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2005). Similarly, an absence of uniformity (impartiality) in 
the application of the concept of transparency across social, economic and political 
space has been suggested to have implications for the public procurement process 
that it begets (Bobonis and CÃ, 2011). This is because a socio-political system that 
may have emerged from an electoral process that is not free and fair cannot be seen 
to guarantee equality of the opportunities existing in the political space, which are 
often distributed through the process of public procurement (Freille et al., 2007).  
 
It has been argued that transparency signifies the absence of corruption, while the 
lack of it is synonymous with corruption (Yehoue, 2007). This theory has, however, 
been criticised as very misleading, because as Lindstetd and Naurin (2006) 
explained, just making information available or making people aware of the 
processes involved in the conduct of government business cannot in itself prevent 
corruption if inherent risk factors that may result in advantages being conferred upon 
persons inequitably are not identified and dealt with.  
 
In addition to the popular concept of transparency as a prerequisite for all efforts at 
combating systemic corruption (Lambsdorff and Lambsdorff, 2007), identifying the 
risk factors that may make the public procurement process lack impartiality can 
ensure that corruption, however construed, can be identified and dealt with 
(Marquette, 2003; Langseth, 2006). Lindstetd and Naurin (2006) further explain that 
the availability of information about government business cannot be of value in any 
effort towards fighting corruption unless specific risk factors, which can be exploited 
to confer improper advantages on predetermined bidders for government contracts 
administered through the procurement process, are identified and eliminated. It 
therefore follows that the importance of risk factors that predispose the procurement 
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process to corrupt exploitation are as important as the need to make the conduct of 
government business transparent.  
 
Furthermore, Ribadu (2006a) has argued that not identifying and dealing with 
corruption risk factors can provide an explanation of why, in Nigeria, the 
implementation of the transparency agenda alone has not mitigated the growing 
problem of corruption, especially in the public procurement process. Expanding his 
argument further, he states that even though elaborate measures aimed at achieving 
transparency have been implemented for the procurement process in Nigeria, 
corruption still features prominently meaning that the effectiveness of transparency 
as a stand-alone device for fighting corruption has been overstated, hence the need to 
ensure that the Principle of Impartiality is also embedded in the process.  
2.4.7 The Principal-Agent debate 
The Principal-Agency debate on corruption is a general concept of social relations 
involving the delegation of authority in such a way that generally results in problems 
of control (Kiser, 1999). The theory has been applied to a broad range of substantive 
contexts where the concept of delegated authority can lead to the abuse of discretion 
(Shapiro, 2005b). In the classical social contract context typical of the public 
procurement process, the theory explains the social contract imposed by the fiduciary 
relationship between the procurement officer (agent) and the principal (Gregory, 
1995a; Shapiro, 2005a). The agent in a fiduciary relationship has a certain role and 
responsibilities, going beyond which would mean engaging in partiality (Damania et 
al., 2003b). It therefore follows that setting procedural guidelines transparently in 
terms that instil impartiality is a necessary check on the agent in the agency 
relationship (Archer, 1996; Gutner, 2005).  
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A key responsibility of the agent in a process such as public procurement is the need 
to maintain confidentiality so that none of the bidders is conferred any advantage 
over the others (Pierce Jr, 1989; Shapiro, 2005b). Management of all the 
stakeholders in the delegated authority has become an ethically-based principle for 
approaching issues of agency contracts between the agent and the principal or the 
stakeholders who delegated authority (Miller, 2002; Miller et al., 2005). The 
impartial agent, in fulfilling their fiduciary duties, will in addition to not taking 
personal profit, also ensure that the weak and vulnerable as well as the strong and 
mighty are treated equally in the procurement process (Kiser, 1999; Marens and 
Wicks, 1999).  
 
As Hill and Jones (1992) also argued, an important point in agency debate is seen to 
be its focus on the ways principals try to ensure that their agents are not inequitable 
in the exercise of the power delegated to them. From these analyses, the key issue of 
agency relations is how to ensure that after delegating authority, which can be used 
to administer public procurement; it is not used in a way that promotes inequity-
partiality.  
2.4.8 The state capture debate 
State capture is defined as the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules that 
govern the processes leading up to the award of government contracts (Søreide, 
2002). According to Makkai and Braithwaite (1992), this debate explores the 
relationship between regulatory agencies and the business environment in which they 
conduct their regulatory functions and looks at why they have persistently been beset 
by corruption (Hellman et al., 2000; Damania et al., 2003a).  
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A new element to the long-held view of the agency debate explained in section 2.4.7. 
is the notion that the activities of agents who abuse delegated authority for personal 
profit can be exposed by identifying the vulnerabilities (risk factors) in the agency 
relationship and by involving vocal advocacy groups through aggressive 
investigative journalism to monitor and report abuse (Boehm and Olaya, 2006). This, 
Boehm and Olaya (2006) argued, will expose the inherent corrupt activities towards 
which they may have deployed the authority delegated to them (Priest, 1993; Boehm, 
2007a).  
 
Furthermore, there are circumstances in which organisations may resort to desperate 
measures to evade economic policy aimed at ensuring that undue advantage is not 
conferred on one organisation over others (Sherman, 1980; Boehm, 2007b). Taking 
this argument further, Boehm (2007a) has suggested that under cumbersome and 
ambiguous administrative procedures, business organisations will seek to evade 
regulations through a number of means. They may do this by resorting to offering 
bribes to local inspectors, and other officers vested with the responsibility of 
enforcing relevant regulations to ensure that they do their business in accordance 
with established rules and regulations (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2006; Pesic, 
2007). Some very influential businesses have also actively resorted to lobbying high-
level government officials in order to resist or frustrate policies aimed at identifying 
the risk factors that will ensure that through transparency, corruption becomes 
difficult to perpetrate (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2006).  
 
The tendency of businesses to engage in desperate efforts to compromise officers of 
government and by extension wriggle out of state regulations, such as tax regimes 
aimed at promoting accountability and social justice, is greater in contexts of 
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administrative, political and social instability (Steves et al., 2003; Haarhuis and 
Torenvlied, 2006). Similarly, Boehm (2007a) has said that in politically unstable 
regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance with relevant 
regulations aimed at promoting transparency are weak. Taking his argument further, 
he said that in such countries, including Nigeria and Mexico, corruption is more 
pervasive because compliance with regulations is more difficult to accomplish and as 
a result, companies go the extra mile to evade the official procedures through 
corruption.  
 
Corruption caused by ‘state capture’4-style influence has been shown to produce the 
consequence that some companies are conferred undue advantages over others 
(Hellman et al., 2000). In this way, companies that have established inordinately 
close relationships with the state acquire a legacy of influence which enables them to 
enjoy more privileges of access to public space − the consequence of which is 
improper competitive advantage over other companies that have limited access and 
influence (Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Lambsdorff and Lambsdorff, 2007). 
2.4.9 Implications for this study 
Following the definitions and explanation of the types of corruption presented in 
section 2.3 and the detailed exploration of the debates in 2.4, the concepts of 
corruption as a social problem have been variously explained to mean: the use of 
power for personal gain (Van Roy, 1970); abuse of discretionary public power for 
private benefit (Tanzi, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998); and the exercise of lawful 
                                                          
4
  Corruption being so endemic as to influence state/government policies (Hellman, J.S., Jones, G. and 
Kaufmann, D. (2000) 'Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption and influence in 
transition', World.) 
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authority to influence the allocation of rights and privileges in favour of some 
predetermined individuals at the expense of others (Colombatto, 2003). 
In relation to public procurement as defined in sections 1.1 and 1.2, corruption is the 
appropriation of public goods for private use, in violation of the extant rules
5
 
(Søreide, 2002). In Nigeria, ‘corruption is an act which results in any right, interest, 
title or privilege being illegitimately conferred on any person’ (National Assembly 
Nigeria, 2000 ) and in the context of public procurement, corruption means: 
“offering, giving, or promising to give, directly or indirectly, to any officer or 
employee of an Procuring Entity or other governmental/private authority or any 
individual a gratuity in any form, an employment or any other thing or service of 
value, as an inducement with respect to an act or decision of, or method 
following by, a procuring Entity in connection with the procurement 
proceeding.” 
(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e).  
Common to all the definitions of corruption presented above is the notion of 
misappropriation (abuse of discretion) (Kurer, 2005); therefore, the term 
corruption for this study is defined as ‘partiality and/or abuse of power to profit 
in exercise of public procurement-related discretion’ as encapsulated in the 
Impartiality Principle (Tanzi, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998) (see Section 2.3.2). 
The relationship between the various schools of thought on corruption has been 
presented in diagrammatic format in figure 1.  
 
                                                          
5
 Existing rules guiding public procurement. 
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As shown in Figure 1 above, central to all the theories of corruption reviewed is the 
notion of discrimination and distributive justice upon which the Principle of 
Impartiality (explained in section 2.3.3) is based. The perceived and actual 
advantages derived by companies which enjoy a state capture-style of influence 
means that they would as a matter of policy want to entrench it in the processes 
through which public contracts are awarded (Lenhoff, 1954). This would mean that 
if left unchecked, it would become an acceptable informal practice that other 
companies and new entrants would resort to as a survival strategy in order to gain 
access to the opportunities inherent in public procurement (Huther and Shah, 2000; 
Kpundeh, 2004; Kaufmann, 2005).  
2.5 Corruption and public procurement 
 
Public procurement has been described as being particularly susceptible to 
corruption involving abuse of power for personal profit due to the high amounts of 
money involved (Keeley, 1995; Søreide, 2002; Glenn et al., 2007). According to 
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Thai (2001), in spite of efforts by governments and development agencies around the 
world towards improving the practice of public procurement, there has nevertheless 
been a dearth of academic research in this field. Existing studies show that 
corruption in public procurement has been mainly through abuses of the prescribed 
procurement processes, perpetrated by procurement officers themselves, for personal 
profit or for the benefit of other predetermined individuals (Konstantin et al., 2006). 
For example, Glenn et al. (2007) posited that given the amount of money involved, 
public procurement is characterised by extreme competition between bidding 
companies − a situation that leads them resort to corruption to win the contract. 
 
In relation to the public procurement process, a number of risk factors have been 
identified as capable of leading it to fail the test of impartiality (Doig, 1995; Kurer, 
2005). These risk factors, according to Kurer (2005), Aidt (2003), Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2008), and Rothstein and Eek (2009), range from government involvement 
in the open market; weak institutional capacity and absence of competition; over-
regulation of private activity; expanded public procurement and poor remuneration 
of civil servants; to compromise of confidential information. 
2.5.1 Government and the open market 
Certain forms of government involvement in transactions in open or private sector 
markets are regarded as capable of generating corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). In many developing countries, corruption in the form of bribery 
for public contract assignment thrives because the practice is so entrenched and 
endemic that it seems to be the normal thing to do in order to get a contract from the 
public sector (Besley and Burgess, 2002). As argued by Aidt (2003), it is a widely 
held view in these countries that losing a contract because another company bribed 
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the officials to get the contract is frustrating, and leads to the fear that a company 
which continues to lose out in the competition leading up to the award of contracts in 
this way will face the prospect of being driven out of business in the long run. As a 
result, many companies are prepared to resort to paying bribes to officials charged 
with the responsibility of administering the public contract process.  
 
The situation where many companies are prepared to resort to bribing officials in a 
bid to win a contract that probably only one of them might win means that the 
respective companies come to pay bribes as a matter of company policy. The net 
effect of this is that all companies involved in the bidding, except the one that 
eventually wins the contract, make a financial loss (Bardhan, 1997). Furthermore, 
this creates a situation where even though all the companies would be better off not 
paying bribes, they still pay, because of the assumption that if they do not pay or do 
not pay enough, others’ bribes, or the amount that others are prepared to bribe, will 
mean they do not get the contract (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). The 
implications of this for both the companies and the public contract administration 
process are negative.  
 
The majority of companies that get involved in bribery campaigns for contracts do 
not win the contract and inevitably loose the bribe money (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 
2008). Similarly, the contract price is inflated because the companies that pay bribes 
in order to achieve the award of public contracts will inevitably set their price so as 
to recoup the bribe money in addition to making a profit from the contract sum, in 
order to remain in business. The result is a worsening economic environment and 
social pressure on otherwise non-corrupt companies to succumb to corruption.   
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2.5.2 Weak institutions 
Political commitment and strong institutional capacity are central to the success of 
anti-corruption reforms (Morrissey, 1995). Where institutional capacity is weak, 
corruption can be perpetrated by circumventing the stated process of allocating 
public goods and services in favour of a select few, at the expense of the interest of 
the greater majority of the people (Hellman et al., 2000). The effect of weak 
regulatory institutions has always been that the bigger companies, in particular, are 
able to engage in wholesale bribery of the bureaucracy, as was the case in the 
Siemens and Halliburton bribe-for-contract cases (Sidhu, 2009; Lewis, 2010). In 
these two cases of corruption, multinational companies were able to take advantage 
of weak institutional capacity in the public procurement process to engage in 
elaborate schemes of bribery for contracts in a way that gave them a spiralling 
competitive advantage over other companies that bid against them for the contracts 
(George and Lacey, 2006a).  
2.5.3 Excessive control of private activity 
According to Collier (2000), the main reason for the increase in cases of corruption 
in many African countries is the rise in opportunities for engaging in corruption. He 
further argued that over-regulation of private activity by the public authority is one 
of the main sources of official corruption in Africa. When private activities are 
subjected to lengthy bureaucratic procedures that make it very difficult to obtain the 
necessary government authorisation needed to operate legally, the tendency will be 
for private businesses to seek to bribe their way through (Collier and Gunning, 
1999).  
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In some instances the processes are not only cumbersome, they are also unclear and 
it could take genuine private sector organisations an unnecessarily long period of 
time to obtain permits and licences which they need in order to engage in business 
(Collier, 2000; Collier and Gunning, 1999). As Ikejiofor (2009) illustrated, the 
processes for obtaining building plan approval in Nigeria are not only cumbersome, 
they are designed in such a way that it is almost impossible to advance through them 
without giving some kind of inducement to officials. The author further observed 
that just like the processes for obtaining other government permits, all the stages 
from the initial inquiry to the main application are designed in such a way that 
without bribing officials, it could take up to a decade for a single approval to be 
obtained. On the other hand he said that companies that bribe their way through 
obtain the necessary approvals within weeks of commencing the process; the 
implication being that organisations that want to avoid bureaucratic delay in the 
approval process are pressurised into bribery and corruption in a bid to obtain 
approval quickly and by extension remain in business.   
 
It has been argued that in an over-regulated business environment, corruption may 
positively contribute to growth and development (Méon and Sekkat, 2005). This is 
because it avoids the consequences in terms of delays in an over-regulated business 
environment, characterised by a defective bureaucracy that tends to freeze up 
processes for businesses that operate a corruption-free policy. However, corruption 
entered into in order to get through the very difficult administrative realities in a 
bureaucracy inevitably creates and reinforces further inefficiencies, which can only 
make an already bad regulatory framework worse. Furthermore, although bribery in 
a difficult and unpredictable regulatory environment may have the apparent benefit 
of enabling businesses to obtain the necessary permits and licences, it may also 
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impose additional costs, which have an impact on the final cost of providing services 
(Méon and Sekkat, 2005). The explanation above shows that the business 
environment that is burdened with over-regulation and an unpredictable bureaucracy 
has the potential to drive business firms into bribery as a coping strategy. 
2.5.4 Expansion in procurement activities 
Public sector corruption has been associated with the relative growth in public sector 
procurement activities in the past four decades in Africa (Collier, 2000; Basheka, 
2008). Corruption in the public procurement process spans the pre- and post-tender 
stages of public procurement (Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1999; Iossa and Martimort, 
2011). Corruption at the pre-tender and tender stages in public procurement consists 
of a deliberate act of compromise of the guidelines and rules governing the tendering 
process, with the aim of securing a predetermined result. It has the effect of eliciting 
various reactive measures aimed at combating it (Kenny et al., 2007; Osei-Tutu et 
al., 2010).  
 
Post-tender corruption − which involves the payment of bribe money variously as a 
‘kick back’ (bribe for award of contract), either directly to the officials involved in 
the administration of the procurement process or through proxies in fulfilment of 
illicit promises made in the run-up to the award of the relevant procurement 
contracts − is an issue that has remained almost unexplored (Martin, 1997; Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, 2006; Larmour, 2007). It is therefore 
important for this research to study the relationship between the pre-tender, tender 
and post-tender stages in the public procurement process so as to isolate the inherent 
risk factors that can predispose the process to corrupt exploitation.  
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2.5.5 Violation of procurement rules 
The manipulation of set guidelines for public procurement in favour of a specific 
bidder over other bidders is a major problem of accountability in the public 
procurement process (Søreide, 2002). The violation of the rules guiding the 
administration of the procurement process can be crafted in such a way that the 
impropriety will be concealed and the bidding process will seem to have been 
genuinely conducted in accordance with extant rules (Yukins, 2006). Exercise of 
discretionary powers to invite tenders from the pool of would-be bidders must be 
subjected to oversight checks and balances to avoid abuse by those mandated to 
discharge such powers.  
 
According to Basheka (2008), in order to ensure that the companies that offered 
bribes win the contract, the officers in charge of the procurement process are in the 
habit of limiting the number of bids they invite. In addition, they also ensure that the 
complete body of information relevant to a successful bid is only made available to 
the favoured company, to the disadvantage of the other bidders. Furthermore, 
restrictions placed on the time allowed for potential bidders to submit bids also 
provide a potential opportunity for the process to be compromised (Søreide, 2002). 
For example, information might be given to the preferred company well before it is 
made officially available to other bidders, who are constrained in the quality of their 
submission by the short time given to respond with a bid (Ekpenkhio, 2003). In 
scenarios like this, it would appear to all extents and purposes that the bidding 
process has provided a level playing ground for the bidding companies (Caroli, 
2006). This may not be the case, because implicitly those companies that have 
compromised the officers in charge through the payment of bribes or other 
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inducements could have apparently been given the information long before it became 
officially available to other bidders. 
2.5.6 Compromise of confidential information 
Public officials in possession of information which, if made available to private 
business concerns, could enhance their competitive advantage over other companies, 
are a potential source of corruption, especially if the information is relevant to 
procurement activities that have not been made public. The person in whose hands 
confidential information is vested could also be given discretionary powers regarding 
how that information is used in relation to processes such as the public procurement 
process (Golden and Chang, 2001; Della Porta and Vannucci, 2007). Scenarios like 
this, according to Søreide (2002), expose the affected officials to the temptation of 
using their special knowledge as a source of rent-seeking activities. If appropriate 
checks and balances are not in place, confidential information could be offered for a 
fee to firms who seek to acquire improper competitive advantage over would-be 
competitors in the run-up to a competitive bidding process.   
2.6 Corruption and Nigeria 
As explained in section 2.3, corruption is the misuse of a position of authority 
whether legitimate or not, for personal gain (Doh et al.,, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993; Tanzi, 1998; Kurer, 2005). In Nigeria, corruption is an act which results in any 
right, interest, title or privilege being illegitimately conferred on any person 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2000 ) and in the context of public procurement in 
Nigeria, corruption is any action or behaviour calculated to vitiate the public 
procurement process to influence the selection of beneficiaries of  public contracts 
for the supply of goods and services (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e).  
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Ufere (2005) argued that the problem of corruption is not only endemic in public 
procurement in Nigeria, but that it is mainly perpetrated by two set of actors − the 
procurement officers and their private sector collaborators who benefit from 
contracts granted through the procurement process. Explaining further, he stated that 
narratives of corruption in the Nigerian procurement process demonstrate how 
private companies that survive only or mostly on government contracts deliberately 
create the enabling environment for corruption. They do this by subverting the 
formal procurement process, offering bribes in either cash or kind to public officials 
in exchange for the award of contracts, with the sole aim of making inequitable 
private gains from public procurement.  
Arguing further, Ufere (2010) stated that corruption in the Nigerian public 
procurement process has two sides to it. The demand-side, which is represented by 
the government officials that have procurement responsibilities, and the supply-side 
represented by the private sector contractors who would offer money, gifts or other 
inducements in order to influence the decisions of the procurement officer.  
Furthermore, the demand-side of corruption in the public procurement process is 
exemplified in two stages: firstly, petty, low-level corruption where junior officers 
demand money from contractors before doing their various duties such as giving out 
of information pertaining to a particular procurement activity, and secondly, at the 
strategic level where senior government officials demand bribes in order to influence 
the award of contract administered through the public procurement process to the 
contractor or even out-rightly causing appropriated public funds to the contractor, in 
which case they would share according to an agreed percentage (Adewunmi, 2011; 
Ufere, 2010).  
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Furthermore, Dike (2008), after examining data on procurement related corruption in 
Nigeria, concluded that corruption in the process is the product of a complex and 
recursive interplay between skilled agents of private firms and the hierarchy of the 
public procurement process, with the aim of manipulating the process in favour of a 
pre-determined firm from among the firms competing for a particular contract 
administered through the procurement process.  
 
Corruption is a major problem with global ramifications and is manifest throughout 
the development process (Tanzi, 1998; Transparency International, 2010). In 
Nigeria, corruption has been linked to public office holders who misappropriate 
public funds for private use through the conduit of the public procurement process 
(Ajayi and Abdulkareem, 2010). The return of Nigeria to democratic governance in 
1999 raised national consciousness about the problem of public procurement-related 
corruption (Fagbadebo, 2007). As a result, two commissions, namely the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission ( EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices 
and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), were formed by act of the Nigerian 
National Assembly and given clear mandate to fight corruption in all its 
ramifications in the country (National Assembly Nigeria, 2000; National Assembly 
Nigeria, 2004).  
According to Harvey (2009), in Europe the scale of corruption has been generally 
reported with a sensationally zealous underpinning. However, in Nigeria, reporting 
corruption has focused mainly on the large amount of money involved, greed as its 
motivation and the methods adopted for hiding its proceeds but failing to examine 
the source of it, which is traceable to the public procurement process (Tanzi, 1998; 
Ajayi and Abdulkareem, 2010; Transparency International, 2010).  
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2.7 Research question and gap highlighted 
This review of the literature highlighted the research question – what are the risk 
factors of corruption in the Nigerian PPP? – by examining a range of debates on 
corruption. These debates lead to an attempt at an explanation for the corruption 
which arises in the process of public procurement between government officials 
(procurement officers) and organised private sector operators. It also reveals the 
propensity of procurement officers for corruption by way of deliberate compromise 
of extant procurement rules for private gain. Contractors, in their desperate bid to 
outplay one another to achieve lucrative government contracts, have also deliberately 
created the demand (opportunity) for corruption, an opportunity which the 
procurement officers have always taken advantage of by stage-managing the 
procurement process so that the contractor pre-determined by them is eventually 
awarded the contract.  
 
Another notable outcome of the review of literature is the identification of Ufere’s 
(2010) and Adewunmi’s (2001) findings that numerous managers in private 
companies seeking government contracts in Nigeria had designed corruption 
strategies and made the decisions to pay bribes. Developing their findings further, 
the authors identified three behaviours which they argue can be seen to be 
responsible for the deliberate drive by private companies and their managers to 
corruptly induce procurement officers to award their companies contracts 
administered through the procurement process.  
 
Firstly, they identified choice behaviour, which describes the actions of private 
company executives as they relate to deliberate bribery decisions and the choice of a 
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delivery mechanism through which they deliver bribes to government officials. The 
second is the capture behaviour. This relates to a proactive and deliberate initiation 
of bribery by the private company management, who generates corruption 
opportunities which they use as bait to compromise those government officials who 
make procurement decisions. The third reason is that of consent by private 
companies to devise corruption strategies to compromise the procurement officers 
and by extension, the public procurement process, because they depend solely on 
government contracts to remain in business. 
 
From the analysis above, it is clear that corruption, contextualised from the 
perspectives of the institution, the threshold effect or agency captures debates, is 
explained in terms of the abuse of process, discretion or partiality. The result of this 
is that even though the public interest effect is essentially the result of the public 
morality concept of corruption translated into law, its violation nonetheless still 
attracts sanctions (Carse, 1998). Furthermore, discussions involving public opinion 
and public interest debates necessarily describe different phenomena, having 
different causes and effects. While the debates on the violation of the public morality 
concept could be in the context of legitimate criticisms on the part of the violators, 
the debates on the violation of the legal codes will be seen in the context of state 
sanctions.  
 
The review has also shown that, notwithstanding the social indices upon which it is 
based, the notion of deviations from established procedure in dispensing public 
goods, or violation of certain societal rules of impartiality that govern the conduct of 
public or private business, have always featured prominently in debates on the 
subject of corruption. As Kurer (2005) noted, the Principle of Impartiality is a 
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common index that underpins the definition of corruption, regardless of the 
perspective from which it is posited. The Impartiality Principle explores the subject 
of corruption within the context of deviations from defined norms for the allocation 
of public resources within a given system.  
 
Existing studies have focused on different aspects of the causes of public 
procurement-related corruption. While some have shown that the causes vary from 
one country to another (Konstantin et al., 2006), others have revealed that they vary 
across levels of government, depending on the amount of public funds available 
(Thai, 2001; Auriol, 2006). Similarly, aggressive competition for government 
contracts by companies, owing to their level of dependence on public contracts for 
survival, has been identified as the reason why they resort to corrupt means of 
winning government contracts at all costs (Matechak, 2002; Arrowsmith and Trybus, 
2003). Furthermore, other studies by Svensson (2005), Burguet and Che (2004), and 
Celentani and Ganuza (2002) have reported a general consensus among procurement 
experts, to the effect that the lower the capacity of a country to detect and deal with 
corruption through appropriate checks and balances, control systems and law 
enforcement, the greater the susceptibility of its public procurement process to 
corruption. 
 
Büchner et al. (2008) explained that procurement officers who exercise discretion in 
determining which company is awarded government contracts are prone to 
demanding or accepting proffered bribes that compromise the bidding process. 
Furthermore, corruption in the public procurement process has also been reported as 
consisting of fraudulent behaviour by officers who collude with prospective 
contractor(s) to compromise the process in the latter’s favour and to the disadvantage 
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of the others, sometimes in exchange for favours (Andrews, 1989; Jain, 2001; 
Obanda Wanyama, 2010). However, favours offered by a contractor to the 
procurement officer, although they are illegitimate and could vitiate his sense of 
impartiality, may not necessarily amount to a crime that can be punished 
(Arrowsmith and Wallace, 2000). This view is complemented by Murray’s (2009) 
assertion that the absence of effective control mechanisms means that procurement 
officials are open to making procurement decisions based on personal preferences, 
derived from their primary interests, career prospects, social contacts or monetary 
rewards, as opposed to being guided by principles of transparency, equity and 
fairness to all competing companies. In Nigeria, corruption in public procurement 
has been widely reported as being one of the reasons for Nigeria’s underdevelopment 
(Ribadu, 2006b; Adeniran, 2007; Adewunmi, 2011); however studies aimed at 
isolating the reasons why public procurement in Nigeria is easily beset by corruption 
have not been conducted to date.  
 
This review has shown that research on corruption in the public procurement process 
remains scant, and that which exists is mainly focused on the causes behind 
corruption of the procurement process, such as greed, unrestricted discretion by 
procurement officers and lack of inbuilt check and balance mechanisms. Others have 
focused on the effects of corruption in public procurement on citizens (Erridge and 
Greer, 2002); and there has also been some examination of reform efforts aimed at 
improving the practice of public procurement and developing it into a reputable 
profession (Trionfetti, 2000).  
 
Despite the widespread level and consequences of corruption in Nigeria, which 
mainly has its root in the public procurement process (Makinde, 2003; Olowu, 2001; 
57 
 
Transparency International, 2009), there has been no effort at researching and 
understanding the variables that underpin its growth and spread and this explains 
why it has withstood remedies aimed at curtailing it. This shows an absence of 
research, particularly in Nigeria, which is specifically aimed at studying the 
underlying risk factors in the process of public procurement that might be able to 
explain why it is susceptible to corruption in order to develop a corruption risk-factor 
vulnerability check-list for management of public procurement in Nigeria  − hence 
the need for this study which is premised upon the research question: what are the 
risk factors that promote corruption in public procurement in Nigeria? 
2.8 Chapter summary 
This review has articulated corruption within the purview of the Principle of 
Impartiality to explain the meanings and categories of the concept of corruption in 
relation to the public procurement process. The review indicates that the tripartite 
manifestations of corruption in terms of petty, grand and systemic corruption in the 
process of public procurement are found in the notion of partiality encapsulated in 
the Principle of Impartiality. This is a strong principle against any form of 
discrimination in the allocation of state goods and contractual opportunities through 
the process of public procurement (Colombatto, 2003; Doig et al., 2005; Kurer, 
2005). This principle provides an all-encompassing means through which any 
wrongdoing and abuse of discretion for private gain can assume the meaning of 
corruption for the purpose of anti-corruption policy frameworks that promote 
transparency in public contract administration (Doig, 1995; Kurer, 2005; Rothstein 
and Eek, 2009).  
58 
 
The review of literature for this research has also been summarised in a tabular 
format below. Table 1 explores the concept, meaning and types of corruption in 
relation to the Impartiality Principle. Table 2 presents some key debates on the 
concept of corruption and table 3 presents the key elements of the risk factors that 
contextualise the concept of corruption within the process of public procurement. 
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Table 1: The concept, meaning and types of corruption in relation to Impartiality Principle 
Concept Characteristics Outline description Key references 
Definition, meaning and 
conceptual framework 
Difficulty to ascribe or articulate a single 
definition. This difficulty has meant that 
corruption has been defined from various 
perspectives. 
Corruption defined based on:  
 National laws; 
 Public perception (opinion)  
 In the contexts of dishonesty 
 Fraudulent or inequitable behaviours by those in power 
 Typically involving the bribery of public officers 
(Van Roy, 1970; Philp, 1997; Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1998; Jain, 2001; Gardiner, 
2002; Heidenheimer, 2002; Colombatto, 
2003; Philp, 2006) 
Types of corruption Corruption is broadly categorised into three 
types 
 Petty corruption alters the implementation of policies by civil servants, 
chiefly by circumventing the strict implementation of extant rules such as 
procurement rules in exchange for illicit petty financial rewards 
 Grand corruption involves influencing the formulation of laws, regulation 
and policies by politicians and other high-profile officers such as 
permanent secretaries and directors, such as revoking licenses, permits 
or privatising public enterprises in their favour to gain economic 
monopoly for illicit substantial financial rewards 
 Systemic corruption is essentially the combination of petty and grand 
corruption, and is thereby characteristic of the corruption in the public 
(Doig, 1995; Doig and Riley, 1998; Riley, 
1998; Doig, 1999; Ensor and Duran-
Moreno, 2002; Doig et al., 2005; Napal, 
2006; Stefes, 2007; Heston and Kumar, 
2008; Kayrak, 2008) 
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procurement process in Nigeria. It is said to exist when corruption is an 
integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political 
systems 
 
Impartiality Principle The notion of partiality (abuse of 
discretion). 
 A strong principle against any form of discrimination in the allocation of 
procurement opportunities made available to deserving individuals by 
the state 
 The principle hinges on the prescription that in allocating public 
opportunities, the existing rules must be followed strictly as laid down, so 
that none of the parties is given undue advantage 
 The principle has been seen to relate to the subject of corruption, in the 
context of deviation from defined norms for the administration of public 
resources within a given system 
(Van Roy, 1970; Rothstein and Stolle, 
2003; Kurer, 2005; Rothstein and Teorell, 
2008) 
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Table 2: Some key debates concept of corruption 
Types of debate Characteristics Outline description Key references 
Normative debate This school of thought views corruption from 
the perspective of deviations from acceptable 
social norms 
 Norms are (often implicit) standards with which members of a society 
are supposed to conform and deviations from them will attract 
informal sanctions from members of society 
 It is important to consider the impact of constantly changing political 
environments 
 Violations of social norms form societal mores that can be coded into 
law that can be enforced against erring members 
(Khan, 1996; Windsor and Getz, 2000; 
Marong, 2001; Bukovansky, 2002; 
Kirsch, 2003; Granovetter, 2005; Luo, 
2005; Li et al., 2008) 
Cognitive debate The cognitive values define acceptable 
behaviours for the conduct of organisational 
business and could be framed in such a way 
as to discourage corruption 
 Organisational rules may also be framed in such a way that 
corruption is inherently permitted as a matter of organisational ethics 
 Institutional rules can also be framed in a way that imposes 
inordinate obligations on employees who become bound to them 
through their employment 
 Individuals within organisations could engage in acts of corruption 
not only for their personal benefit, but also for the benefit of the 
organisation 
(Messick and Tenbrunsel, 1996; Geo-
Jala and Mangum, 2000; Grieger, 2005; 
Kim and Molleda, 2005; George and 
Lacey, 2006b; Ayres et al., 2007; 
Schubert and Miller, 2008a; Webb et al., 
2009) 
Institutional debate  From the perspective of the institutional 
debate, the interactive influence of cultural 
 Corruption is a normative concept construed in terms of a qualitative 
departure from the state of being pristine to the state of being bad or 
(Johnston, 1998; Robbins, 2000; Collier, 
2002; Heidenheimer, 2002; Theobald, 
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and organisational institutions in society has 
been shown to have effects on the 
prevalence of corruption 
corrupted in relation to the cultural parameters of the society in 
question 
 The term corruption is associated with decay in societal norms when 
applied to social institutions such as states, companies and schools 
or to processes such as procurement and electioneering processes 
 Corruption connotes dissonance with folkways of central importance 
accepted without question and embodying the fundamental moral 
views of a group which serve as compelling guides for individual and 
corporate conduct 
2002; Kurer, 2005; Lambsdorff and 
Lambsdorff, 2007; Aidt, 2009) 
Regulatory framework The regulatory framework debate is an 
offshoot of the institutional construction of the 
explanation of corruption that derives from 
the fact that there is a regulatory framework, 
based on legal rules that govern the way in 
which the business of particular institutions is 
conducted. 
 The framework prescribes behaviours expected of people vested 
with the responsibility for administering the resources of an 
organisation through defined processes like the public procurement 
process;it also outlines punishments for behaviours that fall short of 
the framework which are enforced by coercive sanctions of 
government 
(Damania et al., 2004; Xin and Rudel, 
2004b; Wei-dong, 2006; Cameron et al., 
2009; Méon and Weill, 2010; Vann, 
2011) 
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Table 3: The key elements of the risk factors of corruption within the PPP 
Risk activity Characteristics Outline description Key references 
Government and the open 
market 
Certain forms of government involvement in 
transactions in open or private sector markets 
are regarded as capable of generating 
corruption 
 In many developing countries, corruption in the form of 
bribery for public contract assignment thrives because 
the practice is so entrenched and endemic that it seems 
to be the right thing to do in order to get a contract from 
the public sector 
 As a result, many companies are prepared to resort to 
paying bribes to officials charged with the responsibility 
for administering the public contract process. 
(Keeley, 1995; Huther and Shah, 2000; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Konstantin et al., 
2006; Glenn et al., 2007; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 
2008) 
Weak institutions and 
excessive control of 
private activity 
Political commitment and strong institutional 
capacity are central to the success of anti-
corruption reforms. When private activities 
are subjected to lengthy bureaucratic 
procedures that make it very difficult to obtain 
the necessary government authorisation 
needed to operate legally, the tendency will 
be for private businesses to seek to bribe 
their way through 
 Where institutional capacity is weak, corruption can be 
perpetrated by circumventing the stated process of 
allocating public goods and services in favour of a select 
few at the expense of the interest of the greater majority 
of the people 
 The effect of weak regulatory institutions has always 
been that the bigger companies, in particular, are able to 
engage in wholesale bribery of the bureaucracy, as was 
the case in the Siemens and Halliburton bribe-for-
(Morrissey, 1995; Collier and Gunning, 1999; 
Méon and Sekkat, 2005; George and Lacey, 
2006b; Ikejiofor, 2009; Sidhu, 2009; Lewis, 2010) 
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contract cases 
 Over-regulation of private activity by the public authority 
is one of the main sources of official corruption in Africa 
Expansion in procurement 
activities, compromise of 
confidential information 
and violation of 
procurement rules  
Public sector corruption has been associated 
with the relative growth in public sector 
procurement activities in the past four 
decades in Africa. Corruption in the public 
procurement process spans the pre- and 
post- tender stages of public procurement. 
 Public sector corruption has been associated with the 
relative growth in public sector procurement activities in 
the past four decades in Africa 
 Corruption in the public procurement process spans the 
pre- and post- tender stages of public procurement 
 The manipulation of set guidelines for public procurement 
in favour of a specific bidder over other bidders is a 
major problem of accountability in the public 
procurement process 
 Public officials in possession of information which if made 
available to private business concerns could enhance 
their competitive advantage over others companies are a 
potential source of corruption, especially if the 
information is relevant to procurement activities that 
have not been made public 
(Martin, 1997; Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1999; 
Golden and Chang, 2001; Caroli Casavola, 
2006; Yukins, 2006; Kenny et al., 2007; 
Basheka, 2008a; Vannucci, 2009; Iossa and 
Martimort, 2011) 
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Table 1 displays in a single page the issues that emerged as salient in the review of 
literature relating to the concept, meaning and types of corruption in relation to the 
Impartiality Principle. It describes the key features of the Principle of Impartiality 
and gives an operational description of the meaning and definition of corruption. The 
table also lists the key references that shape academic arguments in this area of 
academic discourse, such that the research underpinnings for the concept of 
corruption are elucidated.   
In table 2, debates around aspects of the concept of corruption are presented, clearly 
articulating in an outline format the key schools of thought that address the subject of 
corruption from various thematic perspectives. The table also describes the concept’s 
key features and lists key references that shape the debates. Table 3 summarises the 
debate on key elements of the risk factors for corruption within the process of public 
procurement that predispose it to corruption. The table also explains key elements of 
the risk factors in outline and gives the key references that shape the debate in each 
of these domains.  
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Research methodology 
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Chapter 3 
Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The preliminary readings presented in sections 1.1 and 1.2 culminated in articulation 
of the aim, objectives and question for this study (see section 1.3). Following this, a 
gap in knowledge was identified through the review of literature presented in chapter 
2. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology and in 
particular, the appropriateness of the qualitative method adopted for this study 
(Powe, 2007; Bryman, 2008).  
Within the qualitative research tradition, this study is based on the interpretivist 
ontological position that corruption (see section 3.2) − a social problem − can be the 
result of risk factors that can be exploited by social actors to divert public funds for 
private use (Bryman, 2008; Kurer, 2005). In response to this, this research applies 
the Impartiality Principle (Kurer, 2005), to answer the question ‘what are the risk 
factors that promote corruption in the Nigerian PPP?’. The Impartiality 
Principle, as explained in section 2.3, provides a theoretical explanation of 
corruption that supports the study of its associated risk factors within the public 
procurement process (Van Roy, 1970; Collier, 2002; Kurer, 2005; Li et al., 2008; 
National Assembly Nigeria, 2011).  
This chapter is organised into eight sections. The next section presents the 
advantages of the choice of the qualitative research method for this study and this is 
followed by an explanation of the study design and strategy. Thereafter, the research 
methodology, sources of data, and the case studies selection are discussed before the 
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interview process; data transcript and analysis are elaborated. The chapter ends with 
a review of the associated ethical issues encountered during the research process and 
a section providing an overall summary.  
3.1.1 The research process 
The research process started with the preliminary reading, leading on to the 
identification of the research problem pertaining to the risk factors for corruption in 
the Nigerian PPP. Following this, the research aim of strengthening the PPP in 
Nigeria by means of evidence-based policy frameworks that promote transparency in 
public contract administration was formulated. To further the achievement of the 
research aim, a number of distinct tasks were formulated. These included the 
examination of the existing public procurement framework in Nigeria, using the case 
study approach to explain the vulnerability of the Nigerian PPP to corruption and the 
formulation of a corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list for the management of 
public procurement in Nigeria including the statement of the research problem. 
Following this, relevant literature was reviewed showing that existing studies on 
corruption in the PPP have reported in a sensational style in terms of the large sums 
of money involved and the means used to try to conceal it. From the review, it was 
revealed that the associated risk factors in the public procurement process that have 
made it susceptible to corruption have not been studied. It is to fill this gap in 
knowledge that this research method has been developed. 
3.1.2 Case study as the research approach  
Based on its interpretivist philosophical underpinning (see section 3.2), this research 
has adopted a case study strategy in exploring the problem of corruption risk factors 
within the public procurement process in Nigeria. The case study approach is useful 
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as a strategy to study a problem in-depth, to understand the interplay of socio-
economic forces and the processes associated with a particular case study.  It is also 
suitable to understand the ways a social phenomenon, in this case corruption 
manifests in a given social context (public procurement in Nigeria) (Hartley, 2004; 
Verschuren, 2003; Yin, 2008).  
Investigations into complex social and behavioural phenomena such as corruption 
and its associated risk factors tend to choose the case study approach because it 
affords the researcher the opportunity to focus in-depth on a single or multiple case 
studies (Schneider, 1977; Stake, 1995). Since this study is an exploratory analysis of 
corruption risk-factors in the public procurement in Nigeria, the multiple case study 
approach was identified to be the most appropriate approach.  This is because it 
provided the opportunity to study a number of different but related organisations in-
depth (presented in chapter five) and thereafter, to produce a cross-case analysis of 
the findings from all the case studies (presented in chapter six).. In this regard, the 
aim of the approach was to understand the contextual dimensions such as the 
institutional, historical and cultural elements which may have acted together to create 
risk factors in the public procurement process, and to see if they can be associated 
with vulnerability to corrupt exploitation in Nigeria. 
The modified case study (explained in section 3.1.4) is a research strategy is suitable 
for studies focusing on influencing factors (for this research corruption risk factors) 
from which a number of data variables can be generated. From examination of these 
can  produce patterns of associations that to answer the research questions and justify 
the research objectives (Bryman, 2008). This enabled the researcher to explore the 
full extent of issues involved in corrupt exploitation of the public procurement 
process in Nigeria by collecting data from both primary and secondary sources. The 
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data collected were then treated and processed for quantitative template analyses (see 
section 3.5) (Bryman, 2008; Esrock and Leichty, 1998; Porter and Savigny, 2002; 
Tambunan, 2006; Tambunan and Thee, 2006). 
3.1.3 Justification of case study as a research approach  
Having discussed the justification for using a case study as the research approach 
within the overarching social science research strategy, there is a need to evaluate its 
validity for the type of social problem: corruption risk factors which form the crux of 
this research. According to Hartley (2004), a case study approach is useful as a 
strategy to study a problem in-depth, to understand the interplay of socio-economic 
forces and processes as exemplified in the selected organisations (See also,Yin, 
2008; Verschuren, 2003). The case study strategy has always been favoured as a 
research approach by social science researchers. This can be traced back to the 1920s 
when Robert and Helen Lynd undertook the study of social problems in a medium-
sized American city over a period of about two years (Zabel et al., 2003; Wakefield 
et al., 1998; Anderson et al., 1978). The research report presented the social life style 
of the Midwestern United States and covered six topics which included making a 
living and a home, training the young, using leisure; engaging in religious practices 
and engaging in community based developmental activities- the resulting work was 
very successful and is still in print even today, almost a Century later (Yin, 2008).   
Other investigations into complex social contexts have also chosen the case study 
approach (Stake, 1995; Schneider, 1977). This research puts the issues of the risk 
factors of corruption in Nigeria into the specific context of how it manifests within 
the PPP. It aims to identify a corruption vulnerability checklist that can be used in 
the management of public procurement in Nigeria in a way that strengthens the 
process against corruption.  It also aims to create evidence-based building blocks by 
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way of recommendations (see section 7.5) that informs public policy frameworks 
that promote transparency and accountability in the administration of public 
contracts through the PPP.  
 
A single case study approach could not be used to study all of the problems of 
corruption and its associated risk factors in the PPP due to the diversity between the 
interested stakeholders- broadly classified into governmental (procuring entities and 
anti-corruption agencies), non-governmental/civil societies and private actors 
(contractors) – each of whom has distinctive features which are not mutually 
congruent. This implies that it is important to understand the contextual elements, 
such as the institutional, historical and cultural contexts which may have acted 
together to create the web of activities that currently manifest themselves in terms of 
corruption and its associated risk factors in the PPP in Nigeria.  
3.1.4 The modified case studies and interviewees 
Because of the sensitivities of the issues of corruption in Nigeria, data were 
generated from the Public Power Company (PPC), the Rural Electrification 
Organisation (REO), the Anticorruption Commission (ACC) and the Public 
Procurement Organisation (PPO), analyses of which are presented in sections 5.3, 
5.4 and 5.5 respectively. The result of public procurement-related corruption in the 
Nigerian electric power sector (Adenikinju, 2003) has perpetuated the perennial 
problem of poor electricity supply, which is reported to be the greatest contemporary 
development challenge on all fronts in Nigeria (Ikeme and Ebohon, 2005; Okafor, 
2008; Okafor and Joe-Uzuegbu, 2010).  
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The electricity sector in Nigeria is categorised into the rural and urban; hence data on 
corruption were collected from two case studies in the electricity sector based on the 
sector’s rural-urban divide and from another two case studies, one each the anti-
corruption sector and one from a public procurement checking organisation (see 
figure 3).  Preliminary results from the initial data analyses were further subjected to 
verification interviews in three organisations namely: Anti-Corruption Reform 
Organisation, Public Prosecution Office Public Procurement Organisation where 
one, three and two verification Interviews (VI) respectively were conducted. Results 
from the verification interviews formed the basis for the cross-case analyses 
presented in chapter 6. 
3.2 The philosophical stance 
A good understanding of research philosophy is an important step towards the 
selection of an appropriate research methodology (Crossan, 2003). A review of 
philosophical literature has shown that the decision about the way a research study is 
conducted involves going beyond the practicality of the research methodology and 
methods − it requires a philosophical solution (explanation) to the question of ‘Why 
research?’(Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Wacker, 1998). The philosophical perspective of 
a research study therefore relates to the core assumptions underpinning how it is 
conducted (Holden and Lynch, 2004; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).  
 
Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) opined that engaging in philosophy will 
help the researcher to refine and specify the research methods to be used in a study 
and will clarify the overall research strategy to be used. It also enables the researcher 
to evaluate different methodologies and methods. This way, the researcher avoids 
using methods that are inappropriate by identifying the limitations of particular 
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approaches at an early stage (Crossan, 2003). Basing the choice of methods on a 
philosophical underpinning also has the benefit of helping the researcher to be 
creative and innovative in either the selection or adaptation of methods that have 
previously been outside his or her experience (Holden and Lynch, 2004). 
 
According to Morgan (1990) there is a choice between the ‘regulatory’ or ‘radical 
change’ views of society − meaning that social evolution is seen as either arising 
from the status quo or from alternative visions. An explanation of this regulatory-
radical change divide in views of social evolution can be seen in work of  
McGoldrick et al. (2004) and Burrell and Morgan (1979). According to them, from a 
regulatory perspective, the researcher assumes society evolves rationally, whereas 
from the perspective of radical change, society is viewed as riven with constant 
conflict as humans struggle to free themselves from the domination of social 
structures. This core division between the two positions in socio-philosophy has 
gained various labels in the literature. While Easterby-Smith et al. (1998) named 
them positivism and phenomenology, Hughes and Sharrock (1997) described them 
as positivism and interpretivism.Because this study is focused on the understanding 
of a particular problem − the risk factors for corruption in the public procurement 
process in Nigeria − the interpretivist philosophical approach is adopted. 
Furthermore, the interpretivist epistemological underpinning of this research (see 
section 3.2) makes the adoption of a general social science research strategy more 
appropriate because corruption, as explained in section 2.3, is a social problem 
(Becker, 1991; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Bryman, 2008). Research is an attempt to derive 
knowledge that can be generalised by addressing clearly defined questions (see 
section 1.4 for this research) with sSystemic and rigorous methods (Bryman, 2008). 
74 
 
In social science, research is designed to provide evidence to support, justify or 
refute a stated research question and/or aim, which can be generalised (Eisenhardt, 
1989b; Crotty, 1998; Cooper et al., 2009). According to Johnson et al. (2007) and 
Bryman (2008), in deciding to conduct social research, the first step to be taken is 
the decision as to the strategy or strategies to be adopted in executing the study. This 
is because there are several ways of conducting social research and deciding which 
one is appropriate for a particular study can be a difficult step in the research process 
(Stake, 1995).  
A number of pre-conditions have to be carefully considered before adopting the 
appropriate strategy for any research exercise. According to Pettigrew (1990), the 
necessary pre-conditions that should inform the choice of research strategy are: 
1. The research aim and objectives 
2. The level of control the researcher can exercise over actual behavioural 
events 
3. The contemporary or historical focus of the research. 
The research aim and objectives in social research are of primary importance in 
deciding which strategy is to be adapted for the inquiry. This is because the whole 
essence of the inquiry is to provide an explanation that corresponds to the research 
aim and objectives. The level of control the researcher can exercise over actual 
behavioural experiment also contributes to the choice of research strategy. 
According to Stake (1995) and Yin (2012), whether a research study is 
contemporary, future-oriented or historical also has implications for the choice of 
strategy to be adopted to address the study aim and objectives.   
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Furthermore, research questions categorised as open or closed can traditionally be 
asked in the form of ‘what’, ‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘which’ for the purpose of 
determining the appropriate strategy to be adopted (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004; Rounding and Ulcers, 2009). The nature of the inquiry focused on, and the 
explanation sought in a research study underpins the strategy to be used in achieving 
the objectives. As Bryman (2008) argued, the ‘what’ question is appropriate for 
research using case studies and experiments. Developing his argument further, he 
said that the ‘where’ and ‘who’ questions are most likely to be appropriate as a 
strategy for archival studies, while ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory 
in nature and would be likely to be used for conducting case studies, historical and 
experimental research (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Corner, 1991).  
As Holden and Lynch (2004) further explained, these two philosophical approaches 
are delineated by core assumptions concerning ontology (reality), epistemology 
(knowledge), human nature and methodology. The sociological persuasions of the 
researcher notwithstanding, these assumptions are innately linked to one another − 
the researcher’s view of ontology affects his epistemological position and this in turn 
affects his view of human nature, with the consequence that the researcher’s choice 
of methodology logically follows the philosophical assumptions the researcher has 
already made regarding what should be the subject of his/her research (Willis, 1995; 
Ponterotto, 2005; Leitch et al., 2010). Because this study is based on qualitative 
parameters such as attitudes and behaviours in relation to the public procurement 
process in Nigeria (Dawson, 2009), a qualitative methodology is used.  
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3.2.1 The choice of qualitative strategy 
The decision about the choice of method for a research study, in addition to 
depending on upon the research aim and objectives and on the questions to be 
answered by the research (Bryman, 2009; Yin, 2008), also depends on whether the 
researcher is looking for meaning and explanation which would connote a qualitative 
orientation or for establishing or verifying frequencies and fundamental laws which 
would depict a quantitative orientation (Snape and Spencer, 2003; Bryman, 2009). 
This research seeks an explanation of the question about the risk factors of 
corruption (see section 1.3.2) − a social problem, which gives it a social research 
orientation (Bryman, 2009; Kurer, 2005). 
As stated in section 1.3.2, the question for this research is: ‘What are the risk 
factors that promote corruption in public procurement in Nigeria?’ This points 
the goal of the research towards providing an explanation for corruption – a social 
problem in the procurement process in Nigeria for which a qualitative method is 
more appropriate. 
The differences between the qualitative and quantitative methods and the 
characteristics that would dictate their application in different research contexts have 
been explained by Bryman (2004).  
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Table 4: Choice of research method 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Theoretical underpinning Deductive based on testing of 
theory 
Inductive based on 
generalisation of theory 
Epistemological approach Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontological approach Objectivism Constructionism 
 
 
As shown in table 4, the qualitative approach is most suitable for this research which 
studies a social problem − the risk factors for corruption. The model, concepts, and 
the theories on which the research aim, objectives and question are based have an 
interpretivist and constructionist orientation (See Section 3.2). Also, the approach is 
inductive in that it seeks to allow research findings (risk factors for corruption) to 
emerge from the analysis of raw data based on the research themes using template 
analysis (King, 2004; Thomas, 2006; Waring and Wainwright, 2008; Ketokivi and 
Mantere, 2010) and also the research question, ‘what are the risk factors for 
corruption’, based on the ideas of Yin (2003) as discussed above, entails a qualitative 
strategy. 
The qualitative method in the social sciences is associated with the use of words 
rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2009; 
Creswell, 2012). Because it is based to a greater degree on verbal communications, 
the main steps in the design process for qualitative research exhibit a lesser degree of 
codification than is associated with quantitative research (Brunsdon et al., 1999; 
Bryman, 2008).  
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As Bryman (2008) also stated, the potential for being too subjective is another 
possible shortcoming of qualitative research. He further noted that qualitative 
research has a tendency to be impressionistic, through over-reliance on the 
researcher’s often unsystematic views about what is significant and needing 
emphasis in the interview process and in the coding of the transcribed interview data. 
The problem of generalisation is another criticism of the qualitative research method 
(Bryman, 2004; Hammersley, 2004; Bryman, 2008). It is suggested that the findings 
of qualitative research are limited in their scope of application, with regard to the 
extent of data collection, case studies selection and sampling considerations, making 
it impossible to know how findings can be generalised to other research settings. For 
this research, the qualitative research method has been strengthened by the use of 
modified multiple case studies and rigorous reliability and validity criteria applied 
through a verification interview method which was used to test the veracity of the 
findings with the civil society, prosecutors and other procurement officers (see table 
5) (Bryman, 2008). Furthermore, in addition to the semi-structured interview 
schedule, the verification interviews provided the possibility of follow-up questions 
to the respondent where the data generated needs to be augmented − a feature that 
makes qualitative research more applicable for this research. Based on these 
considerations, it was deemed essential to explore the range of issues about 
corruption risk factors in the public procurement process in Nigeria with the 
advantages of in-depth probing offered by qualitative research, in order to examine 
the public procurement process in Nigeria, drawing on the case studies and other 
examples to identify a set of risk factors that can be associated with corruption.   
In the social sciences, a research strategy refers to the framework for gathering and 
analysing data (Bryman, 2009). The choice of strategy for a particular study is a 
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reflection of the researcher’s decisions about the nature of the data and the analytical 
approach envisaged in the research process. The strategy for this research is guided 
by the qualitative nature of the data to be collected (see section 3.2.1). Specifically, 
this shaped the way that data for the research has been collected and analysed in 
order to provide explanations that answer the research aim and objectives.  
As shown in sections 1.2 and 1.3, preliminary readings for the study on the problem 
of corruption in the PPP in Nigeria helped the researcher to articulate the aim, 
objectives and question for the research. This and the literature reviewed in chapter 2 
culminated in the identification of a research gap that informed this methodology and 
methods for data generation and analysis for answering the research question. That 
is: what are the risk factors for corruption that can be associated with the PPP in 
Nigeria?  
As case study research, this study adopts the ‘what’ question to examine the existing 
public procurement framework in Nigeria. This is done in the hope that drawing 
from analysis of data from the case studies, a set of risk factors that can be associated 
with vulnerability to corruption is identified. The result of analysis of data from the 
modified case studies forms the basis upon which a corruption risk factor 
vulnerability check-list for the management of public procurement in Nigeria is 
developed for a corruption-free management of the process of public procurement in 
Nigeria. 
According to Bryman (2008) the case study is associated with a location, which may 
be a community or an organisation, such as the PPC or the Rural Electrification 
Organisation that were selected for the purpose of this research. He stated further 
that the emphasis in social research that connotes a case study approach is predicated 
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upon intensive examination of the setting of the cases selected and by implication a 
presumption associating case study research with qualitative research.  
3.2.2 The research design 
In social science, research design refers to the framework within which data is 
gathered and analysed (Bryman, 2009). The choice of design for a particular research 
study is a reflection of the researcher’s decisions about priority being given to issues 
such as the nature of the data and the analytical approach in the research process. 
The research design for this study is guided by the selection of a research strategy, 
which has been based on its philosophical underpinnings as justified above, and 
flows through to the choice of research methodology and methods discussed in 
chapter three. This shapes the way that data for the research is to be collected and 
analysed in order to provide explanations in justification of the research aim and 
objectives. The research design is illustrated in figure2. 
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Figure 2: Research Design 
Preliminary Literature Review and 
identification of case studies 
Statement of research problem
Refinement research problem
Research aim , objectives, scope
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Instruments design Research design/ 
Method of data collection
Field work
instrument testing and 
Literature Review
Instrument revision
Data collection and preparation
Data analyses and interpretation
Conclusions and recommendations
 
The qualitative method in social science is associated with the use of words rather 
than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2009). Because it 
is based to a greater degree on verbal communications, the main steps in the design 
process for qualitative research exhibit a lesser degree of codification than is 
associated with quantitative research (Brunsdon et al., 1999; Bryman, 2008). One 
resulting shortcoming of this method is that it is difficult to replicate precisely, 
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because what the researcher hears or observes during the fieldwork will correspond 
very much with their personal perspective (Larsson, 1993; Bryman, 2008).  
These perceived shortcomings of qualitative research, however, have been 
ameliorated according to Bryman (2008) through rigorous reliability and validity 
criteria informing the interview method. This includes the possibility of follow-up 
questions to the respondent where the data needs to be augmented; a feature that 
makes qualitative research more applicable where in-depth insight into the research 
subjects is required. 
Based on the above discussion, it was deemed essential to explore the range of issues 
about corruption risk factors in the public procurement process in Nigeria with the 
advantage offered by qualitative research of in-depth probing to examine the public 
procurement process in Nigeria. This is done by drawing on the case studies and 
other samples to identify a set of risk factors that can be associated with corruption, 
in order to provide policy recommendations towards strengthening the PPP against 
corruption. 
To achieve the aim of the study there was a need to gain in-depth understanding of 
the problem of corruption within the public procurement process. For this reason, the 
case study strategy (defined by Stake (1995) and Gerring (2004) as in-depth study of 
the particularity and complexity of a single case to understand its activity within 
important circumstances) is adopted instead of action research6 (Bryman, 2008). The 
reason behind this choice is that the Rural Electrification Organisation declined 
collaboration with the research, due to the sensitivity of the corruption issue in 
Nigeria, but consented to semi-structured interviews on the condition that staff 
                                                          
6
 An approach in which a researcher and a client collaborate in the diagnosis of a problem to develop 
a solution 
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interviewed would remain anonymous in the resulting report (Bryman, 2008). Based 
on the explanations above, the use of the semi-structured interview is most 
appropriate given (a) the fact that it was investigated and linked to the details of the 
court case (b) the rules for procurement are the same across all government 
institutions in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, as Yin (2003) noted, the case studies research strategy is amenable to 
the examination of influencing factors conceived from an interpretivist perspective. 
This entails the systematic collection of qualitative data in respect of different 
indicators (risk factors for corruption) which are then analysed to discern patterns of 
association in order to achieve the research aim and objectives (Bryman, 2009). This 
strategy enables the researcher to explore the full extent and variety of issues 
involved, in order to identify the risk factors that may explain the vulnerability of the 
public procurement process to corruption, as a first step towards building a 
corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list for the management of public 
procurement in Nigeria. It is also suitable for understanding the ways in which a 
social problem, in this case corruption, manifests in a given social context so that the 
findings can be extrapolated to other cases (of public procurement in Nigeria) 
(Verschuren, 2003; Hartley, 2004; Yin, 2009). 
 
As Hartley (2004) stated further, the case study approach is useful as a strategy to 
study a problem in-depth; to understand the complex interplay of socio-economic 
forces and processes (in the case of the public procurement process in Nigeria, the 
risk factors); and to understand the variously manifesting scenarios and situations in 
the particular study context, so as to inform a pragmatic set of policy 
recommendations that aim to remedy the situation (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2009). 
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3.2.3 Data collected for the research 
The practice knowledge of the principal researcher gained over four years of 
employment in public procurement was useful in gaining initial appreciation of the 
study context. It provided the essential information for defining the context of public 
procurement in Nigeria, and the background knowledge for managing the process of 
data collection (van Teijlingen et al., 2001). Research data is broadly classified into 
primary and secondary types (Bryman, 2009). Primary data, which forms the main 
data component for this research, is collected directly from respondents through the 
use of semi-structured interview questionnaires (example provided in Appendix 6).  
 
Secondary data, defined as data collected by others for purposes other than the 
present research (Cowton, 1998; Houston, 2004), is used in qualitative studies to 
complement the data collected from the primary source(s) (Sandelowski, 1997; 
Blaxter et al., 2006). In this research secondary data is used to cross-validate the data 
from the primary source, to confirm and/or modify the findings from the primary 
source (Blaxter et al., 2006). For this study, secondary data include office 
documentations of procurement activities, court documents and published reports, 
which provides useful direct insights into the problem of corruption in public 
procurement and also provides a useful means for corroborating indirect insights 
drawn from the interviews (Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009). A diagrammatic illustration of the 
research design is presented in Figure 2. 
In-depth interviews to cross-validate these preliminary findings were also conducted 
with senior management staff of the Anti-Corruption Reform Civil Society, the 
Police and the Procurement Department of a federal procuring entity. 
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As already mentioned in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, corruption in the public procurement 
process in Nigeria has defied initiatives aimed at curbing it. It is hoped that by 
gaining a better understanding of the factors that may have made it resistant to past 
initiatives, it may be possible to better manage the process and this may inform 
policy frameworks that promote transparency and ultimately tighten the process 
against corruption. This way, not only will there be value for money used for public 
procurement, but monies saved will be used on other projects and the nascent 
practice of public procurement in Nigeria will be improved through greater 
transparency in public contract administration. 
3.2.4 Secondary data and its use for the research 
In order to examine the existing framework of the PPP in Nigeria towards achieving 
the first objective of this research, as set out in section 1.3, there is need to examine 
existing information- secondary data that outline public procurement framework in 
Nigeria.  
These secondary data were sourced from documents such as the Nigerian Public 
Procurement Act and Procurement Regulations upon which the institutional 
framework of the PPP in Nigeria is based (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b). 
Furthermore, these statutory documents, which prescribe the institutional and 
administrative framework for the practice of public procurement in Nigeria, set key 
principles upon which PPP is based.   
In addition to the Public Procurement Act of 2007, which sets out the general 
framework for the PPP in Nigeria, other statutory instruments provide specific 
details of how parts of the Act should be implemented. Some of these, the specific 
provisions of which are explained under the section entitled ‘secondary procurement 
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policies’, are the public procurement regulations for consultancy services, standard 
bidding documents for the procurement of goods, standard bidding documents for 
the procurement of services, standard requests for proposals for selection of firms 
(small, complex and time-based assignments and individual consultants) and public 
procurement regulations for goods and works. This chapter, which details the 
institutional framework for the PPP in Nigeria through in-depth analyses of extant 
rules, policy documents, guidelines and academic commentaries on the PPP in 
Nigeria, is geared towards achieving the first objective of this research (see section 
1.3.1). Analyses of the secondary data were conducted using template analysis (see 
section 3.5). 
3.2.5 Use of the semi-structured interview 
As explained in section 2.4.9, corruption in relation to public procurement is defined 
in terms of inappropriate behaviours (wrongdoing) (Boynton and Greenhalgh, 2004; 
Kim et al., 2009). The associated risk factors can be explained in terms of the 
Impartiality Principle as acts of wrongdoing (partiality) which undermine the 
integrity of the procurement process (Kurer, 2005; Rothstein and Eek, 2009). The 
result of this is that that public procurement-related corruption is difficult to measure 
(study) using quantitative methods (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003), hence the use 
of qualitative methods for this study. Corruption involves secrecy and deceit, and the 
possibility of informants being punished when exposed (Kim et al., 2009), and so is 
difficult to probe by asking respondents direct questions about their involvement or 
otherwise (Del Monte and Papagni, 2007).  
 
The sensitivity of corruption in Nigeria means that it is difficult to directly probe 
individuals’ behaviour in relation to corruption. This was indicated by the 
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interviewees’ wish to see the proposed questions before giving their consent to 
participate, and suggests the necessity of asking indirect questions about their 
knowledge of processes and practices. As Kim et al. (2009) also explained, a semi-
structured approach is more likely to encourage people to disclose information than a 
structured interview format if the subject matter of the interview involves corruption. 
Because a semi-structured interview gives the interviewer the discretion to ask 
further questions in response to statements that seem significant (Drever, 2003; 
Bryman, 2009), this kind of interview was used to collect data, with the interviews 
proceeding on the basis of an interview schedule (see appendix 4).  
3.3 The fieldwork 
The fieldwork was undertaken in four public sector organisations namely; the Rural 
Electrification Organisation, the Public Power Organisation, the Public Procurement 
Organisation and the Anti-Corruption Commission. This was followed with a 
verification interview to verify the preliminary findings of the research with public 
legal prosecutors, public procurement officers and civil society organisations that 
make up the case studies for this research. Two of the organisations are major 
dispensers of public funds in the public electric power sector and the others have, 
respectively, overarching supervisory responsibility for public procurement, for 
investigating violations of public procurement rules, for legal prosecution of public 
procurement rule violations, and for anti-corruption reform goals.  
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Table 5: Semi-structured interviews (SSI) and Verification Interviews 
Job Designation Organisation Activity type and frequency 
Procurement Officers Rural Electrification Organisation SS interview: 9 interviewees 
Investigators Anti-Corruption Commission SS interview: 4 interviewee 
Procurement Checking Officers Public Procurement Organisation SS interview:3 interviewees 
Procurement Officers Public Power Company SS interview: 4 interviewees 
Research Analyst Anti-Corruption Reform Organisation VI interview: 1 interviewee 
Prosecutors Public Prosecution Office VI interview:  3 interviewees 
Procurement Officers Public Procurement Organisation VI interview: 2 interviewees 
 
Key: SSI: Semi-structured interview: VI: Verification interview. Source: Fieldwork: 2011 and 2012 
Furthermore, the fieldwork was conducted in two phases. The first phase was the 
main fieldwork which was conducted in 2011 using the semi-structured interview 
schedule (see appendix 4). Each semi-structured interview lasted about three hours, 
because the researcher had to painstakingly record the interviews manually in 
longhand. After each day interview, the researcher transcribed the handwritten notes 
and sent them back to the interviewees to check that the transcripts reflected the 
interviews. Data were collected in two phases – the semi-structured interview and 
the verification interview. 
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As shown in figure 3, the fieldwork for this research was conducted in two phases. 
The first phase was the main fieldwork during which four case studies namely: the 
Rural Electrification Organisation, the Public Power Company, the Public 
procurement Organisation and the Anti-Corruption and the Commission were visited 
for semi-structured interviews. Once the interviewees had given their agreement for 
any interview day, the researcher then proceeded to schedule the next interview day. 
The findings from analyses of data from the main fieldwork were then used for the 
second phase of interview (verification interview). 
The semi-structured interviews were particularly conducted to collect textual data on 
the following specific areas of the PPP: 
Analyses and 
Corruption Risk – 
Factor  
Identification  
 
Public Power  
Company  
 
Public Procurement  
Organisation  
Rural electrification 
organisation  
Anti – Corruption  
Organisation  
 
VI with   Prosecutors 
 
VI with Procurement 
Officer V I with the Civil Society  
Analyses of verification 
interview data corruption  
Figure 3: Fieldwork and verification interview 
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 Working of the PPP in the organisation  
 The most important aspect of PPP in the organisation 
 Confidentiality of the PPP in the organisation 
 Key risks of the PPP in the organisation. 
The research themes, which are based on the research aim and objectives, and the 
corresponding questions, are presented in table 6. 
Table 6: Research themes and SS interview questions 
Themes Corresponding interview question 
To describe the public 
procurement process 
Please tell me how the public procurement process works in your organisation 
What do you consider to be the most important aspect of public procurement in your 
organisation? 
Is the process confidential? If yes, how is this ensured? 
Drawing from the case 
studies analysis, to identify a 
set of risk factors that may 
explain the vulnerability of the 
public procurement process 
to corruption 
When making decisions how much discretion can procurement officers exercise in your 
organisation? 
Please comment on the clarity of the bidding processes in your organisation to those tendering 
for contracts. Are there any issues that you see arising from this? 
Please describe the role of civil society in the public procurement process in your organisation  
Do you think that the pricing regime in public procurement is comparable with open market 
pricing? 
Please tell me how price intelligence impacts on the procurement process in your organisation 
To propose a corruption risk 
factor vulnerability check-list 
for the management of public 
procurement in Nigeria  
 
Are there any areas of the procurement process that you feel could be improved? What are 
they and how can they is strengthened? 
What would you say are the existing public procurement challenges in relation to: 
I. The staff’s technical knowledge 
II. Existing laws/government policies on procurement 
III. Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
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3.3.1 Sources of data 
Various sources of data provide evidence for case studies research (Eisenhardt, 
1989b; Stake, 1995). The most common sources, however, are structured, semi-
structured and unstructured interviews, mapping, documentation and observations 
(Yin, 1999). Each of these sources has its own comparative advantages and 
disadvantages (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). As Yin (1993) averred, documents 
are relevant for the data collection exercise in case studies research because they 
have stable, exact and broad-based content coverage. Notwithstanding this 
advantage, documents must be diligently authenticated and not treated as 
synonymous with literal recordings of events. This is because these recordings could 
be selective and biased in favour of the recorder or his views on the subject matter of 
the research (Bryman, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, Yin (2003) argued that archival records of other documents must also 
be used with great care because records in this class of secondary data were 
produced for a specific purpose and audience, inevitably different from the purpose 
for which they are sought by the case study researcher. For this reason, archival 
records must be carefully compared with data from other sources in order to 
ascertain their veracity before they are incorporated into the case study research data. 
 
Interviews, whether structured, semi-structured or unstructured, can provide 
insightful and originally targeted information for the purpose of case study research 
(Larsson, 1993; Yin, 2003). As Yin (1999) further contended, information obtained 
from interviews can also be biased for a variety of reasons. These may include the 
type of questions, the interviewer’s bias and the atmosphere at the time of 
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conducting the interview, as well as the level of knowledge of the interviewee. 
Direct observation is among the first-hand methods that provide contextual and real 
factual information which can seemingly be error-free, although it is very expensive 
to undertake (Bryman, 1999).  
3.3.2 Research methods 
The research makes use of data from primary and secondary sources. The primary 
data is generated through the administration of semi-structured interview 
questionnaires with respondents from the case studies. Secondary data to inform a 
review of the framework for and practice of the PPP were acquired from published 
information about cases of corruption in Nigeria, newspaper and other reports about 
the Nigerian ports and the Universal Basic Education Commission corruption cases. 
Court judgements from public procurement-related corruption cases also form part of 
the secondary data for analysis. These documents are public documents available on 
application by the operation of the Freedom of Information Act 2011, and have been 
obtained as part of the secondary data for the research (National Assembly Nigeria, 
1999; Modell, 2010; National Assembly Nigeria, 2011).  Before proceeding with the 
fieldwork, the researcher applied for and received ethical approval. Details of ethical 
issues that arose in the course of this research and how they were addressed are 
discussed in section 3.4.   
3.3.3 The case studies and interviewees 
The primary case studies for the research were selected from the electricity sector in 
Nigeria. The immense deficiencies in the electric power infrastructure in Nigeria 
since it gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960 has resulted in a 
situation where less than 20% of the nation’s electricity needs are currently being 
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met (Adenikinju, 2003). To remedy this situation, the government has consistently 
made massive budgetary provisions which are dispensed through the public 
procurement process (Adenikinju, 2005; National Assembly Nigeria, 2007b). The 
enormous capital expenditure in the electric power sector through the public 
procurement process has resulted in endemic cases of corruption, with the outcome 
that while considerable money has been spent, there has been no real impact on the 
electric power situation in the country (Iwayemi, 2008; Akinlo, 2009).  
The result of public procurement-related corruption in the Nigerian electric power 
sector (Adenikinju, 2003) has perpetuated the perennial problem of poor electricity 
supply, which is reported to be the greatest contemporary development challenge on 
all fronts in Nigeria (Ikeme and Ebohon, 2005; Okafor, 2008; Okafor and Joe-
Uzuegbu, 2010). The electricity sector in Nigeria is categorised into the rural and 
urban; hence data on corruption was collected from two case studies based on the 
sector’s rural-urban divide.  
Data was also collected from the two secondary case studies. While one of the 
secondary case studies is a public anti-corruption agency with a mandate to detect 
and eliminate corruption in the PPP, the second secondary case study is a public 
agency with oversight responsibility for the PPP. The researcher’s years of work 
both in the private sector as a public sector credit and marketing officer and in the 
public sector as an accountant, coupled with initial readings, were invaluable in the 
choice of both the primary and secondary case studies. The researcher’s work 
experience in the public sector was useful as a guide in screening the pool of 
respondents put forward by the case studies’ organisations to ensure that those 
interviewed had the requisite experience to comment on the PPP in Nigeria. A total 
of 20 interviews were conducted across the four case studies during the fieldwork. 
94 
 
As explained in section 3.5, particularly the illustration in figure 5, the face-to-face 
interview format was adopted for all interviews.  
3.4 Ethical issues 
Careful observation of ethical issues is considered critical in social research to ensure 
that respondents and others directly connected with the research are not adversely 
affected by it in any way (Broom, 2006; Lutabingwa and Nethonzhe, 2006). As a 
first step towards the fieldwork, the researcher contacted those at a managerial level 
in the case studies organisations visited during the fieldwork and the verification 
interviews strictly within the purview of the Newcastle Business School’s ethical 
requirements, approval for which was sought and obtained from the School Ethics 
Sub Committee.  
In articulating ethical considerations for this research, the research considered the 
prescriptions of Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003), a summary of which is that 
participants in any research must have the right to:  
 Personal privacy 
 Participate in the research voluntarily 
 Withdraw their participation at will either partially or completely 
 To give genuine consent that is not based on any deception 
 To confidentiality and anonymity in the research report 
 To air opinions on the procedure for data collection. 
In addition to observing the codes prescribed above, the researcher also strictly 
followed the terms of the ethical approval granted by the Newcastle Business 
School’s ethical committee. Ethical issues anticipated for this research focused on 
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the protocol for the semi-structured interviews and the verification interviews, both 
of which involved face-to-face interviews with the respondents.  
Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter of the research, there was a need to 
exhibit a high degree of ethical decorum so as not to expose the researcher to legal 
challenges consequent upon the research and its outcomes. During the fieldwork and 
the verification interviews, the researcher also interviewed prosecutors, procurement 
officers and the civil society involved in matters that are being litigated upon before 
Nigerian courts for their opinions on the cases since court rules demand that facts of 
the cases before the courts are not be reported in academic research. In addition, the 
decided case of Federal Government of Nigeria versus Bode George and others, 
which centred on an elaborate PPP-related corruption, was obtained as part of the 
secondary data for this research. The case in which Bode George –a high-ranking 
Nigerian politician – and nine other public office holders were convicted of public 
procurement-related corruption. They were found guilty of circumventing the public 
procurement rules (see sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) in the first ever conviction by the 
courts in Nigeria for PPP-related corruption because of the absence of an 
independent corruption vulnerability checklist, which this research has sought to 
develop for detecting corruption in the PPP (see table 11). 
The researcher took time to explain the purpose of the research and particularly the 
semi-structured interview to every interviewee. The interview protocol for the 
research is based on the prescription of Ekwo (2011), which requires that consent 
obtained from interviewees during the interview process must be genuine consent. 
This means that the purpose of the research, in addition to any risks and 
disadvantages that it may entail, must be fully disclosed to the respondents and any 
concerns expressed thereafter must be fully resolved to their satisfaction before the 
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consent can be said to be genuine. As part of the adopted interview schedule (see 
appendix 4), the researcher explained fully to all respondents the purpose, possible 
risks and disadvantages, as well as benefits, that the research study may entail for 
Nigeria and Nigerians in general (the respondents inclusive), plus it’s potential 
contribution to practice and literature. Upon this basis, the consent of all respondents 
was obtained before each semi-structured interview was conducted. 
 
Court judgements on cases that touch upon public procurement-related violation of 
the 2007 Nigerian Public Procurement Act, particularly the judgement convicting the 
Board and Management of the Nigeria Ports Authority (Federal Government of 
Nigeria v Bode George and others), were sourced as part of the secondary data. 
Official statistics such as those presented in the Nigerian National Appropriation 
Bills were also procured in order to explore the statistics regarding statutory 
appropriations of public funds for public procurement.  
3.4.1 Pre-fieldwork activities 
As a first step towards the main fieldwork, the researcher contacted the managers of 
the case studies organisations which were identified through the initial readings 
about the problem of corruption in the procurement process in the electric power 
industry in Nigeria, with a request to visit them during the fieldwork. Assurances of 
authorisation from the supervisory team and the university hosting the doctoral 
research were also conveyed to the organisations and the respondents. The researcher 
was identified by means of a student identification card and assurances by her of the 
purpose of the fieldwork and the potential benefits to Nigeria and in particular, the 
management of public procurement. Assurances that information supplied by 
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interviewees would be treated with utmost confidentiality were also given, with the 
researcher pledging that data were being sought solely for academic purposes.  
3.4.2 Data collection and analysis techniques 
Following the classification of the data for this research into primary and secondary 
types (Bryman, 2009), the primary data, which forms the main data component for 
this research, was collected directly from respondents through the use of semi-
structured interview questionnaires (example provided in Appendix 6). Secondary 
data defined as data collected by others for purposes other than the present research 
(Cowton, 1998; Houston, 2004), for this research consists of the Public Procurement 
Act, 2007 and the Public Procurement Manuals (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007), 
analyses of which is presented in the institutional framework of public procurement 
in chapter 4. These data are used in this research, as is the case with other qualitative 
studies, to complement the data collected from the primary source(s) (Sandelowski, 
1997; Blaxter et al., 2006). In specific terms, secondary data is used to cross-validate 
the data from the primary source and to confirm and/or modify the findings from the 
primary source (Blaxter et al., 2006). A diagrammatic illustration of the processes of 
data collection is presented in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Data Collection Processes 
-Reports on public procureme nt
-Standard bid documents
- Public procureme nt manuals
-Procurement plan
-Procurement records
-Decided court case
Methods of Data Collection
Secondary Data Primary Data
3 interviews at the PPO
4 interviews with Officials at the ACC
9 interviews with Officials of  the REO 
The Public Procureme nt Act 2007 
4 interviews with Officials of  the Public Power 
Company 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4, primary data for this research have been generated from 
the administration of semi-structured interview questionnaires with nine respondents 
in the Rural Electrification Organisation. Three interviews were also held with 
respondents in the Public Procurement Organisation while four interviews each were 
conducted at the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Public Power Company of 
Nigeria.  
The secondary data component is sourced from published official documents, 
statistics, and corporate disclosures by companies. Furthermore, other secondary 
sources of data include the Public Procurement Act, official reports on public 
procurement, standard bid documents and court papers on the case of corruption at 
the Rural Electrification Organisation. The resulting data are collated and variously 
prepared and synchronised for qualitative analysis in order to provide explanations to 
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achieve the research aim and objectives (Esrock and Leichty, 1998; Tambunan, 
2006; Bryman, 2008).  
Analysis of documents from secondary sources is widely used for various kinds of 
social science research (Bourgeois Iii, 1980; Hentschel et al., 2000). According to 
Yin (2008), documented secondary data can be in the form of communiqués, 
archival records, administrative documents and computer files and records. This 
research, however, also used procurement policy documents, corporate websites, 
published official documents and journal articles as secondary data.  
3.4.3 The semi-structured interview 
An open ended interview method was adopted for the conduct of the semi-structured 
interviews, in order to give the interviewees the opportunity to talk freely about the 
issues raised during the interview. However, this technique has been criticised as 
very complex and difficult to control (Bryman, 2009). Developing his argument, 
Bryman (2009) said that it is risky to adopt a technique that leaves the researcher 
without any element of control over the interview process as the sole means of 
primary data collection. This view loosely fits the philosophy behind the research 
strategy which hinges on an interpretivist ontological principle, premised on the 
assumption that with social phenomena such as corruption, the associated risk factors 
and their meanings are continually being brought into existence by social actors 
(Bryman, 2008). The interpretivist ontological underpinning of the study meant that 
the researcher generates data that truly represent the views of the respondents, 
without the introduction of artificiality in the form of exertion of undue influence 
and interference in generating data that may not represent the true views of the 
respondents. For this research, the social problem is the issue of corruption and its 
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associated risk factors in the public procurement process in Nigeria; while the social 
actors are the officers and other professionals with covert and overt responsibilities 
for the management of the public procurement process in Nigeria.   
Although the researcher pursued a consistent line of inquiry in the interview process, 
the stream of questions to be used was fluid and open ended and pre-agreed by the 
respondents as opposed to being rigid, as can be contemplated in a structured 
fieldwork design (Simpson and Humphrey, 2010). The interview process remained 
open-ended and at times assumed a conversational manner, due to the sensitivity of 
the issue of corruption in Nigeria, but strictly followed the underlying research 
ethical protocol, built around the researcher refraining from giving any direction to 
the respondents as to what to say and what not to say (Seidler, 1974; Lederman, 
1990; Sim, 1998).  
As explained in section 2.2, corruption in relation to public procurement is defined in 
terms of inappropriate behaviours (wrongdoing) (Boynton and Greenhalgh, 2004; 
Kim et al., 2009). The associated risk factors are explained in terms of the 
Impartiality Principle − acts of wrongdoing (partiality) which undermine the 
integrity of the procurement process (Kurer, 2005; Rothstein and Eek, 2009). The 
result is that public procurement-related corruption is difficult to measure (study) 
using quantitative methods (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003), hence the use of 
qualitative methods for this study. Corruption involves secrecy and deceit, and the 
possibility of informants being punished when exposed (Kim et al., 2009). 
The sensitivity of corruption in Nigeria means that it is difficult to directly probe 
individuals’ behaviour in relation to corruption. This was indicated by the 
interviewees’ wish to see the proposed questions before giving their consent to be 
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interviewed, and meant that it was necessary to pose questions about their 
knowledge of processes and practices in an indirect manner. As Kim et al. (2009) 
also explained, a semi-structured approach is more likely to encourage people to 
disclose information than a structured interview format if the subject matter of the 
interview involves corruption, as a semi-structured interview gives the interviewer 
the discretion to ask further questions about responses that seem significant. Twenty 
one semi-structured interviews were planned for the fieldwork. However, the 
researcher conducted 20 which constituted over 95% of the planned semi-structured 
interviews during the course of the fieldwork.  
 
The first nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with procurement officers 
in the procurement unit of the case studies’ organisation in this research, the Rural 
Electrification Organisation. As shown in figure 5, the researcher administered the 
semi-structured interview according to a schedule which served to guard the 
interview process against any distractions. The semi-structured interview employed a 
technique based on Bryman’s (2008) prescription for the interview framework. 
While the interviews at the Rural Electrification Organisation and the PPC dealt with 
the issue of corruption in public procurement from the point of view of the 
procurement officers, focusing on their views about the possible risk factors in the 
Nigerian public procurement process, the interview at the Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Public Procurement Organisation focused on the subject of the 
risk factors for corruption in the procurement process from the perspective of anti-
corruption agencies.  
The semi-structured interview framework provides the opportunity for the researcher 
and the interviewee to interact personally with each other. To avoid linguistic 
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misunderstandings, the interviews for this study were all conducted in English 
(Mandel, 2003).  
Figure 5: The semi-structured interview schedule 
 
Source: Adapted from Ekwo, 2011 
 
Furthermore, following the semi-structured interview procedure outlined in figure 5, 
each interview began slowly with a preliminary interchange as an icebreaker, to 
introduce the topic. The conversation started gradually thereafter, in such a manner 
as to gain the confidence of the interviewee prior to the confidentiality declaration. 
The researcher followed this up by introducing the subject matter of the interview 
Pre-Interview Stage
Contact the interviewee to confirm the appointment 
Review the interview guide 
Arrive ahead of scheduled meeting time to wait for the interviewee
Interview Stage
Begin preliminary chat to introduce the purpose of interview
Make sure time frame for each question is maintained
Maintain tact in introducing sensitive questions
Post Interview Stage
Checking and collation of records
Send thank you message to the interviewee
Identify key points raised by interviewee
Transcribe data
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and delivering the questions one after the other. By following this procedure, the 
interview process ran its course successfully. At the end of each interview, the 
interviewer asked the permission of the interviewee to have recourse to follow-up by 
email or phone if the need arose and all the interviewees agreed to this. The elaborate 
preparations made before going into the field impacted positively on the whole 
process of the interview.  
 
The supervisory team gave unstinting support to the researcher. The researcher had 
contacted the organisations visited during the fieldwork in advance and secured the 
acceptance of their management for the interviews ahead of the fieldwork. This gave 
the degree of credibility to the exercise that is required due to the bureaucratic nature 
of Nigerian society. The processes leading up to the interviews created some degree 
of trust between the interviewer and the interviewees. The trust built during the 
interview process led to a few of the interviewees calling the researcher after the 
interview to volunteer further information that became available to them after the 
interview process was completed. This helped the researcher to update the data 
collected. 
3.4.4 Approaching the interviewees 
Because of formal requirements and the peculiar safety risks of research on the 
subject of corruption, steps were taken to ensure the safety of the researcher. The 
process of conducting interviews is set out in four successive steps: identifying the 
interviewees, approaching the interviewees, conducting the interviews and 
transcription.  
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The identification of subjects to be interviewed is vital for collecting the required 
quality of data from the case studies organisation and each of the other four 
organisations visited during the main and supplementary fieldwork. Given the 
complexities of the issues of corruption in public procurement and its incessant 
manifestations in Nigeria, finding out which organisation and category of officers 
should be visited during the conduct of the fieldwork became essential in order to 
identify credible interviewees for the study.  
Having access to key informants is very difficult, especially in a society that is 
highly fragmented along ethnic and religious lines like Nigeria. As is the case with 
most fieldwork in developing countries, some of the interviewees exhibited high 
levels of scepticism as to the identity and motives of the researcher (Ilesanmi, 2001; 
Okediji, 2005; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Although prior to going into the field, 
the researcher had attempted to make contact with most of the organisations and 
communities visited, using her network of contacts developed over a long period, 
and this did not mean gaining access to participants was an easy task. Many of the 
interviewees asked the researcher to come back again and again before finally 
granting an audience. 
3.4.5Data transcription and analysis 
In social research, data obtained through interviews is only useable if it is 
transcribed. As already mentioned above, transcription of the interview data and 
coding it into codes for template analysis was one of the important post-fieldwork 
activities carried out by the researcher (Hycner, 1985; McLellan et al., 2003). The 
researcher transcribed the semi-structured interview data immediately after the day’s 
scheduled interviews had been completed. This was so that all the information 
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gained from the day’s interview could be properly recorded and transcribed while the 
memory of the day’s interview engagements was still fresh. According to Yin 
(1993), adopting an appropriate strategy for analysing data from case study evidence 
has always been difficult because the strategy is still evolving. He nevertheless 
prescribed three analytical strategies for data generated from case study research. 
These are: 
1. Relying on the theoretical propositions that led to the research questions, aim and 
objectives 
2. Examining rival explanations about the research theme and 
3. Developing a case explanation. 
Furthermore, Yin (1999) advanced the idea of theoretical propositions, which are 
most commonly used for analysing evidential data in case study research. This 
strategy of analysis has been considered for adoption in this study, based on the 
theoretical underpinnings explained in chapter 2. It provides a guide for recognising 
data that have direct relevance to the purpose of the research. It is a strategy that 
helps the researcher to sieve and discard irrelevant data as a quality check for data 
integrity and general quality assurance in the case study research process. This 
strategy has been found to be especially useful in answering the ‘how’, ‘what’ and 
‘why’ questions in case study research (Darke et al., 1998).  
Furthermore, this strategy is very useful for analysing the qualitative data envisaged 
to be collected in this research because it is amenable to template analysis processes 
that underpin this study. The strategy of thinking about rival explanations is useful 
for qualitative research (Bryman, 2008). This is because it can only be applied to 
textual data analyses through the instrument of template analysis (Yin, 1993). 
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Because of its exclusively qualitative attribute, it is suitable for the textual data 
generated for this research.  
Developing a case study description is usually adopted as an alternative strategy 
when the case studies does not fit into the other two methods of data analysis 
described above, and the research seeks to develop a descriptive framework for 
analysing and presenting the case studies evidence (Mays and Pope, 1995). In 
practice however, this method of data analysis is less preferable than the first two. It 
is mostly used in situations where it has not been possible to apply the first two 
methods; hence it is not applicable for this research. 
3.5 Template analysis 
According to King (2004) template analysis is an approach to data analysis that 
involves developing a 'template' of themes from mostly raw data − for this study, 
data from semi-structured interviews − and organising them in a meaningful way 
into codes which can then be subjected to further analysis to form themes that relate 
to the research aim. The themes emerging from the initial data will be further 
generated into information codes that reflect the whole data set and by implication, 
the overall aim and objectives of the study. Specifically, the approach of template 
analysis involves looking at a small section of the data set and identifying the themes 
that are emerging from the data, before further organising them into meaningful 
codes that form a 'template', which is then used to analyse the whole data set 
(Plumecoq and Lefranc, 2000; Heeks and Bailur, 2007).  
The codes created derived from the researcher’s reading of the literature and the 
government approved procurement manual, as set out in the Public Procurement Act 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b). The raw data generated from the fieldwork 
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were coded separately for each individual respondent. Responses to each question 
(code) across all respondents were then sorted so that all similar texts were arranged 
together in one place. Next, through a careful reading across the segments of all 
similar texts from the case study organisation, these were compared with those from 
the PPC of Nigeria; the Bureau for Public Enterprises and the Anti-Corruption 
Commission, and in this way, an initial set of templates was generated (see 
Appendix 3). These initial templates were cross-validated and further integrated with 
templates from the primary source and with those from the secondary data to 
generate a new set of themes. This process continued until a final template was 
defined and the whole data set coded in fulfilment of the research aim and objectives 
(King, 2004; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
3.5.1 The process of template analysis 
Analysis of the data collected using the semi-structured interviews from the case 
studies was carried out by applying template analysis using the process outlined in 
figure 6 and the research design outlined in figure 1. As Al-Mijrab (2010) reported, 
template analysis has become the most popular analytic technique used by 
qualitative researchers. He went on to say that template analysis can be used to 
create templates from qualitative data templates which are then used to build the 
research argument in furtherance of the aim and objectives of the study. A template 
has been defined by King (2004) as the product of the application of the technique of 
template analysis to qualitative data transcribed from qualitative interviews. 
Particularly, a template has been described thus: 
‘…essentially as a list of the codes or categories that represents the themes 
revealed from the data that have been collected. Template analysis combines 
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a deductive and an inductive approach to qualitative analysis in the sense 
that codes can be predetermined and then amended or added to as data are 
collected and analysed’  
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009, p. 505 cited in Al-Mijrab (2010)). 
 
Template analysis can therefore be used for organising transcribed textual data and 
collating them to reflect a set of priori codes that are essentially pre-formulated 
research themes, which for this research are set-out in the semi-structured interview 
questionnaire (See appendix 6). As explained by King (2004), the choice of template 
analysis for this research stems from its amenability in application and development 
of codes from textual data towards answering research questions and achieving 
research aim and objectives. Furthermore, King (2004) and Al-Mijrab (2010) 
described template analysis as a very effective and flexible technique for developing 
patterns from semi-structured interviews into a clear hierarchy of themes, concepts 
that encapsulate meanings which allow the researcher to compare and interrogate 
perspectives from different groups, such as the different case studies for this study. 
Template analysis was applied to the textual data transcribed from the semi-
structured interviews, which were conducted across six public organisations over the 
course of two years, during the main fieldwork in 2011 and the verification 
fieldwork in 2012 (see table 5), in order to gain an understanding of the risk factors 
that may have made the public procurement process in Nigeria vulnerable to 
corruption. In particular, the interviewees were asked what the risk factors of 
corruption were from the purview of the public procurement officers, the contractors 
seeking public contracts through the public procurement process and civil society 
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with responsibility for oversight of the public procurement process to combat 
corruption.  
Though its use in organisational research is still a recent development, having only 
begun in the 1990s (Waring and Wainwright, 2010, Miller and Crabtreee, 1999), the 
application of template analysis to unstructured or semi-structured qualitative data 
has become an accepted technique for qualitative data analysis. For this study, it is 
applied to textual data transcribed from semi-structured interviews to illustrate the 
case studies, relating to risk factors for corruption with reference to the current 
framework for public procurement in Nigeria (see chapter 4). In the first case study 
visited during the main fieldwork, the researcher conducted nine interviews with the 
procurement officers of a rural electrification organisation. Four interviews each 
were conducted at the public electricity company in Nigeria and the anti-corruption 
organisation while three interviews were conducted at the supervisory public 
organisation for public procurement in Nigeria. The transcribed data from the 
fieldwork was analysed and the findings thereof formed the basis for the verification 
fieldwork which was conducted in 2012. During the verification fieldwork, findings 
from the main fieldwork were discussed with interviewees from an anti-corruption 
reform civil society with an interest in public procurement-related corruption, public 
prosecutors and procurement officers from a procurement entity outside the electric 
power sector in Nigeria.  
The purpose of the application of template analysis is to provide an indicative 
overview of the key themes and sub-themes that emerge from the transcription of the 
interview data from the semi-structured interviews. As defined by King (2004), 
themes and codes are relevant features that emerge from analysis of the transcribed 
data of the interviews − be they unstructured, semi-structured or structured − which 
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can then be used as building blocks with which to construct conclusions that respond 
to the research questions and justify the research aim and objectives.  
According to Waring and Wainwright (2010), the approach of template analysis 
involves coding a large volume of text so that segments about an identified topic (the 
codes) can be assembled in one place to complete the interpretative process. The 
original themes for this research are identified from the research aim, objectives and 
question (see section 1.3), and they have to do with the risk factors for corruption in 
the public procurement process in Nigeria. These main themes were further 
developed, through the review of related literature, into semi-structured interview 
questions used for the conduct of interviews, and into preliminary templates were 
generated typifying thematic codes. The preliminary templates were then subjected 
to verification and corroboration by way of a verification phase of fieldwork, the 
analysis of which led to the generation of the final templates, depicting the possible 
risk factors for corruption in the Nigerian public procurement process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 1: Rural electrification 
organisation 
Case study 2: Public electricity 
organisation 
 
Case study 3: Anti-corruption 
organisation 
Development of semi structured interview 
questions and guide  
Analysis of the procurement Act 2007 and 
other manuals 
Semi structured interviews  
Transcription of interviews 
Verification of initial thematic codes 
Reading first transcript, generate initial 
thematic codes 
Development of final templates 
Figure 6: The process of template analysis 
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The process of template analysis for this research involved organising, connecting 
and corroborating thematic codes involving:  
 Creating a code manual/coding scheme  
 Hand or computer coding the text  
 Sorting segments to get all similar text into one place  
 Reading the segments and making the connections that are subsequently 
corroborated to answer the research question and justify the research aim and 
objectives. 
As shown in figure 6, the researcher developed the initial template from pre-defined 
codes which were derived from the literature review and the Nigerian Public 
Procurement Law of 2007. The pre-defined codes are: 
1. Examination of the public procurement process  
2. Identification of a set of risk factors in the PPP  
3. Corruption vulnerability check-list. 
The pre-defined codes were rigorously subjected to review by the researcher and the 
supervisory team before being used by the researcher as the basis for the semi-
structured interview process, the transcripts of which were subjected to template 
analysis. The initial templates that emerged from the analysis of transcripts for the 
semi-structured interviews conducted during the main fieldwork in 2011 give 
indicative thematic codes depicting possible risk factors for corruption in the 
Nigerian public procurement process.  
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3.5.2 Coding the raw data 
Coding of the raw data, according to Corbin 1990 and King 2004, is an important 
and sometimes most difficult part of the qualitative data analysis. Furthermore, 
Corbin 1990 categorised coding into open and axial coding. While axial coding 
creates categories by grouping codes or labels given to words and phrases, open 
coding involves the coding of labelling of words and phrases found in the transcript 
or text. In doing open coding, which is adopted for this research, the researcher reads 
through the data transcript and marks as appropriate by circling or highlighting 
sections of the text selected codes or labels. For this study, this could be texts or 
phrases depicting corruption risk factors. The circled or highlighted codes are then 
collated to form themes towards creating templates. 
As Charmaz (2003) opined, typically when coding, the researcher usually has some 
codes already in mind and is also looking for other ideas that seem to emerge out of 
the data. Explaining further, Charmaz (2003) prescribed a set of questions the 
researcher must consider about the data being coded: 
 What is going on?  
 What are people doing?  
 What is the person saying?  
 What do these actions and statements take for granted?  
 How do structure and context serve to support, maintain, impede or change these 
actions and statements?  
 
Lewins, Taylor and Gibbs, (2005) provide a more detailed list of the kinds of things 
that can be coded (see Table 8). The examples of each kind tend to be descriptive 
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because it makes it is easier to explain the phenomena. However, when you are 
coding it is advisable to move from descriptive codes to more analytic ones as 
quickly as possible. 
Qualitative attributes and behaviours such as corruption, practices or strategies, like 
the PPP and participation in a system such as the system of work in the public 
service, are the key indices of the of the semi-structured interviews and are the 
attributes that can be coded in the process of template analysis.  
Applying the open coding technique, which involves reading through the raw 
transcript of the data from the semi-structured interview, thematic codes depicting 
the risk factors of corruption in the PPP in Nigeria were generated.  
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Figure 7: Coding sample 
 
Source: Semi-structured interview transcript 
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Applying the technique of open coding to data on the theme of examination of the 
PPP produced the following sub-themes: 
1. Examination of the PPP  
1.1 Administration of the PPP 
1.1.2 Fundamental principles of the PPP 
1.1.3 Competition and value for money 
1.1.4 Setting of procurement price thresholds 
1.1.5 Standardising the PPP 
Applying template analysis to the data from the case studies to identify a set of risk 
factors that may explain the vulnerability of the public procurement process to 
corruption produced the following sub-themes: 
2. Identify a set of risk factors in the PPP  
1.2.1 Interference in the PPP 
1.2.2 Absence of confidentiality in the PPP  
1.2.3 Contract splitting 
1.2.4 Abuse of discretion  
1.2.5 Independence of civil society  
1.2.6 Use of price intelligence (Market Fieldwork)  
1.2.7 Need to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives in PPP 
3.5.3 Drawing conclusions 
Drawing conclusions is an important aspect of data analysis (Bryman, 2008). Much 
of social research, and in particular that using qualitative research methods, has 
116 
 
considerable difficulties in drawing conclusions (McKendrick, 1999; Wood et al., 
1999). This is particularly the case when conducting social research that employs the 
case study strategy (Yin, 2003). According to Bennett (2002), the combination of 
new themes of research, the broadening scope of methodologies, and greater 
specialisation within sub-fields (such as the emerging field of corruption research) 
has overshadowed the common methodological concerns of researchers in many 
social fields. Bennett further opined that when conducting interviews (be they 
structured or semi-structured) on different subjects within the case study context, one 
or more of which might be more familiar to the researcher, care must be taken to 
avoid bias towards the more familiar subjects within the case study or case studies; 
as such a position may end up being the basis for the interpretation of other subjects 
within the case studies. According to him, this might affect the validity of the 
conclusions drawn from the study.  
As argued by Bryman (2008), drawing conclusions in case study research entails 
looking for patterns in activities, meanings and forms of participation, relationships 
and settings in order to answer research questions or justify the research aim and 
objectives. The search for meaning in the form of valid conclusions that reflect the 
research aim and objectives is often carried out through a chain of activities 
involving a search for patterns. In order to draw reliable conclusions, a distinct 
analysis technique should be used to strategically interpret the research results in line 
with the research aim and objectives (Bhattacharya, 2008).  
The researcher in this study adopted different approaches which imply selecting 
categories or dimensions through which to seek within-group similarities coupled 
with inter-group differences to interpret the evidence derived from the data analysis. 
Before any final conclusions were drawn, the researcher looked through all forms of 
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documents and other original data acquired and their transformations through the 
template analysis process. If differences were noticed, the places where these new 
insights emerged were traced and re-read. This was also followed by revisiting and 
updating the research aim and objectives. By doing this, the researcher tried to 
ensure that the conclusion reflected the flow of argument through the whole research 
process.  
3.6 Limitations of the research method 
Despite the details presented in the design process for this research, some limitations 
were still perceived in the course of the study. These limitations are highlighted 
below. 
 
It would have been helpful if the researcher had been able to interview the non-
Nigerians involved in acts of corruption in Nigeria, some of whom had already 
pleaded guilty to this crime and were serving prison sentences in the country. This 
would have given insight into the international dimensions to the problems of public 
procurement-related corruption in Nigeria. However, the researcher was not able to 
secure approval to talk to the foreign cohort of perpetrators in order to unravel the 
motives behind their involvement and their modes of operation. Another limitation is 
the inability of the researcher to conduct a complete census of all the relevant 
stakeholders in the research context. This would undoubtedly have revealed more 
information, going beyond the revelations of the case studies and the other 
organisations investigated (Schlesselman and Stolley, 1982). The case studies are, 
however, still justified, because it is impossible to conduct a census fieldwork for a 
doctoral research project due to time and resource constraints.  
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Secondly, the participants were mostly stakeholders in the public procurement sub-
sector of the Nigerian economy and those involved in investigation, prosecution and 
reform efforts at checking corruption in public procurement in Nigeria. Information 
from non-stakeholders would have given insight into the thinking of those who could 
not be classified as public procurement stakeholders with regard to the problem 
studied. This deficiency was hopefully reduced by the integration of documentary 
evidence. Thirdly, due to the case study research design, the data acquired strongly 
reflected the uniqueness of the character of the case studies selected.  
 
Finally, because of the sensitivity of the subject of corruption in Nigeria, the 
researcher encountered difficulty in accessing the respondents for the semi-
structured interviews. In addition to the letter of introduction from the University, the 
researcher also had to make several follow-up phone calls to the respondents to gain 
their trust for the interviews. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has explained why the case studies were chosen as the research strategy 
for this research. The reason for selection of a qualitative case study design − 
particularly the semi-structured interview as the appropriate method for data 
acquisition − has also been explained in this chapter, along with the reason for the 
adoption of the instrument of template analysis for the data analysis process. 
Drawing on the methodological literature, the chapter discussed why the single case 
study design is best suited to the research aim and objectives, in conjunction with 
data from the other related organisations visited during the fieldwork. Building on 
the methodological assumptions of the qualitative approach in conducting case study 
research, this chapter gave a comprehensive description of how multiple data 
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collection methods (interviews, court papers and reports) as employed in the study fit 
well with its research aim and objectives. 
 
Details of the approach to data collection and analysis were presented in 
comprehensive detail in order to give the reader a clear understanding of how the 
research was carried out. Furthermore, the discussion of data collection and analysis 
is focused on the problem of corruption in the public procurement process, with 
implications for its risk factors and its social and economic impact on the Nigerian 
people and economy. This provides a critical awareness of the problems of 
accountability and transparency in the public procurement process in the Nigerian 
context for national and international readers. The chapter ends with a reflection on 
the methodological limitations of the research. This is of particular use in supporting 
the researcher in dealing with methodological issues in future research. It will also 
help other researchers who may want to adopt the methodological approach taken in 
this research with a view to avoiding the limitations that have been highlighted.  
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Chapter 4 
The framework for PPP in Nigeria 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the existing framework of the PPP in Nigeria is examined through 
analysis of secondary data to achieve the first objective of this research, as set out in 
section 1.3. To achieve this, the purpose of the PPP is contextualised by examination 
of the existing public procurement framework in Nigeria. In this chapter, documents 
such as the Nigerian Public Procurement Act and Procurement Regulations upon 
which the institutional framework of the PPP in Nigeria is based are analysed 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b). These statutory documents, which prescribe 
the institutional and administrative framework for the practice of public procurement 
in Nigeria, set key principles upon which PPP is based. In part IV of the Public 
Procurement Act 2007 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b), a set of fundamental 
principles upon which all public procurement activities must be based are itemised 
and part V provides the schedule that details the organisation of procurement 
activities.  
In addition to the Public Procurement Act of 2007, which sets out the general 
framework for the PPP in Nigeria, other statutory instruments provide specific 
details of how parts of the Act should be implemented. Some of these, the specific 
provisions of which are explained under the section entitled ‘secondary procurement 
policies’, are the public procurement regulations for consultancy services, standard 
bidding documents for the procurement of goods, standard bidding documents for 
the procurement of services, standard requests for proposals for selection of firms 
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(small, complex and time-based assignments and individual consultants) and public 
procurement regulations for goods and works. This chapter, which details the 
institutional framework for the PPP in Nigeria through in-depth analyses of extant 
rules, policy documents, guidelines and academic commentaries on the PPP in 
Nigeria, is geared towards achieving the first objective of this research (see section 
1.3.1).  
 
4.2 A background and review of PPP framework 
Upon the return of Nigeria to a system of constitutional democracy on the 29th May 
1999 (National Assembly Nigeria, 1999), it was observed that that the time-tested 
approach to conducting government business had degenerated to such an extent that 
the Public Service Rules, Financial Regulations and Ethics and Norms of the Service 
had all been jettisoned, either due to sheer ignorance or for selfish reasons, and in 
particular for motives of personal gain (Ekpenkhio, 2003). The level of non-
adherence to the applicable rules and procedures and the attendant costs in real and 
financial terms to the country can be seen from the outcry by the government, as 
reported in Ekpenkhio (2003. p.1):    
[...] all the elements that enhance efficiency, reliability and continuity of the 
system have been tampered with. This resulted in major and severe setbacks 
for the conduct of Government business…’ It was further emphasized that 
transparency in Government procedures was necessary to usher in ‘a great 
and dynamic economy’ to ensure ‘a just and egalitarian society.’ 
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As a result, the Nigerian government commissioned a team of procurement experts 
to study its Financial Systems and general procurement-related activities with a view 
to proposing policy measures that would assist the Nigerian Government with a 
process of embedding efficiency, accountability, integrity and transparency into 
Government Procurement and Financial Management Systems (Ekpenkhio, 2003; 
Owolabi, 2004; Akenroye et al., 2013). It therefore follows that a clear objective of 
the Nigerian government, which is also reflected in the aim of this research, is to 
reduce the scope of corruption in the public procurement process and so improve 
efficiency in the management of the country’s public expenditure (Evenett and 
Hoekman, 2005a). The review process identified that weaknesses in the pre-1999 
public procurement process in Nigeria itemised in Ekpenkhio (2003) are namely:  
 
i) that Nigeria lacks a modern law on Public Procurement and a  
permanent oversight body to provide guidance and monitor 
purchasing entities; 
ii) that the Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1958, together with 
the Financial Regulations − which set basic rules for managing public 
expenditure − have gaps and deficiencies. Furthermore, faulty 
implementation of existing regulations on procurement, such as a lack 
of permanent arrangements for control and surveillance, have created 
opportunities for bribery and corruption; 
iii) that due to inflation and lack of regular adjustments to the thresholds 
for the approving limits of the Tender Boards, their authorization was 
constantly being eroded, resulting in abuses, among which the 
practice of splitting contracts is prominent; 
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iv) that there was proliferation of Tender Boards, which were perceived 
by the private sector as sources of delay and non-transparency. In 
addition, these Tender Boards appeared to have a restricted mandate, 
with de facto powers to decide contracts resting with the Permanent 
Secretary and Minister/ Commissioner; 
v) that Customs systems and procedures were cumbersome and major 
causes of delay in clearing goods, and hence a source of corruption; 
and 
vi) that procurement is often carried out by staff who are largely lacking 
in relevant public procurement training. 
 
Furthermore, the committee proffered recommendations which were aimed at 
correcting the identified weaknesses in the procurement process. These were:  
(a) the need to integrate the United Nations Commission for International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model into a law to regulate the practice of 
public procurement in Nigeria; 
(b) the need to establish a Public Procurement Commission (PPC) to 
serve as the regulatory and oversight body on Public Sector 
Procurements in Nigeria; 
(c) the revision of key areas of the Financial Regulations to make them 
more transparent; 
(d) the streamlining of Tender Boards and strengthening their functional 
authority, including powers to award contracts; 
(e) a critical need to rebuild procurement and financial management 
capacity in the public sector through training. 
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4.2.1 Towards the 2007 policy for public procurement 
Upon submission of the review committee on public procurement in Nigeria, the 
government issued the New Policy Guidelines for Procurement and Award of 
Contracts in Government Ministries via Circular No. F. 15775 of 27th June, 2000, 
wherein it accepted the review committee’s recommendations (see section above), 
but added a proviso for the Registration of Contractors and the involvement of 
Political Office holders such as Ministers and Commissioners in the award of 
contracts in excess of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling (£250,000). 
The main provisions of the Circular, which aimed to elevate public procurement in 
Nigeria up to the levels of international best practice according to Ekpenkhio (2003) 
were: 
a) Establishment of a Steering Committee and Procurement Reform 
Implementation Unit (PRIU) to prepare the ground for the 
establishment and proper delivery of a Public Procurement 
Commission (PPC), which it envisaged would be the lead policy-
making body on all procurements and award of contract matters in 
public service; 
b) Permanent Secretary to approve contracts of works, services and 
purchases up to fifty thousand pounds sterling (£50,000); 
c) Establishment and strengthening of the Ministerial Tender Boards; 
d) Strict prohibition of contract splitting; 
e) Open competitive tendering procedures; 
f) Advertisement of tenders in at least two national daily newspapers, 
and/or government gazettes and at least six weeks before the deadline 
for submitting tenders; 
126 
 
g) Opening of tenders in public with or without press coverage; 
h) Clearly defined bid criteria; 
i) Committee of professionals to evaluate bids; 
j) Officials involved in the tendering process to declare conflict of 
interest and exclude themselves; 
k) All contracts valued at two hundred and fifty thousand pounds 
(£250,000) and above to be approved by the Federal Executive 
Council. 
 
Following the publication of this Government Circular (Ekpenkhio, 2003), initiating 
a reform process towards greater transparency and accountability in Nigeria in the 
year 2000, a Steering Committee was formed to drive implementation of the public 
procurement reforms. 
4.2.2 The reform and the 2007 PPP 
The establishment of the Steering Committee in the year 2000 marked the final 
departure from the pre-1999 military rule era, when public procurement in Nigeria 
was carried out without a defined framework to direct public expenditure towards 
transparency and accountability (Eze, 2011). The work of the Steering Committee 
was to later produce the basis for a formal framework for public procurement in 
Nigeria, based on the following parameters:  
(i) Administrative and Legal parameters; 
(ii) Rules and procedures for a Procurement Manual for the Public Sector; 
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(iii) Price Intelligence and Monitoring to gather and collate the prices of 
items with a view to having a data bank on open market prices to provide an 
evidence base on which to monitor contracts. 
 
The activities of the Steering Committee, after extensive reviews of practices in 
other public procurement jurisdictions, culminated in the drafting of a Bill which 
was legislated upon by the Nigerian National Parliament to enact the Public 
Procurement Act of 2007 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007). The Public 
Procurement Act of 2007, which gave statutory effect to public procurement in 
Nigeria, is explored in detail in this chapter to establish the existing framework of 
the PPP in Nigeria.  
Procurement is an important process in the running of the business of government in 
Nigeria and commands the spending of an enormous percentage of the Federal 
government annual budget. It has equally been a significant site of corruption in the 
country over many years (Ribadu, 2006a; Transparency International, 2013).  
 
In Nigeria, procurement is defined as the act of acquiring goods and services, and 
public procurement is the acquisition of goods, services or works through any 
means, by a public authority or entity (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b). As a 
statutory requirement: 
‘a public procuring entity7 shall plan its procurement (a) preparing the needs 
assessment and evaluation; (b) identifying the goods, works or services 
required; (c) conducting appropriate market and statistical fieldwork and on 
                                                          
7
Government department engaging procurement activities. 
128 
 
that basis prepare analysis of the cost implications of the proposed 
procurement.’  
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b, p. 14) 
 
Furthermore: 
‘Where a procuring entity has made a decision with respect to the goods 
and/or services to be procured, it must set minimum qualifications of 
suppliers, contractors or service providers and request interested bidders to 
submit applications for pre-qualification, and thereafter set out precise 
criteria upon which it seeks to give consideration to the applications in 
reaching a decision as to which supplier, contractor or service provider 
qualifies, applying only the criteria set out in the prequalification documents 
and no more.’ 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2007. p.16). 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing and other requirements governing public procurement 
in Nigeria that aim at ensuring only qualified contractors are selected to execute a 
contract, corruption continues to happen (Arrowsmith and Trybus, 2003; Caldwell et 
al., 2005; Dike, 2005; Nicholls et al., 2011).  
 
This study examines the problems of corruption in Nigeria, particularly within the 
public procurement process, with a view to isolating the factors that may have made 
it resistant to past efforts to curtail it, and aims to propose a new framework that 
aims at promoting transparency in the process. 
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4.3Administration of public procurement 
The administration of public procurement in Nigeria is provided for in the Act of 
2007 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007-b). Part I of the Act established the National 
Council on Public Procurement under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance, 
with members drawn from the public and private sectors of the Nigerian economy, 
civil society and a secretary who is also the director general and manager of the 
Public Procurement Organisation charged with the responsibility for overseeing 
public procurement in Nigeria. The Council is vested with the overall management 
of public procurement in Nigeria. Specifically, it is empowered in part I of the Act to 
consider, approve and amend the monetary thresholds and prior review thresholds to 
guide the application of the provisions of the Act by procuring entities.
8
 The council 
has responsibility for other policy matters viz. to consider and approve policies on 
public procurement; approve changes in the procurement process in response to 
improvements in modern technology and socio-economic challenges; and to give 
such other directives and perform such other functions as may be necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Public Procurement Act, 2007.  
4.3.1 Fundamental principles 
A set of fundamental principles aimed at ensuring that public procurement became a 
regulated practice in Nigeria in 2007 are set out in part 4 of the Act. The principles 
enumerate a fundamental set of rules meant to ensure that in addition to being 
transparent, the practice of public procurement in Nigeria meets the requirements of 
accountability as it involves the spending of appropriated public money. Before a 
procuring entity embarks on any procurement activity, funds must have been 
                                                          
8
Government ministries, departments and agencies that engage in public procurement. 
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allocated for that purpose. This means that for every procurement commitment 
entered into, there is a corresponding fund allocated to meet the financial obligations 
to be created. Specifically, the Act in section 7(1) states that:  
‘…based only on procurement plans supported by prior budgetary 
appropriations and no procurement proceedings shall be formalized until the 
procuring entity has ensured that funds are available to meet the obligations 
and subject to the threshold in the regulations made by the Bureau, has 
obtained a Certificate of No Objection
9
 to Contract Award from the Bureau
10
 
by open competitive bidding’ 
 
This principle is meant to ensure that the public treasury is not committed to a 
procurement contract that is not provided for in the budget. As Olatunji (2008) 
explains, before the Public Procurement law was implemented in 2007, government 
departments and agencies at were at liberty to set rules for each contracted item they 
procured. According to the author, at the time, procuring entities could covertly 
implement procurement guidelines that would lead to a predetermined contractor 
being awarded the contract.  
Furthermore, until they were restrained by the Procurement Act 2007, government 
appointees were in the habit of committing government to contractual obligations for 
which monies were not allocated (So and Opawole, 2010). This resulted in an ever-
growing debt owed by government to contractors both within and outside the 
country, but with the implementation of the Act, it was considered as serious 
misconduct for any official of government to award a contract for which funds have 
not been specifically allocated. In addition, many government projects could not be 
                                                          
9
An approval in writing stating that the procurement activity under consideration meets extant rules. 
10
The Public Procurement Organisation. 
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completed, because funds were not allocated for them. This led to a string of 
abandoned projects
11
 across the country.  
4.3.2 Competition and value for money 
Because of the problems manifest in public award and administration in the years 
before 2007 (Ojo et al., 2006; So and Opawole, 2010), contracts for the procurement 
of public goods and services were awarded to predetermined beneficiaries in covert 
circumstances dictated by the political and administrative heads of government 
departments. Another problem that was manifest in the award of government 
contracts in the pre-2007 era lay the award of fake contracts to non-existent 
companies
12
(Eddy and Akpan, 2008). This way government officials provided 
simulated documentation for funds directly diverted from the public coffers for 
personal use (Nnabuife, 2010). In response to these problems, part 4, section1, clause 
c-g of the Act provided that every public procurement activity leading up to the 
award of contract must be:  
‘…by open competitive bidding; in a manner which is transparent, timely, 
equitable for ensuring accountability and conformity with this Act and 
regulations deriving there from; with the aim of achieving value for money 
and fitness for purpose; in a manner which promotes competition, economy 
and efficiency; and in accordance with the procedures and time-line laid 
down in this Act and as may be specified by the Bureau from time to time…’ 
 
Not only did the Act outlaw wasteful pre-2007 practice, it introduced a new regime 
of public contract administration with clear cut parameters to ensure value for any 
                                                          
11
 Projects started which could not be completed due to lack of allocated funds. 
12
 Companies that are not registered and so cannot sue and be sued in their corporate names. 
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money spent on public procurement. A competitive bidding process is required, 
under the condition that for a contract to be awarded it must be advertised to the 
public and made open to every interested contractor’s bid. This ensures that the 
process is transparent and can be scrutinised against the published criteria and extant 
regulations pursuant to the Act that now govern the administration of public 
procurement in Nigeria. It is also a requirement that the competence of the contractor 
is taken into account in the procurement process, with the result (at least in 
appearance) that only companies which have the wherewithal to carry out a project 
will be awarded the contract (Olayiwola and Oyegoke, 2010). Another of this Act’s 
innovations to advance transparency is the empowerment of the Public Procurement 
Organisation to make new regulations in response to feedback on the implementation 
of the new public procurement regime in the country.  
4.3.3 Setting a threshold for public procurement 
Against the practice where contracts were awarded by fiat of the political and/or 
administrative leadership in government agencies (Aliyu and Elijah, 2011), the new 
regime is not only prospective in its drive to achieve transparency, it is also reactive, 
requiring the Bureau
13
 to set and as appropriate, review thresholds
14
 in the 
procurement regulations to reflect changing social and economic realities. 
Specifically, part 4 section 2 of the Act states: 
‘Where the Bureau has set prior review thresholds in the procurement 
regulations, no funds shall be disbursed from the Treasury or Federation 
Account or any bank account of any procuring entity for any procurement 
falling above the set thresholds unless the cheque, payments or other form of 
                                                          
13
Public Procurement Organisation. 
14
 Monetary limits requiring different levels of approvals in public procurement in Nigeria. 
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request for payments is accompanied by a certificate of ‘No Objection’ to an 
award of contract duly issued by the Bureau.’ 
 
In addition to setting and reviewing the thresholds for ensuring that there is 
transparency in the process of public procurement, the bureau also imposes the 
issuing of a certificate of ‘No Objection’ before payments for contracts that have 
been awarded and executed can be paid for from the public treasury. In this way, 
accountability and transparency are monitored at all stages of the procurement 
process.  
Another problem associated with the administration of public contract awards in the 
years preceding 2007, as explained by Olayiwola and Oyegoke (2010), is that many 
of the companies benefited from government contracts which they did not have 
capacity, in terms of personnel and equipment, to execute. As a result, many of the 
companies that were awarded contracts could only deliver shoddy work, while others 
could not deliver any work at all due to lack of capacity and the government having 
little or no remedy. Many of the contractors that benefited from contracts at that time 
were neither natural persons nor legal persons nor a combination of the two, meaning 
they could not be held individually or jointly liable for obligations and/or 
responsibility arising from the non-performance or improper performance of any 
contract awarded. Consequently, it is provided in section 6 of part 4 of the 2007 Act 
that in addition to requirements contained in any solicitation documents, bidders 
shall: 
‘…possess the necessary: professional and technical qualifications to carry 
out particular procurements; financial capability; equipment and other 
relevant infrastructure; shall have adequate personnel to perform the 
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obligations of the procurement contracts. Possess the legal capacity to enter 
into the procurement contract; not be in receivership, the subject of any form 
of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings or the subject of any form of 
winding up petition or proceedings; have fulfilled all its obligations to pay 
taxes, pensions and social security contributions not have any director who 
has been convicted in any country for any criminal offence relating to fraud 
or financial impropriety or criminal misrepresentation or falsification of acts 
relating to any matter; accompany every bid with an affidavit disclosing 
whether or not any officer of the relevant committees of the procurement 
entity or Bureau is a former or present director, shareholder or has any 
pecuniary interest in the bidder and confirm that all information presented in 
its bid are true and correct in all particulars.’ 
 
To ensure that contracts awarded are not abandoned by the contractors, leaving the 
government at a loss in terms of remedies, the Procurement Act specifically provides 
that a contract can only be awarded to a person, either legal or natural. Even though 
the Public Procurement Act has not eliminated corruption from the procurement 
circle in Nigeria (Jacob, 2010), the implication of its implementation has been that 
only persons against whom proceedings for damages can be sustained in the case of 
a breach can be awarded contracts. Furthermore, a process of due diligence for 
checking the would-be contractor’s capacities in terms of professional, technical and 
financial capacities, and possession of the necessary equipment to execute the scale 
of project being contracted, is also elaborated. This is to ensure that the contractors(s) 
who pass the rigorous evaluation process and eventually get awarded the contract(s) 
are less likely to be agents of potential corruption.  
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In the pre-2007 era of public contract administration in Nigeria, procurement officers 
were often confronted by certain contractors who would stop at nothing to coerce 
them through bribery into influencing contract awards in their favour (Nwaobi, 2004; 
Nell, 2009). By contrast with the old order, where the giver of a bribe committed no 
crime, under the new dispensation of public contract administration in Nigeria, the 
giver is as guilty as the recipient of the bribe (National Assembly Nigeria, 2000). Not 
only could the bidder who engages in acts of bribery be guilty of corruption, but 
section 8 of the Procurement Act specifically states that: 
‘Whenever it is established by a procuring entity or the Bureau that any or a 
combination of the situations set out exist, a bidder may have its bid or 
tender excluded from any particular procurement proceeding if: there is 
verifiable evidence that any supplier, contractor or consultant has given or 
promised a gift of money or any tangible item, or has promised, offered or 
given employment or any other benefit, item or a service that can be 
quantified in monetary terms to a current or former employee of a procuring 
entity or the Bureau, in an attempt to influence any action, or decision 
making of any procurement activity; a supplier, contractor or consultant 
during the last three years prior to the commencement of the procurement 
proceedings in issue, failed to perform or to provide.’ 
 
The quotation above shows that procurement officers now enjoy some level of 
protection from desperate contractors who hitherto would go to extreme lengths to 
bribe family members, friends and other associates of the procurement officer in a 
desperate scheme to conscript the officer into tempering extant rules in their favour 
(Ebbe, 1997; Schubert and Miller, 2008a). Furthermore, explicit responsibility now 
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rests with the accounting officer
15
 of any procuring entity in the event that the 
corruption safeguards of the act are compromised. This is seen in part 4 of the Act, 
and in particular, sections 22-25, which state that:        
‘The accounting officer of a procuring entity and any officer to whom 
responsibility is delegated are responsible and accountable for any actions 
taken or omitted to be taken either in compliance with or in contravention of 
this Act. The accounting officer of a procuring entity has the responsibility to 
ensure that the provisions of this Act and the regulations laid down by the 
Bureau are complied with, and concurrent approval by any Tenders Board 
shall not absolve the accounting officer from accountability for anything 
done in contravention of this Act or the regulations laid down hereunder. 
Procurement and disposal decisions of a procuring entity shall be taken in 
strict adherence to the provisions of this Act and any regulations as may from 
time to time be laid down by the Bureau. Persons who have been engaged in 
preparing for a procurement or part of the proceedings thereof may neither 
bid for the procurement in question or any part thereof either as main 
contractor or sub-contractor nor may they cooperate in any manner with 
bidders in the course of preparing their tenders.’ 
 
This compels the accounting officer to ensure full implementation of the Act against 
corruption, failing which he could be liable both at law and in equity for the resultant 
corruption and any financial and other losses thereof that government may suffer 
(Awolusi, 2010). In addition to the Act, secondary regulations detailing how specific 
sections of the Act must be implemented have been produced to promote the 
                                                          
15
The administrative head of a procuring entity with responsibility for supervising public procurement 
activities. 
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transparency, accountability and integrity of the process of public procurement in 
Nigeria. 
4.3.4 Transparency in selecting consultants 
In the post-2007 public procurement regime in Nigeria, attempts have been made to 
reduce the cumbersome bureaucracy, which has been the bane of the process of 
public procurement in many countries (Arrowsmith and Wallace, 2000; Arrowsmith 
and Trybus, 2003). A number of implementation guidelines that simplify the specific 
provisions of the 2007 Act with regard to the standard request for proposals, 
standard bidding documents and other documents explaining various articles of the 
Act have been produced for application to procurement of different works and 
services in Nigeria. These documents, which aim to simplify parts 4-8 of the Act, 
seek the objectives of openness and transparency to reduce the risk of corruption in 
the process of procuring contractors for different categories of contracts (National 
Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b; Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e).  
The regulations, which are in accordance with the Nigerian Public Procurement Act 
2007, are also crafted to reflect internationally accepted best practice with regard to 
procurement (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e p.iii). Furthermore, the Request 
of Proposal gives all the information needed for all pre-qualified
16
 bidders so that 
none of the bidders are given more information about the procurement process than 
others. To promote integrity and openness of the process, would-be contractors are 
required to submit their bids in two separate parts: the technical proposal and the 
financial proposal (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008d). It is a requirement of the 
regulations that the technical proposal component of the bid be stated in a:  
                                                          
16
A short list of consultants following Request for Expression of Interest through advertising in the 
media. 
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‘…standard format that permits the requested technical information to be 
presented in a clear, precise and readily available manner and allows that 
client to readily understand and evaluate the technical proposals in 
accordance with the established selection criteria. The completed form to 
indicate details of the consultant’s organisation and experience, methodology, 
work plan, work schedule, team composition and task assignments, and 
staffing schedule.’ 
 (Public Procurement Organisation, 2008a: p.v). 
 
From this statement it is clear that implementation of the post-2007 procurement 
agenda in Nigeria is designed so that the procuring entity is supplied with all the 
required technical information about the contractors bidding for its contracts, 
following which the resulting procurement decisions are based on the available data. 
Thus, the bidder is required to supply all the information needed by the procuring 
entity on which to ground an objective decision about which provider is technically 
best suited to fulfil the contract on offer.  
Furthermore, not only does the new regime ensure that all relevant information is 
supplied by the bidding contractors to enable the procuring entity to make an 
objective decision, but the possibility that contractors that have not disclosed 
relevant information can be excluded from the process, meaning that the 
responsibility to ensure the supply of all necessary information now rests on the 
contractors. In addition to the technical proposal, which is evaluated either by in-
house experts or by appointed consultants of the procuring entity to determine the 
technical capability of the bids submitted, financial bids are also required to be 
submitted by the contractors (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e). In particular, 
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section 4b of the notes to users provides a standard request for the presentation of the 
proposal, 2008 which states, inter alia:  
‘…the use of standard format that permits the requested financial 
information to be presented in a clear, precise and readily available manner 
that allows the client (procuring entity) to easily understand and evaluate the 
financial proposals in accordance with the established selection criteria.’ 
 
As against the former practice where some contractors used misleading information 
about their financial capacities to secure the contract and then struggle with the 
project at the expense of the client (Olusegun et al., 2011), the procuring entity must 
now be given all the required financial information in the manner it determines as 
best suited to support its decision as to which of the companies is best suited for the 
contract. Furthermore, there is a strict stipulation that evaluations of the financial 
bids are carried out by financial experts, completely independent of the evaluation of 
the technical bids as a measure to check the integrity of the evaluation process. The 
implication of the double blind process in the evaluation of the proposals means that 
for any proposal to be adjudged successful, it must achieve successful evaluation in 
both the technical and financial evaluation processes.   
Having both the technical and financial bids placed at the disposal of the procuring 
entity has contributed immensely to the quality of procurement decisions made in the 
post-2007 era of public contract administration in Nigeria (Jacob, 2010; Lindskog et 
al., 2010). However, although the double evaluation process for bids submitted has 
made it difficult for the procuring entity to be deceived into taking inappropriate 
procurement decisions − hence eliminating corruption that may emanate from the 
contractor’s side of the procurement chain − the same cannot be said to be the case 
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with corruption that has an origin in the procuring entity (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2010; Ufere, 2010).  
A consultant who knowingly supplies incorrect information in support of their 
technical or financial bids could also be declared ineligible, either indefinitely or for 
a stated period of time, from participating in procurement proceedings funded from 
the public treasury. Consultants or service providers bidding for contracts funded 
from the public purse are required to exhibit the highest level of ethical standards, 
failing which they could be punished by outright exclusion from the procurement 
process and/or be referred to the appropriate professional bodies for disciplinary 
action on one or more public procurement-related offences, that is, any of the 
corrupt, fraudulent, collusive and coercive practices enumerated in section 3.4 of the 
Contract Agreement Instrument of Nigerian (see section 4.2) (Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2008e, p. 39). In addition to the general anti-corruption measures 
embedded in the post-2007 procurement process in Nigeria, specific measures have 
also been detailed to strengthen the processes for particular categories of 
procurement activity.  
4.3.5 Small complex and time-based assignments 
Specific corruption prevention mechanisms have been developed to complement the 
general provision that has been made to strengthen the post-2007 procurement 
process against corruption (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007-b; Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2008e). The procurement regulations for small contractual service 
assignments impose specific obligations which contractors must fulfil before 
payments for services rendered can be remunerated (Bureau of Public Procurement, 
2008e. p. 40-43). Consequently, only the claim for actual hours spent and verified by 
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the procuring entity can be remunerated. This way, besides executing the work, the 
contractor is saddled with the task of proving by way of documentary evidence 
specifics of the work done on the days and hours indicated.  
For reimbursable allowances to be claimed by the service consultant, actual costs 
and expenses evidenced by verifiable invoices must be presented and checked to 
avoid fraudulent claims on the public coffers. Payments for items of expenditure 
such as Per Diem and Travel Costs under this arrangement can only be made upon 
full proof demonstrated by the service provider that the expenditure was actually 
incurred, making it particularly difficult for fraudulent claims to succeed without the 
concurrence of the procurement officers.  
Furthermore, payment for small service contract assignments executed in the new 
public procurement era can only be made if evidenced by an invoice and supported 
by necessary documentation at the end of every month or other periodic duration of 
time agreed. If this in order the due payment can be made within the 30 days 
immediately after the invoice has been submitted. Other mechanisms to check 
corruption by service providers also exist. In part C of section 4 of the small 
assignment regulation, it is particularly stated that:  
‘The final payment shall be made only after the final report shall have been 
submitted and approved as satisfactory by the procuring entity. If any 
deficiencies are noticed in the service delivered or in the final report, the 
consultant shall promptly make any necessary corrections to the satisfaction 
of the procuring entity.’ 
(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008e). 
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The requirement that a final report must be submitted and approved by way of 
verification by the procuring entity before total payment for small service contract 
assignments is fully remunerated almost certainly precludes the tendency towards 
contractor-driven corruption for this category of service. 
Furthermore, besides the elaborate mechanisms in the framework for small service 
assignment contracts explained above, further anti-corruption safeguards have been 
articulated in the regulations for complex assignments (Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2008d). The latter presents complex technical challenges with regard 
to whether payment of a lump-sum should be made either before the project or when 
part of it has been completed. The conditions for such tenders include a proviso that 
only contractors or a consortium of consultants who have already been evaluated and 
listed by the Public Procurement Organisation as competent for the type of complex 
service in the view of the procuring entity can be engaged. And in addition, the 
contractor is required to conduct their activities with the highest level of diligence 
and prudence, so as not to incur any supplementary expenditure for the procuring 
entity outside the contract. In particular, section 36.2 states that: 
‘The consultant shall indemnify the procuring entity from and against any 
and all claims, liabilities, obligations, losses, damages, penalties, actions, 
judgements, suits, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses and disbursement 
of whatsoever nature that may be imposed on, incurred by or asserted 
against the procuring entity during or in connection with the performance of 
the contract.’ 
(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008d. p. 35). 
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Because of the higher amount of money involved and the technical complexity of the 
lump-sum project type, the contractor is required, in addition to ensuring that it 
conducts itself with probity in relation to the contract, to also go the extra mile to 
ensure that it protects the client from any form of expenses that are not covered by 
the contract. From the quotation above, it can be seen that measures that border on 
the inequitable are employed by the post-2007 public procurement regime in Nigeria 
to safeguard the process against corruption instigated by the contractor.  
As stated in the fundamental principles of public procurement (National Assembly 
Nigeria, 2007.-b), there is a need to achieve procedural transparency in soliciting 
procurement proposals from eligible contractors and consultants. This has been 
provided for by way of a standard request template for procurement proposals which 
has been developed for uniform application in Nigeria (Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2008f. p.5). Contractors are particularly required to declare any 
information that exposes them to the dilemma of conflict of interest and potentially 
impairs their ability to transparently discharge their contractual responsibilities. 
Following this declaration, which is placed on the contractor as a duty, the 
procurement entity is empowered to exercise discretion to disqualify the contractor 
if, in its opinion, the declared conflict of interest is considered potentially damaging.  
The requirement that all contractors are required to disclose information about their 
company history and particularly, any criminal records held by the directors and 
other employees if applicable, as well as providing a comprehensive work 
methodology (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008f. p 11), means that not only is it 
easier to achieve transparency in the processes leading up to the award of the 
procurement contract, but use of the process to commit fraud on the public treasury 
will be rendered more difficult. 
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4.4 Anti-corruption and the bidding process 
As part of the post-2007 procurement process, a number of measures have been 
taken to ensure that transparency is achieved in the bidding process leading up to the 
award of contracts in Nigeria. Those which have been itemised in the standard 
bidding process for the procurement of small works and goods are explained below.  
In accordance with the Public Procurement Act (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007b), 
a Standard Bidding Document (Standard Tender Document) (Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2008b) has been prepared as a guideline for the procurement of small 
and other related services by competitive tendering.
17
 The standard bidding process 
aims for probity in government spending and to enable the Procuring Entity to select 
the bid evaluated as best value for money. The importance of the introduction of the 
standard bidding document in the procurement process for small works and services 
is that once requests for bids are made, the procuring entity is bound to accept the 
lowest evaluated bid, provided it meets the published requirements of the specific 
works or services to be procured.  
In addition to the tendering process for this category of works and services, the 
specifics of which have been enumerated in section 5, sub-sections on the notice to 
users (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008b) state that although it is open to all 
eligible bidders, pre-qualification
18
 is required. Another anti-corruption point in the 
procedure outlined for the procurement of small works is the requirement that all 
bids submitted must be opened in the presence of contractors. Also, as part of the 
evaluation process following the opening of the bids, the procuring entity is required 
to consider only those tenders opened and recorded during the tender opening 
                                                          
17
 A tendering process open to all eligible contractors in which the bid evaluated as best succeeds.  
18
A process by which a short list of eligible contractors is compiled prior to the bidding process. 
145 
 
exercise. This way, the process is put under the scrutiny of the contractors involved 
and civil society and others with an interest in the process are also able to track the 
records of the evaluation, as against the pre-2007 procurement practice of awarding 
contracts to contractors who did not even participate in the bidding process (Smith, 
2001).  
In addition to the inbuilt transparency mechanisms in the standard bidding process 
for the procurement of small works, a pre-tender meeting is required to clarify 
concerns that the tenderers may have about the bidding process being proposed for 
the procurement of any major public work (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008c. p. 
5). To make the tendering process for major works even more transparent, all 
questions raised and addressed during the pre-tender meeting are adopted as an 
integral part of the tender document, which must then be made available to all 
contractors who acquired the tender document.  
As in the requirements in the bidding process for the procurement of small works, 
prequalification is not usually required in the bidding process for the procurement of 
goods (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008a. p. i). To ensure fairness to all potential 
bidders for goods to be procured, the mandatory Instruction to Tenderers (ITT)
19
 is 
made available to all bidders. This way, all the bidders have access to the same 
amount and quality of information for the preparation of their tender documents and 
the tenderers are also made aware of the criteria upon which their tender submissions 
will be evaluated.    
                                                          
19
 Details of how tenders should be prepared. 
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4.4.1 Standardising procurement process 
As against the practice where every agency of government varied the procurement 
rules to suit their preferred contractor(s) (Falvey et al., 2008; Oyewobi et al., 2011), 
implementation of the 2007 Procurement Act in Nigeria has introduced uniform 
rules in the administration of contracts funded by the public purse (Bureau of Public 
Procurement, 2007b). In particular, it is stated in section 92 of the regulation that: 
‘The Procuring Entity shall use, or ensure the use of, the Public Procurement 
Organisation Standard Bid Evaluation Report for the Evaluation of Goods 
and Works to detail the specific reasons on which the determinations for the 
recommendation for the award of contract is made. If the procurement is 
subject to the prior review of the Public Procurement Organisation, the 
Procuring Entity shall send this Report to the Public Procurement 
Organisation with the Procuring Entity’s contract award recommendation 
for the Public Procurement Organisation’s comment and ‘no objection’ 
before the award of contract to the successful bidder is announced. The 
report to the Public Procurement Organisation on the evaluation and 
comparison of bids shall be accompanied by the three lowest evaluated cost 
bids’. 
 (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007b, p.27). 
 
As shown above, transparency of the procurement process in Nigeria is further 
strengthened by the overarching oversight function of the Public Procurement 
Organisation (BPP). In addition to the requirement of the law that all Procuring 
Entities apply the BPP’s Standard Bid Evaluation Report format for the Evaluation 
of Goods and Works and make the report available to it for scrutiny, the BPP is also 
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empowered by law to review the procurement exercise if, in its opinion, the exercise 
is substantially non-compliant with the Public Procurement Act, 2007 (National 
Assembly Nigeria, 2007b). Compared with the problem of ambiguity that was the 
bane of the pre-2007 public procurement process in Nigeria (Evenett and Hoekman, 
2005b), the advent of a unified process that can be applied across the public sector 
for procurement of goods and services is a major achievement in the battle against 
corruption.  
The post-2007 uniformity of the public procurement process (National Assembly 
Nigeria, 2007b) has meant that reported cases of corruption are able to be tracked 
and data generated enabling regular review that will further strengthen the process 
against corruption (Awolusi, 2010). That a process now exists in Nigeria (National 
Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b), and that this process must be followed and strictly 
adhered to in the award and administration of contracts funded from the public purse, 
makes it more open to wider participation. This has now imposed a measure of 
checks and balances in the process, hence reducing the susceptibility of the process 
to the wanton abuse common in the pre-2007 era when contract award was by fiat of 
the management of the Procuring Entity (Robinson, 1998; Salisu, 2000b; Madichie, 
2005).  
The new regime of public procurement in Nigeria has also extended its drive for 
transparency and accountability to public procurement exercises that involve 
international competitive bidding (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007a). 
International companies wishing to participate in competitive bidding for contracts in 
Nigeria now have the benefit of a public procurement process where the rights and 
obligations arising from the process are clearly stated and can be enforced in 
Nigerian courts in the event of breach (Obayelu, 2007; Okafor, 2009).  
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Beyond standardisation of the public procurement process for easy participation of 
international firms, the Regulations for Procurement of Consultancy Services 
(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007a) are explicit in section one about Joint 
Venture,
20
 providing clear frameworks that ensure that all companies in a joint 
venture are jointly liable for the entire contract. This allows obligations arising from 
a joint venture arrangement to the parties as well as their client (Procuring Entity) to 
be stated unambiguously, so that breach and any other irregularities before, during 
and after the award of the contract are transparently dealt with, by contrast with the 
pre-2007 era when joint ventures featured prominently in unresolved fraud against 
the public treasury in Nigeria (Adeniran, 2008).  
4.5 Post-2007 procurement process and corruption 
In spite of the promising nature of the measures described above, they are not 
without their critics. Ezeani (2005) has nevertheless contended in the run-up to the 
2007 Act that the anti-corruption measures in the post-2007 public procurement 
process, like other anti-corruption measures in Nigeria, are superficial and cosmetic, 
and as a result, have been ineffective in combating corruption in the procurement 
process. They have targeted the contractor-side risk factors and failed to identify and 
eliminate the risk factors that may be internal to the process, which remains the main 
instrument of private wealth accumulation (Osoba, 1996; Eddy and Akpan, 2008).  
4.6 Summary of chapter 
That large scale corruption incidents still dogged the post-2007 procurement era in 
Nigeria has shown that efforts to stamp out corruption from the public procurement 
                                                          
20
Association of firms bidding for and executing a contract in such a way that they share both profits 
and liability. 
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process, in addition to targeting corruption tendencies that are external to the 
procurement process, must also look inwards and effectively tackle risk factors 
within the procuring entities that can be exploited for corruption (Awolusi, 2010). 
The 2009 conviction of top management staff of the Nigerian Port Authority (Azeez, 
2011; Joseph A et al., 2011) and several on-going corruption cases in Nigeria for 
abuse of the procurement process has shown that the 2007 Public Procurement Act 
and the new regime of public procurement it has created in Nigeria are still 
susceptible to corruption (Yekini, 2008; Asada, 2010; Williams, 2010).  
Furthermore, the comprehensive anti-corruption mechanisms built into the Public 
Procurement Act of 2007 in Nigeria have not been able to eradicate corruption from 
the procurement process in Nigeria. Furthermore, they have shown that a systemic 
knowledge about factors that may have exposed the procurement process to 
corruption needs to be gleaned from analyses of case studies, such as the Public 
Power Organisation, the Rural Electrification Organisation, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Public Procurement Organisation, in addition to other 
secondary facts and figures of the authorities identifying a set of risk factors that 
provide explanations for the post-Public Procurement 2007 Act perpetuation of 
corruption in the procurement process in Nigeria.  
The key anti-corruption provisions in the institutional framework of PPP in Nigeria 
based on the Public Procurement Law of 2007 and other statutory instruments are 
presented in summary format in table 7 below. 
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Table 7: Institutional framework of PPP based Public Procurement Act 2007  
Key theme Purpose 
Administration of public 
procurement 
Provision for centralised management of public procurement in Nigeria 
Provision for office with responsibility for PPP policy matters − consideration and approval policies on the PPP 
Reviewing and updating the PPP in response to improvements in technology and development 
Central office with responsibility to give such directives and perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Public Procurement Act, 2007 
Fundamental principles Ensures that for every procurement commitment there is a corresponding fund appropriated  
It became a serious act of misconduct to award a contract for which funds have not been specifically appropriated 
Managements’ powers to unilaterally award a contract were restricted 
Competition and value for 
money 
PPP must be conducted with the aim of achieving value for money and fitness for purpose 
PPP must be conducted in a manner which promotes competition, economy and efficiency 
PPP must be conducted in accordance with the procedures and time-line laid down 
Setting of threshold for public 
procurement 
Setting and appropriate review of thresholds in the procurement regulations to reflect current realities 
Imposition of issuance of a certificate of ‘No Objection’ before payments as a check on diligent adherence to PPP 
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Provision for competence of contractors − professional and technical qualification to carry out projects under the PPP 
Transparency in selecting 
consultants 
Provision for openness and transparency in the PPP 
Provision to request all information needed to ensure that pre-qualified consultants are competent 
Integrity of the PPP ensured through submission of bids in two parts; the technical and the financial proposal 
Provision that a contractor who knowingly supplies incorrect information in support of their technical or financial bids could also 
be declared ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time 
Provision that consultants or service providers bidding for contracts funded from the public purse are required to exhibit the 
highest level of ethical standards, failing which they could be punished by outright exclusion 
Introduction of uniformity to the public procurement process 
 
 
  
152 
 
As summarised in table 7, there are extensive provisions for transparency and 
accountability in the institutional framework for the PPP in Nigeria. However, in 
spite of the implementation of these elaborate frameworks for the PPP over the past 
five years, corruption has persisted. Hence there is a need to generate and analyse 
primary data from those involved in the practice of public procurement in Nigeria in 
order to discover those factors that may have accounted for the vulnerability of the 
PPP to corruption, notwithstanding the provisions against corruption in the 
institutional framework.  
One area where this has been implemented is in the electricity sector in Nigeria; 
hence the fieldwork for this research has focused on two agencies in the sector where 
corruption cases are known to have occurred in spite of the Procurement Law, in 
addition to the Anticorruption Commission and the Public Procurement Checking 
Organisation where corruption cases have not been reported. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that even though there is new legislation against 
corruption in public procurement, a national strategy and a number of Anti-
Corruption Agencies, corruption has still persisted in the procurement process 
because there is an absence of any basic systemic knowledge about the risk factors in 
the process on which anti-corruption efforts in public procurement should be built.  
Having constructed institution framework of the post-2007 PPP that guides the 
practice of public procurement in Nigeria, it is important, through semi-structured 
interviews in selected case studies, to generate and analyse data on the actual 
practice of the PPP in Nigeria in chapter 5 (next chapter) in order to identify those 
risk factors that may have still made the PPP vulnerable to corruption.    
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Chapter 5 
Evidence from case studies 
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Chapter 5 
Evidence from case studies 
5.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the research aim, objectives and the research question presented in 
section 1.4, relevant bodies of literature were reviewed. The review identified a gap 
in knowledge which revealed an absence of investigations into the risk factors 
defined in terms of the Impartiality Principle as underpinning corruption in the 
Nigerian PPP. Following this, a qualitative methodological perspective, using a case 
study strategy, was articulated in chapter 3. The study’s understanding of the 
institutional framework of PPP in Nigeria is based on secondary data sourced for this 
research (Public Procurement Act 2007 and the Procurement Regulations), which is 
examined in chapter four to contextualise the existing framework of the PPP in 
Nigeria. Following this, primary data generated from case studies was analysed to 
identify the factors that may have made PPP resistant to the objective of 
transparency and value for money in the institutional framework as explained in 
chapter four. While two of the case studies are primary dispensers of significant 
public funds through the public procurement process in the public electricity 
industry, the other two have the mandate of eliminating corruption in the public 
procurement process in Nigeria. Furthermore, findings from the analysis of data 
generated through the main phase of fieldwork were discussed during a follow-up 
phase of verification fieldwork with the following three groups: officials from the 
civil society group for ‘Anti-Corruption Reform’; procurement officers from another 
agency of the Nigerian government; and Barristers engaged in the prosecution of 
cases involving the abuse of the public procurement process in Nigeria.  
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In chapter 4, the institutional and legal framework for public procurement in Nigeria 
was explored within the purview of the primary legislation on public procurement 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2007b). This presented the institutional and legal 
frameworks within which public procurement is administered in Nigeria, with an 
explanation of the anti-corruption provisions inherent to these. Building upon the 
analysis of the framework for PPP presented in chapter 4, this chapter now presents 
evidence of public procurement practice by way of analysis of the interviews 
conducted in the four case studies in 2011 and the verification fieldwork conducted 
in 2012.  
 
Analysis of data from each case study is organised around three themes. These are 
the transparency and confidentiality of the process, the level of discretionary powers 
available to procurement officers and the extent to which management staff and civil 
society can play a role in strengthening the public procurement process in Nigeria 
against vulnerability to corruption. In all, the fieldwork for this study involved semi-
structured interviews with interviewees in four organisations and verification 
interviews with two other organisations and a number of prosecutors. 
5.1.1 Content of chapter five 
Chapter five is organised into eight sections. Section one is the introductory section 
of the chapter, outlining its purpose and content. The second section explains the 
fieldwork and the follow-up verification interviews that were conducted in 2011 and 
2012. In section three, the results of analysis of data from the Public Power 
Company (PPC) are presented. Similarly, the results of analyses of data from the 
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Rural Electrification Organisation (REO), the Anticorruption Commission (ACC) 
and the Public Procurement Organisation (PPO) are presented in sections 5.3, 5.4 
and 5.5 respectively. 
Analysis of the qualitative data transcribed from the semi-structured interview 
followed the prescription of coding section 3.5.2 (see sample of coding in figure 7). 
The summary of the chapter is presented in section 5.6. 
5.2 Results from the Public Power Company (PPC) 
Analysis of transcribed data from the PPC shows that the company is aware of the 
need to conduct its procurement activities in line with the requirements of the 
Nigerian Public Procurement Act of 2007, specifically in conformity to the 
fundamental principles outlined in section 4.2. Furthermore, this study also revealed 
that most procurement activities in the PPC are termed unique procurement 
activities.
21
 This enables the company to resort to special guidance on a case-by-case 
basis, as explained in chapter 4. Under the guidelines for unique procurement, the 
existing PPC is only required to structure its procurement activities around a circle of 
activities that will now be described.  
5.2.1 Theme 1: Framework and purpose of the PPP 
Based on the research objectives of articulating the purpose of the PPP through 
examination of the framework for public procurement in Nigeria and the 
corresponding analysis presented in chapter four, the following sub-themes have 
been developed in the format of questions depicting the purpose of the PPP. 
                                                          
21
Procurement activities for which the Procurement Act 2007 can be varied. 
157 
 
Findings from the analysis of data transcribed from the semi-structured interviews at 
the PPC on theme 1 are presented in table 8 below.  
Table 8: Purpose of the PPP at PPC 
Theme  Sub-themes/parent codes Sub-themes/child codes 
1. Purpose of the 
PPP 
1.1 Organisation of the PPP 1.1.1Request to commence PPP 
1.1.2 Obtain approval from approving authority 
1.1.3 Maintain procurement Records 
1.2 Important aspects of the PPP 1.2.1 Provision for competitive bidding and 
transparency 
1.2.2 Use of PPP to obtain the best value for money 
1.3 Confidentiality in the PPP 1.3.1 The process is confidential 
1.3.2 Confidentiality ensured by experienced staff 
Source: Fieldwork and verification interview 2011 and 2012 
The child codes above depict the opinion of the interviewees at the PPC on the 
purpose of the PPP. According to these codes, the purposes ranges from the need to 
have the process conducted under approved guidelines and the need for competition 
and transparency in the process, to the requirement that the process must be 
confidentially conducted. 
One of the interviewees in the PPC said that: 
‘The procurement process in the PPC is supposed to be carried out in 
accordance with the Public Procurement Act, 2007. In cases of unique 
procurement activities, the company resorts to the Public Procurement 
Organisation for guidance. 
(Procurement Officer A, Abuja, 23rd February 2012). 
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This shows a procurement officer in the PPC with a good understanding of the 
purpose of PPP as envisaged by the Public Procurement Act 2007. However, despite 
this knowledge of the purpose of the PPP, cases of corruption still dog procurement 
activities in the power sector in Nigeria, with the most recent example entailing the 
resignation of the country’s Minister of Power on account of public procurement 
corruption in 2012 (Reporter, 2012). 
Furthermore, the same interviewee stated: 
 
‘The most important aspect of the process is the provision for competitive 
bidding and transparency so that scarce resources are used to obtain the best 
possible quality of service for government. The process is confidential. 
Confidentiality is ensured by the appointment of experienced staff to the 
procurement committees.’ 
(Procurement Officer A, Abuja, 23rd February 2012). 
This shows the intention to consider the issues of competition, transparency, value 
for money and confidentiality in the management of public contracts in the PPC, as 
part of the purpose of the PPP. 
For procurement activities to be categorized as unique, the PPC must make a formal 
request to the Public Procurement Organisation to secure their approval. It was 
particularly noted that having been sought, approvals are rarely refused, thereby 
making the process more of a formality. After receipt of the approval, an 
advertisement to invite bids from competent contractors is then placed in the national 
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daily papers, setting specific criteria and date deadlines which must be met by 
interested bidders.  
Upon receipt of bids from interested contractors, the PPC pre-qualifies bids using the 
criteria already outlined in its advertisement, to determine bids that qualify for the 
tendering phase of the procurement exercise. The tendering phase invites the 
preferred bidders to make a presentation to the approving authority, which in many 
instances has been found to have an interest in the bidding companies (Omoleke, 
2011; Reporter, 2012). The circle of activities outlined for the procurement of items 
categorised as unique is concluded by the PPC by obtaining a certificate of ‘No 
Objection’ from the Public Procurement Organisation. Once this is done, the contract 
is awarded and executed and records on the project are maintained for future 
reference only.  
In line with the dictates of the Public Procurement Act 2007, which aims to achieve 
best value for public funds spent, this research finds that the PPC has as its declared 
policy the objective of achieving the best quality and quantity of work obtainable for 
the public money disbursed. Officers were observed to be very knowledgeable about 
the various provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007 and the general need to 
exercise prudence in the spending of often scarce government resources. One 
interviewee stated that:  
‘[...] the most important aspect of the process is the provision for competitive 
bidding and transparency so that scarce resources are used to obtain the best 
possible quality of service for government.’  
(Procurement Officer, 03 April, 2011). 
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However, a decision of the Nigerian High Court in the case of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria v. Bode George and others shows that many procurement 
activities in the PPC have resulted in deliberate efforts on the part of the officers and 
management to use the procurement process to siphon public funds for private use. 
The situation is indicated by the sudden resignation of the Minister responsible for 
monitoring public procurement-related corruption involving the PPC (Reporter, 
2012); and the arrest and subsequent prosecution of most of the management staff of 
the Power Regulatory Commission for incidents of procurement-related corruption 
(Onwuemenyi, 2011; Reporter, 2012). The apparent problem of high level corruption 
is further entrenched by the strict adherence of management to the 2007 Procurement 
Act’s requirement for confidentiality, which can be interpreted in such a way as to 
exclude civil society and other anti-corruption whistle blowers. 
5.2.2 Theme 2: The PPP risk factors at PPC 
Nigeria, as a developing country, has immense infrastructure deficits generally: in 
particular, only about 20% of the country’s electric power needs are presently being 
met (see section 1.1). The government appropriates enormous sums of public money 
to fund infrastructure projects, in particular power infrastructure, and this has 
resulted in negative impacts on the production costs.  
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Table 9: Corruption risk factors at the PPC 
Theme Sub-themes/high codes Sub-themes/low codes 
2. Risk 
factors 
2.1 Exercise of discretion 2.1.1 Desperation by contractors 
2.1.2 Special procurement outside the 2007 Act 
2.1.3 Interference by management  
2.2 Civil society 2.2.1 Participation of civil society is not mandatory 
2.2.2 The PPC can discourage their participation 
2.3 Price intelligence 2.3.1 Price intelligence is used to fix prices only to 
escape audit queries  
Source: Fieldwork and verification interview 2011 and 2012 
 
Because production costs are high, there is a general economic development 
slowdown in relation to private sector activities in the country (Adenikinju, 2003). 
As a result, the government funds most infrastructure development projects, with the 
implication that most companies depend on a small number of public sector projects 
for their survival. 
According to quote 4 from the transcript 2: 
‘…the major risk is the desperation on the part of the bidding contractors 
who want to win the contract at all costs and in the process would want to 
compromise the procurement committee members through corrupt 
inducement. The issue of capacity to handle urgent procurement activities 
without jeopardising best practices and accountability is another area that 
contractors use to put pressure on both the management and procurement 
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officers to either make mistakes or compromise the process to their 
advantage.’ 
(Procurement Officer, 03 April, 2011). 
One of the risk factors in the PPP at the PPC is desperation on the part of 
contractors. This is because the PPP was only formalised in 2007 (National 
Assembly Nigeria, 2007b), which may have an impact on the PPC’s technical 
capacity to apply the prescriptions of the 2007 Nigerian Public Procurement Act to 
the PPP in a way that achieves the objectives of best practice, transparency and 
accountability.  
As another interviewee  at the PPC said: 
‘There is no room for discretion as the whole process is guided by the 
procurement manual and it must conform to the Public Procurement Act, 
2007. The discretion that could be exercised by the officers is only to the 
extent that it does not contravene the ProcurementAct and the 2007 Act.’ 
(Procurement Officer A, Abuja, 24 February 2012). 
In contrast to the foregoing assertion, the exercise of discretion and the abuse of it 
has been a primary reason for corruption in the electricity sector in Nigeria, as 
demonstrated in the resignation on the country’s Minister in charge of power, after 
being indicted of abuse of statutory power of discretion in favour of his company 
(Reporter, 2007). Another possible of risk factor in the PPP was raised in another 
interviewer who stated that: 
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‘The bidding process in PPC is sufficiently clear. It is such that the 
evaluation committee must adhere to nine steps which are in the public 
domain and deviation from them would attract genuine criticisms and 
protests from the bidders.’ 
(Procurement Officer B, Abuja, 26 February 2012). 
Furthermore, the application of the template analysis technique to the interview 
transcript from the PPC also produced a template of nine essential steps in public 
procurement to be applied in their procurement activities. These steps are: 
 Efficient procurement plan driven by needs assessment 
 Appropriation 
 Advertisement 
 Transparent pre-qualification 
 Bid Submission 
 Bid Opening 
 Bid Evaluation −Technical and Financial 
 Tender Board Approval  
 Contract Execution. 
The list of steps above suggests a conscious effort at transparency on the part of the 
management of the PPC, hence the following description that the process of PPP at 
the PPC is straightforward:  
‘The bidding process is very straightforward and there is no ambiguity. 
There is a problem with the clarity of the bidding process except some 
bidders tend to take things for granted. They may even get the impression a 
164 
 
pivotal item is not important and lose out completely. Some of the bidders at 
times deliberately take some of the requirements for granted even if they 
understand what it says.’  
(Procurement Officer A at PPC, 04 April, 2011). 
A careful reading of the transcript above shows that in spite of breaking down the 
PPP at the PPC into nine steps for ease of reference and compliance, not all of the 
contractors bidding for contracts have been able to comply fully, with the result that 
they are disqualified. Another quote from transcript 2 states that: 
‘It is a requirement that civil society is encouraged to attend the bid opening 
exercise but more often than not, they do not attend due to the excuse that 
they need to be assisted with the logistics to attend. It they are unable to 
attend, the process goes on in absence. If they attend, they can raise 
objections if they think any of the guidelines is not being adhered to. The role 
of civil society in the public procurement process in our organization is a 
requirement pursuant to Part v section 19 (b) of the Public Procurement Act 
2007 in order to promote accountability in public procurement.’ 
(Procurement Checking Officer A, Abuja, 25rd February 2012). 
The involvement of civil society, as required by the Nigerian Procurement Act 2007, 
is a means of ensuring that PPP is carried out transparently. However, from the 
transcript above, the involvement of civil society at the PPC seems to be optional, as 
while they are encouraged to get involved in the process, they are not required to be 
present. This means that the PPP can be concluded even without the involvement of 
civil society.  
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The fierce competition from so many private sector companies for a relatively small 
number of public sector contracts is another risk factor for corruption in the process 
of public procurement in this organisation. Since the supply of contracts from the 
private sector is relatively small compared to those arising from the public sector, to 
stay in business contractors must resort to measures aimed at winning public sector 
contracts at all costs, another factor which compromises the process of public 
procurement.  
As shown in table 9 and its subsequent analysis, the risk of corruption in the 
procurement process at the PPC does not lay only with the procurement officers and 
management cadre. The contractors, in desperate bids to win contracts at all costs, 
also resort to means beyond those prescribed in the procurement process.  
5.2.3 Theme 3: Improving the PPP 
The issue of the procurement officers’ technical capacity through training is a major 
area of improvement that features in the transcript of the semi-structured interviews. 
Because the operation of public procurement in Nigeria is still in its infancy, having 
only been formed since the implementation of the Public Procurement Act of 2007, 
the technical capacity of officers pooled from other cadres of the civil service
22
 to a 
procurement role is still at low ebb. When put under pressure by desperate 
contractors, such officers could be led to compromise the process.  
 
Even though most of the interviewees in the PPC have submitted the opinion that the 
procurement process they operate is sufficiently clear, the analysis of the data 
transcribed from the semi-structured interviews suggests that corruption still persists 
                                                          
22
The branches of public service concerned with all governmental administrative functions outside the 
armed services. 
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in the PPP. As a result, the interviewees have suggested possible improvements to 
the PPP. They said that the work of the procurement department in their organisation 
is centred on an evaluation committee which considers all bids in strict adherence to 
the procurement law of the country. One of the interviewees said:  
‘…the bidding process in the PPC is sufficiently clear. It is such that the 
evaluation committee must adhere to nine steps which are in the public 
domain and deviation from them would attract genuine criticisms and 
protests from the bidders. The nine essential steps in public procurement 
which must be adhered to very strictly are efficient procurement plan driven 
by needs assessment, appropriation, advertisement and transparent pre-
qualification exercise which is followed by bid submission by interested 
contractors. Once the bids are received then a date is set by the procurement 
office with approval of the management for bid opening, bid evaluation 
(technical financial) for recommendation of the preferred bid to be made for 
tender board approval following which the contract is awarded and 
executed.’  
(Procurement Officer at PPC, 04 April, 2011).  
As seen in the statement above, public procurement in the PPC consists of a very 
elaborate process. The process has no categorical provision for oversight either from 
civil society, the bidding contractors or other stakeholders outside the organisation. 
Procurement activities in this organisation are centred on the procurement committee 
which is appointed by the management to design the process and implement the 
process from the beginning to the point where the contract is awarded. This means 
that the management that appointed the committee in the first place is also the body 
167 
 
tasked with responsibility for its oversight, with the result that corruption is 
frequently reported (Lawal and Tobi, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, even though the procurement process in the PPC has been reported to 
be clear by the procurement officers who designed it in the first place, they also 
conceded that bidders (contractors) have been complacent about what is required in 
the process − a development that they say has resulted in many contractors losing out 
on the bidding (procurement) process completely.  
 
As shown in the statement by Procurement Officer A at PPC above, non-adherence 
to the framework for public procurement laid down by the procurement committee in 
the PPC has been used as a valid ground for excluding the defaulting contractors. 
But as explained in section 4.4.1, the Request of Proposal requires that all 
information is needed for all pre-qualified consultants, so that no bidders are given 
privileged information about the procurement process. This also serves to promote 
the integrity and openness of the process which requires would-be contractors to 
submit their bids in two separate parts: the technical proposal and the financial 
proposal. To ensure that requests for proposals are presented to the public in the 
form of advertisements, it is required that civil society and the media are represented 
(National Assembly Nigeria, 2007b, section 1.).  
 
Even though the involvement of civil society and the media are key requirements for 
the Procurement Act of 2007 for the purpose of public education and particularly for 
information about the procurement process to be made sufficiently clear and 
available to the interested parties of which the contractor is one, this is not strictly 
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encouraged. As a result, most procurement activities in the PPC have been conducted 
without the participation of the media and civil society. An interviewee said that:  
‘…it is a requirement that the civil society is encouraged to attend bid 
opening exercise but more often than not, they do not attend due to the 
excuses that they need to be assisted with the logistics to attend. It they are 
unable to attend, the process goes on in their absence. If they attend, they can 
raise objection if they think any of the guidelines is not being adhered to. The 
role of civil society in the public procurement process in our organization is 
a requirement pursuant to Part v section 19 (b) of Public Procurement Act 
2007, in order to promote accountability in public procurement.’  
(Procurement Officer B at PPC, 05 April, 2011). 
 
As seen above, the procurement officers are aware that the procurement law in Part 
V of the Act mandates that civil society be encouraged to participate at all stages of 
public procurement, but they have not been able to achieve this solely through 
encouraging the attendance of civil society representatives. Their defence has been 
that they require assistance to attend or participate in the process. A situation where 
the representatives of civil society and the media who are supposed to oversee the 
procurement process will have to be assisted by the organisation concerned makes 
questionable their ability to carry out the oversight function uncompromised by this 
dependence.  
 
The pricing regime in the PPC is adjusted to reflect open market pricing in order to 
conform to the expectation of the Public Procurement Organisation that the 
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prevailing pricing regime in any public organisation must not be unjustifiably higher 
than that which is obtainable in the open market. To ensure that they conform to this 
requirement, the PCC conducts price intelligence periodically to avail themselves of 
the necessary market data, which is then used to benchmark prices for items to be 
procured through competitive bidding. An interviewee, who averred that price 
intelligence is mandatory as a way of complying with the requirement to keep set 
prices for public procurement within the open market range, said that:  
‘…the pricing regime in the PPC is comparable with the open market pricing. 
The PPC do not have any option as the Bureau of Public Enterprises is 
empowered to check that the prices at which public contracts are awarded 
are in tandem with prevailing open market prices. Where this is not the case, 
they have the power to issue queries.’  
(Procurement Officer C at PPC, 06 April, 2011). 
Difficult bureaucratic arrangements in the procurement process have caused delays 
which some of the interviewees say have resulted in funds allocated for electric 
power projects being returned to the Federal Treasury. This is because the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 2007 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007a), requires that all 
allocated government funds not spent during the fiscal year be returned to the 
National Treasury. This measure, which is aimed at ensuring that allocated funds are 
spent during the fiscal year, also serves as incentive for procuring agencies of 
government to work hard to ensure that they are not required to return to the 
Treasury funds allocated to them to execute projects. This is because when 
government agencies return allocated funds due to non-implementation of projects it 
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is interpreted to imply a lack of capacity on the part of the agency concerned to 
implement the projects assigned to them. As some procurement officers noted: 
[...]…the procurement process in the PPC needs improvement in the 
implementation circle to eliminate delays that sometimes stall the award of 
contract. There could be improvement in the process, especially in the pre-
qualification process that must ensure that only very competent/ capable 
companies are given the opportunity to bid. Care is also taken in the area of 
specification of the items in the bill of quantities such that they are not 
ambiguous.  
(Procurement Officer at PPC, 06 April, 2011). 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the public procurement process in the PPC is 
not sufficiently clear to be understood by bidders, whom the procurement officers 
say tend to deliberately fail to observe the guidelines lain down for bid submission − 
hence their bids are rejected for non-compliance with the procurement notices.
23
 In 
Nigeria, more than in other countries, contractors depend on contract awards through 
the procurement process to remain in business and so may not deliberately indulge in 
acts (contravening the procurement process) that will ultimately disqualify them 
from participating in the process. This research has shown that the procurement 
process needs improvement in its implementation life cycle to avoid the scenario of a 
rush to award contracts at the end of the fiscal year, a development that has, over 
time, caused large scale corruption in the power industry in Nigeria (Ayanruoh, 
2012; Ogbe, 2012). 
                                                          
23
 Notices issued periodically detailing the requirements for submission of bids. 
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This research also finds that because public procurement only started as a 
professional practice in Nigeria upon the implementation of the 2007 Procurement 
Act (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007b) and the opportunity to take a distinct course 
of study in procurement has not yet been offered in Nigeria, there is inadequate 
technical expertise to match the enormous public procurement-related technical 
challenges in the country. Under current conditions, officers of all educational 
backgrounds and without any basic capacity or training in the issues are either 
routinely, or on an ad-hoc basis, drafted to carry out procurement duties with the 
result that aspects of procurement activities in Nigeria are still executed based on 
considerations other than sound knowledge of public procurement. In the course of 
the substantive fieldwork for this project, some procurement officers complained 
that, in the words of one interviewee: 
‘…there is dearth of technical knowledge about public procurement 
generally. This is because the procurement cadre in the Nigerian public 
service is still at a nascent state seeing that it was created by the Public 
Procurement Act only in 2007. Existing laws and guidelines seem adequate 
but those charged with the responsibility to implement it are not yet 
sufficiently equipped.’  
(Procurement Officers at PPC, 07 April, 2011). 
In addition to the nascent state of the practice of procurement, and public 
procurement in particular, in Nigeria, there are also no generally applicable 
professional codes of practice that are applicable across the public service. This 
gives wide discretion to the procurement committee in the PPC to invent, apply and 
change their guidelines as often as they deem fit. 
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5.3 Rural Electrification Organisation (REO) 
As is the case with the PPC, the purpose of the PPP in the REO is to promote 
accountability in the application of public funds in rural electrification projects in 
Nigeria in order that corruption will be eliminated or reduced to the barest minimum. 
Template analysis of the semi-structured interview transcripts has produced 
indications of the risk factors that may explain the vulnerability of the PPP at the 
REO to corruption. 
5.3.1 Risk factors of corruption and the REO 
The process of public procurement in the Rural Electrification Organisation (REO) 
of Nigeria is required by statute to conform to the fundamental principles outlined in 
section 4.3 of the Public Procurement Act 2007, which aims to promote 
accountability in the Nigerian public procurement process.  
Evidence from the REO has shown that the PPP is interfered with by the 
management. Commenting on the issue of transparency in the PPP at the REO, a 
respondent said that: 
‘The process of public procurement is interfered with by the Management.’ 
‘The management pre-determines the companies that get awarded contracts. 
Most of the contracts are awarded but rarely get executed.’ 
(Procurement Officer at REO, 08 April, 2011). 
Receipt of bids at the REO in sealed envelopes has been used to create an impression 
of transparency in the process while in practice, the companies that get awarded the 
contracts are known to the management. One of the respondents interviewed said:  
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‘Bids are received in sealed envelopes but the companies are known to the 
management. Lack of openness and manipulation of the process by the 
management (a. bid rigging b. receipt of bids from a few selected companies 
and c. general compromise of the process by the management).’ 
(Procurement Officer at REO, 08 April, 2011). 
Another indication of a risk factor of corruption in the PPP at the REO has been 
attributed to the exercise of discretion by the procurement officers and a bidding 
process that is not only clear but changes from time to time at the direction of 
management. As one of the respondents at the REO asserted:  
‘Procurement officers exercise their discretion only to implement the 
instruction of the management by ensuring that [the latter’s] preferred 
companies gets contract items on the procurement list.’ ‘The bidding process 
is not very clear. The management changes it from time to time and so it is 
difficult to predict what the process will be for any particular procurement 
activity.’ 
(Procurement Officer at REO, 08 April, 2011) 
Involvement of the civil society in the PPP, which has been provided for as a way of 
subjecting the process to scrutiny of the non-formal sector so that any deviation from 
extant rules can be spotted and reported, has not produced the desired effect at the 
REO. A procurement officer interviewed reported that:  
‘The civil society is supposed to act as check against unethical and corrupt 
practices in the procurement process but in the REO, they are rarely invited 
to participate in the process.’ 
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(Procurement Officer at REO, 08 April, 2011) 
The civil society has not been able to achieve its anti-corruption role in the PPP 
because its participation in the process, in addition to being at the instance of the 
procuring entity, is also funded by the procuring entity. The prices fixed by the 
management of the REO for its procurement activities have been found to be 
consistent with those in the open market. This has been attributed to deliberate 
efforts by the management of the REO to avoid audit queries that result in the event 
of notable disparities in their reserved price and those in the open market.  
Commenting on the issue of pricing at the REO, an officer stated that:  
‘The pricing regime is comparative with open market prices. Price 
intelligence ensures that open market prices are used as bases for fixing 
reserve prices for procurement items. The management make use of price 
intelligence to make sure that the prices at which items are procured are 
comparable to open market prices in order to avoid audit queries.’ 
(Procurement Officer at REO, 09 April, 2011). 
In addition to the involvement of the civil society in the PPP as an anti-corruption 
initiative, involvement of anti-corruption agencies in the process can ensure that 
extant rules are strictly adhered to stifle tendencies of corruption in the PPP. This 
was alluded to by one of the interviewees who stated that: 
‘Existing procurement guidelines based on the 2007 Nigerian Public 
Procurement Act [are] to be strictly adhered to. In addition to the civil 
society, anti-corruption agencies should be involved in the procurement 
circle to detect and punish abuse of the process.’ 
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(Procurement Officer at REO, 09 April, 2011). 
 
As seen from the analyses above, interviewees at the Rural Electrification 
Organisation were almost unanimous in asserting that the management, from its 
inception to 2010, has interfered with procurement activities. This research also finds 
that the magnitude of public procurement-related corruption in the REO was the 
reason that the government suspended its operations for three years and also relieved 
all management staff of their appointments, in addition to pursuing them through 
criminal prosecution.  
This research finds that most contracts awarded through the public procurement 
process in the agency, from its inception to 2010, are rarely executed because the 
reason for the award of the contracts in the first place is to enable the Chief 
Executive and other managerial staff to misappropriate funds allocated to the agency 
to implement energy projects in order to avoid the sanction of having to return the 
funds to the National Treasury. A procurement officer revealed that: 
‘…the process of public procurement can be interfered with by Management 
Officers. Contracts have been awarded to companies known to the 
management officers .There is need to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives 
in the public procurement process – provide free access to information to the 
public and civil societies for independent monitoring of the procurement 
process’  
(Procurement Officer at REO, 11 April, 2011).  
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The transcripts further show that the management, in collaboration with other 
management staff at the agency in the period from 2005 to 2010, altered the 
procurement effected through the agency to a mere simulacrum of the real process, 
which was used solely to give legitimacy to the misappropriation of public funds that 
was taking place at the agency for over three years. The influence of one manager at 
the REO was so pronounced that the exercise of discretion by procurement officers 
was entirely under his direction.  
This research also finds that the procurement process used at the agency from its 
inception up to the present day is not clear.  
‘…the civil society is supposed to act as check against unethical and corrupt 
practices in the procurement process but in the Rural Electrification 
Organisation, they are rarely invited to participate in the process. The 
pricing regime is comparative with open market prices. Price intelligence 
ensures that open market prices are used as bases for fixing reserve prices 
for procurement items. The management make use of price intelligence to 
make sure that the prices at which items are procured are comparable to 
open market prices in order to avoid audit queries.’  
(Procurement Officer at Rural Electrification Organisation, 08 April, 2011). 
The study shows that the operation of price intelligence has been important for rural 
electrification, in setting reserve prices for items to be procured using the public 
procurement process. The officers in this case study posited that once the reserve 
price for a particular item to be procured is fixed through price intelligence, 
questions of inflation of contracts may not be raised against them by contractors who 
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may have lost out to other contractors in the bidding process. They acknowledge that 
civil society has a role to play as an independent monitor to ensure that public 
procurement activities are conducted in line with the Nigerian Procurement Act of 
2007, but concede that they rarely get invited into the process as envisaged by law.  
The statement also highlights the need not only to make the involvement of civil 
society mandatory but also to see that civil society representatives who are to be 
involved in public procurement-related oversight activities are given periodical 
training in the procurement process and the laws and regulations that apply to it, so 
that they are properly equipped to advocate a course of probity, accountability and 
transparency in the procurement process. The non-involvement of civil society in the 
procurement process has also been attributed to the problem of funding. Funding for 
civil society activities in Nigeria is a problem that goes to the heart of the issue of the 
independence of civil society organisations and their freedom to report cases of 
abuse of the public procurement process (Sabet, 2005; Mercy, 2012). 
Civil society organisations that receive funding from another organisation, be it 
private or public, may be bogged down by the issue of neutrality and impartiality in 
reporting issues that may impinge on the assumed transparency of the organisation 
that funds their activities (Mercy, 2012). It is therefore important that a statutory 
stream of funding is provided for civil society organisations to draw from, to enable 
them to participate in the procurement process to ensure that existing guidelines are 
adhered to by procuring entities. Because the Rural Electrification Organisation has 
been able to conduct its procurement activities without the involvement of civil 
society from inception to date, existing guidelines have not been strictly adhered to. 
As a procurement officer observed:  
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‘…it is important that existing procurement guidelines as stipulated in the 
relevant section of the 2007 Procurement Act be strictly adhered to. In 
addition to the civil society, anti-corruption agencies should be involved in 
the procurement circle to detect and punish abuse of the process. Lack of 
trained manpower to administer the process is also a major problem in the 
Agency. The procurement cadre is only four years old and the issue of 
manpower to execute the process as required by the procurement act is a 
major problem.’ 
(Procurement Officer at the Rural Electrification Organisation, 15 April, 
2011). 
In addition to the involvement of civil society in the procurement process, anti-
corruption agencies can also be given a role. As opined by the interviewee cited 
above, this will serve the purpose of deterrence and in a case of abuse it will avail 
them an inside position from which to deal with cases of abuse of the procurement 
process if and when it takes place. The operation of the present regime of public 
procurement at the Rural Electrification Organisation has involved the alleged 
misappropriation of public funds over the past seven years (Awolusi, 2010), hence 
the need to review and make recommendations that will strengthen the process 
against misconduct.  
5.4 Procurement and Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) 
Unlike the other case study organisations, the Anti-Corruption Commission is an 
agency of the Nigerian government created by law (National Assembly Nigeria, 
2004) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption in both the private and public 
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sectors of the Nigerian economy. As an agency of government, the commission also 
engages in procurement in order to take care of its operational and other 
administrative needs, hence the need to explore how its procurement activities are 
conducted. The PPP at the ACC is illustrated through the following templates from 
template analysis of transcripts of the semi-structured interviews at the commission.  
In the ACC, the PPP is initiated in accordance with the fundamental principles of 
public procurement in Nigeria (see section 4.3.1). This is illustrated in the comment 
of one of the procurement officers who stated that: 
‘The process is initiated through provision for particular item in the national 
budget. If the proposal in the budget is approved, the procurement unit then 
advertises and receive and process bids before the contract is awarded. The 
most important aspect of the process in the economic and financial crimes 
commission is the stage of bid evaluation. Collusion between procurement 
officers and contractors to undermine the confidentiality of procurement 
rules.’(Procurement Officer at ACC, 10 April, 2011). 
 
As seen above, collusion between the procurement officers and contractors has been 
noted a risk factor of corruption even though the process at the ACC is initiated 
based on the fundamental principles of public procurement. Explaining further, 
another interviewee said that compromise of procurement officers to influence its 
outcome in favour of certain contractors is another problem of corruption that can 
beset the PPP. He particularly stated that:  
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‘Compromise of procurement officers to influence outcome of bidding in 
favour of a preferred contractor is a risk factor in the PPP. The discretion 
that can be exercised is limited to the Public Procurement Act, 2007. The 
bidding process is sufficiently clear to contractors that have the necessary 
competence related to the item being procured. The requirements such as 
closing dates for submission of bids and dates and venue for opening of bids 
are clearly stated on the advertisements. The civil society is to ensure that the 
process meets the requirement of transparency and conformity to the Public 
Procurement Act of 2007.’ 
(Procurement Officer at REO, 09 April, 2011). 
 
As stated above, involvement of the civil society in the PPP even though a condition 
which procuring entities are encouraged to fulfil, because it is not a requirement, the 
procuring entities have been able to avoid it. The result of this has been that the 
process can be denied the objective of a third party scrutiny which the civil society is 
meant to serve. Commenting on the issue of price intelligence and its impact on 
benchmarking of prices for the PPP at the ACC, the procurement officer explained 
that: 
‘The pricing regime is comparable to open market price because benchmark 
prices are fixed with regards to open market prices and profit margin. Price 
intelligence is done by the Public Procurement Organisation that is 
empowered by the act to check that the price so fixed is within open market 
threshold.’ 
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(Procurement Officer at REO, 09 April, 2011). 
Procurement activities at the Anti-Corruption Commission are governed by the 
Nigeria Public Procurement Act 2007 and other procurement guidelines as explained 
in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the Act. The process of public procurement in the 
Commission is initiated by the identification of the need to procure a particular item 
from its allocated public funds and by making budgetary provision in annual 
National Appropriation Act.
24
 
This is followed by the placing of an advertisement in the national daily newspapers 
which sets out the procurement requirements and invites interested contractors to 
submit bids. Upon receipt of bids in response to the advertisement by the 
Commission’s procurement unit, the procurement officers proceed to evaluate the 
bids in line with the guidelines advertised before considering the bids one after the 
other in order to determine a preferred bidder to whom the contract will be 
eventually awarded to after the necessary approvals are obtained.  
Because the raison d’être of the Commission is to work as an anti-corruption agency, 
the procurement process in the commission is implemented in strict compliance with 
Nigeria’s 2007 Public Procurement Act. This research reveals that the most 
important aspect of the procurement process at the Anti-Corruption Commission is 
the stage where bids are evaluated. This is carried out in a rigorous manner to ensure 
that only companies that meet the minimum requirements outlined in the 
procurement advertisement are considered for contract award. The activities of the 
procurement unit are checked on a regular basis to see that staff members do not 
enter into collusion with desperate contractors who may try to offer inducements, 
                                                          
24
 A law stipulating the streams of national revenue and expenditure for a fiscal year passed by the 
Nigerian parliament annually to guide government spending.  
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with the intention of getting officers to exercise discretion in favour of their bids and 
to the disadvantage of other bidders. The focus of the implementation of the public 
procurement law at the Commission hinges on the need to keep the process basic, 
simple and unambiguous, so that it can be read and understood by all bidders for the 
Commission’s contracts − a development reported to have made public procurement 
in the Commission less vulnerable to abuse.  
Unlike the other case studies where major cases of corruption involving the abuse of 
the public procurement process have been recorded (Okogbule, 2006; Ribadu, 
2006a; Awolusi, 2010), since its inception in 2003, the Commission has recorded no 
major incidents of corruption perpetrated through the public procurement process. 
Officers at the Commission are allowed to exercise discretion in the administration 
of the procurement process within the purview of the Public Procurement Act of 
2007 and to the extent that this does not introduce ambiguity into the process. As a 
procurement officer stated: 
‘…the discretion that can be exercised is limited to the Public Procurement 
Act 2007. The bidding process is sufficiently clear to contractors that have 
the necessary competence relating to the item being procured. The 
requirements such as closing dates for submission of bids and dates and 
venue for opening of bids are clearly stated on the advertisements.’ 
(Procurement Officer at Anti-Corruption Commission, 19 April, 2011). 
As shown above, the need to keep the procurement process simple for easy 
comprehension by all bidders and the general public so as to achieve transparency in 
the process has invariably led the Commission to give a clear statement in its 
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procurement advertisements and notices of the basic information needed by the 
bidder, such as the closing date for submission of bids, the venue for the opening of 
bids and the relevant documents to be submitted along with the bids.  
The Commission has also ensured the involvement of civil society in procurement 
activities that reach a threshold that requires their participation. Furthermore, this 
research found that observations made by representatives of civil society on aspects 
of the process are considered and any issues arising there from are resolved prior to 
any contracts being awarded, to ensure that the process meets the requirement for 
transparency and conformity to the Public Procurement Act of 2007. 
 
Price intelligence is conducted from time to time to enable the Commission to set a 
reserve price threshold that is reflective of the open market price, with the aim of a 
procurement process that delivers the best value for the public funds allocated to it. 
As stated by another officer in the unit:  
The pricing regime is comparable to open market price because benchmark 
prices are fixed with regards to open market prices and profit margin. Price 
intelligence is done by the Public Procurement Organisation that is 
empowered by the Act to check that the price so fixed is within open market 
threshold. 
(Procurement Officer at Anti-Corruption Commission, 20 April, 2011). 
Because the pricing regime for public works administered through the procurement 
process and all basic information needed by contractors is made available at the 
Commission, this obviates the problems of persistent lobbying under the guise of 
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seeking clarification on procurement notices issued, thereby putting pressure on the 
procurement officers.  
 
The need for improvement in the PPP of the Commission as canvassed from the 
interviewees centred on training and capacity building as ways to make the 
procurement process in Nigeria more resistant to corruption. As an interviewee 
averred: 
 
‘Procurement officers [need] to undergo capacity training in order to 
acquaint themselves with current global trends in public procurement and to 
also get them familiarised with the content of the Procurement Act of 2007 
and other relevant manuals.’ 
(Procurement Officer at Anti-Corruption Commission, 20 April, 2011) 
 
The procurement officers at the commission were observed to be accountants and 
other allied professionals deployed to form the procurement unit. This is due to the 
lack of officers trained in the practice of procurement, thus the need to train officers 
in the practice of public procurement in order to acquaint them with current global 
trends in public procurement and to also get them familiarised with the contents of 
the Procurement Act of 2007 and the relevant manuals relating to the process. 
5.5 Procurement in the Public Procurement Organisation (PPO) 
The Public Procurement Organisation (PPO) formulates general policies and 
guidelines for public procurement as well as reviewing the procedures for 
procurement and award of contract for every public procurement entity. It is charged 
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with responsibility for certifying public procurement above certain thresholds prior 
to the award of contracts, and performs procurement audits in order to produce 
reports on a biannual basis to the National Assembly in conformity with the Public 
Procurement Act, 2007.  
 
Under the Procurement Act of 2007, the PPO has powers to call for information, 
documents, records and reports in respect of any aspect of all procurement 
proceedings as it deems necessary in order to certify that public funds have been 
spent to achieve best value for money. Because of its oversight responsibility for 
procurement activities in all procuring entities in the country, it is important to 
explore the conduct of its public procurement activities for their conformity with the 
Public Procurement Act 2007.  
 
Public procurement activities started in the PPO with the establishment of its 
administrative structure, in line with part 2 of the Public Procurement Act 2007 
corresponding to extant rules applicable in Nigeria. The process starts mostly with 
the PPO making proposals for funds regarding specific items of expenditure in the 
National Appropriation Bill, which is then presented before the Nigerian parliament 
for consideration and approval (Wehner, 2002; Aiyede, 2012). Template analyses of 
transcripts of semi-structured interviews from the PPO show how the PPP at the PPO 
is practiced with suggested improvements to the process to make it more resistant to 
corruption. Technical assessments to ensure that would consultant bidding for 
contracts through the PPP are qualified is one of the most important aspect of the 
procurement exercise at the PPO. This was alluded to by one of the interviewees 
who said that:  
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‘The most important aspect is the assessment of the technical proposal to 
ensure the expertise of the company matches the required capacity for 
undertaking the project. The assessment of the technical proposal should be 
more opened and not left completely to the procurement officers. There 
should be an open, transparent and objective verification [of] the technical 
bid assessment. A way out may be to subcontract the procurement process to 
a more objective or qualified expert. The process is confidential and this is 
ensured by specifying that bids are submitted sealed. The procurement law 
also forbids staff members’ privy to the documents submitted from disclosing 
any information on a submitted bid’ 
(Procurement Officer at PPO, 22 April, 2011). 
 
As indicated above, issues of confidentiality and restriction of contacts between the 
contractors bidding for contracts and the staff of the PPO are entrenched in the PPP 
as is corporate organisational policy aimed at reducing exposures of the staff 
members to corruption. Analyses of the transcripts from the PPO also gave an 
indication to the possible risk factors of the PPP which the PPO has always guarded 
against. On this topic, an interviewee noted that: 
‘The key risk is in selecting a company that fulfils the documentation 
requirements yet lack the appropriate capacity for executing the project. This 
leads to poor execution or failure in the execution of project. There is no 
room for discretion, except if there is no clear cut winner in a bid process or 
the requirements are not within the specified law’ 
(Procurement Officer at PPO, 20 April, 2011). 
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The process of the PPP as practiced in most of the procuring entities in Nigeria has 
been observed to have some ambiguities. Some of the ambiguities have been 
attributed to the many rules governing the process which are known to change very 
often. Commenting on this, an interviewee posited that: 
‘The process can be rather ambiguous, particularly as it related to the 
myriads of rules relating to different types of contracts. This may create a 
lapse in the understanding of the potential bidder. The civil society role in 
the public procurement is to monitor the process to ensure fairness and 
transparency of the entire process. They participate mainly at the financial 
bid opening stage.’ 
(Procurement Officer at PPO, 22 April, 2011) 
 
As noted above, the role of the civil society has also been recognised as important in 
the efforts at fighting corruption in the PPP in Nigeria. Conduct of market surveys on 
a regular basis guides the pricing regime for items procured through the PPP in 
Nigeria. This is used by the PPO to generate the oversight template with which they 
conduct audit queries on public procurement in Nigeria.  The importance of market 
surveys as regularly conducted by the PPO is highlighted by of one of its 
interviewees who stated that:  
‘Market survey is done [to] ensure that the reserve price for any contract 
item is not way above the open market price. This is one of the ways they 
enforce the provisions of the 2007 Act. Price intelligence is used as a 
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mechanism to ensure that prices at which public contracts are awarded are 
comparable with open market rates.’  
(Procurement Officer at PPO, 25 April, 2011) 
 
Paucity of requisite expertise in the practice of public procurement in Nigeria has 
also resonated in the PPO as an opportunity for corruption in the Nigerian PPP. Due 
to its nascent nature, within the practice of public procurement in Nigeria issues of 
professional training, code of conduct and ethics are still at the lowest state. 
Furthermore, defined standards for professional certification against which to 
measure the conducts of the procurement officers have not been clearly formulated 
with the implication that the practice of public procurement in Nigeria has still not 
been organised so that professionals could be monitored. Explaining the extent of 
paucity of professional expertise in public procurement in Nigeria, an interviewee 
contended that:  
‘Most time[s] the procurement staff lack the requisite knowledge on the 
project for which procurement is being done. Even constituting a 
procurement board may not also solve the problem of the qualification of the 
assessors within the organization to make an objective assessment. The 
existing laws need simplifications where there are so many ambiguities.’  
(Procurement Officer at PPO, 20 April, 2011) 
 
The 2007 Public Procurement Law in Nigeria has been described by the PPO as 
good for public procurement in Nigeria even though its implementation has not 
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produced the desired effect of stopping corruption in the PPP. Describing the essence 
of the 2007 Procurement Law in Nigeria, an interviewee commented that:  
The introduction [of] the procurement law is good, but it has failed to nip in 
the bud the root cause of fraud in the procurement process. There is need for 
true value reorientation in the public service. There is also the need to 
strengthen the anti-corruption initiatives as well as provide free access to 
information to the public and civil societies for independent monitoring of the 
procurement process.’  
(Procurement PPO, 20 April, 2011) 
 
Once approval is given by the Nigerian parliament, the procurement arm of the PPO 
then proceeds to apply the relevant provisions of the Nigerian Public Procurement 
Act 2007 and other procurement regulations and manuals in order to transparently 
procure the goods, public works or services. The specifics of the process to be 
adopted for any particular item to be procured at the PPO are dictated by the 
Procurement Act and take factors such as the amount of money involved, the 
technical specification of the goods, services or works to be procured and the 
proposed life span of the project. Describing the procurement process at the PPO, a 
senior procurement officer said:  
 
‘Depending on the threshold, advertisement is placed in the national dailies 
calling for prospective bidders to submit bids for the item to be procured. 
The public procurement follows the procurement law that specifies open, 
transparent and credible procurement in the public institutions. The 
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procurement process includes three major steps starting with public 
announcement, submission of bids, and assessment and selection of the best 
bid. The process includes the public announcement and call for bids or 
technical proposals, the opening of bids, ranking of bids based on specified 
criteria and selection of the best submission. The best three submissions are 
selected to go through the next stage which is submission of financial 
proposal, where the least feasible proposal is awarded the project following 
a transparent opening of final bids.’ 
 (Senior Procurement Officer, PPO, 4 May, 2011) 
 
Once the amount of money involved in the proposed procurement of an item reaches 
a certain threshold, the Bureau places an advertisement in the national dailies to 
announce its intention to engage competent contractors to procure the items. The 
advertisements, which must state in clear terms the list of requirements, both 
technical and financial, that interested contractors must possess, must also state the 
time limit beyond which submissions may not be received. 
5.5.1 Financial threshold and the PPP 
Where the amount of money involved is below the threshold that requires ‘calls to 
tender’ announcements in the newspapers, the Bureau then resorts to the placement 
of procurement notices on its notice boards and in some cases extends an invitation 
to tender to companies on its data base of contractors. In either of the procurement 
methods (those below or those above certain financial thresholds), upon receipt of 
bids from interested contractors, the Bureau would proceed to open and document 
the bids preparatory to bid evaluation. 
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Opening the bids at the Bureau, as this study shows, is done according to the 
prescription of the Public Procurement Act and specifically − as outlined in the 
adverts or procurement notices as the case may be − in the presence of the 
companies that responded, civil society and in some cases representatives of anti-
corruption agencies. Asked about the important aspects of the procurement process 
at the PPO, one interviewee said: 
 
‘The most important aspect is the assessment of the technical proposal to    
ensure the expertise of the company matches the required capacity for 
undertaking the project. The process is confidential and this is ensured by 
specifying that bids are submitted sealed. The procurement law also forbid 
staff members privy to the documents submitted from disclosing any 
information on a submitted bid. The key risk is in selecting a company that 
fulfilled the documentation requirements yet lack[s] the appropriate capacity 
for executing the project. This leads to poor execution or failure in the 
execution of project.’ (Senior Procurement Officer, PPO, 4 May, 2011). 
From the statement above, it can be seen that because the Bureau is the agency of the 
Nigerian government with the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the 
provisions of the Procurement Act by all other agencies of government, it strives to 
conduct all its procurement activities strictly in line with the dictates of the Act.  
5.5.2 The process of public procurement at the PPO 
The PPO forbids its staff members either covertly or overtly to enter into relations 
with any company involved in a bid for procuring any item of expenditure, as a 
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measure to shield them from the possibility of over-familiarity that could result in 
pressure being placed on them to tamper with the process of public procurement in 
favour of a contractor. The exercise of discretion by procurement officers working in 
the Bureau’s employment is kept at a minimum, so that even when an officer would 
wish to intervene in the process for the benefit of a contractor, this is made difficult 
for lack of discretionary powers that could be abused to achieve such objectives. As 
one interviewee in the Bureau said:  
‘There is no room for discretion, except if there is no clear cut winner in a 
bid process or the requirements are not within the specified law. The process 
can be rather ambiguous, particularly as it related to the myriads of rules 
relating to different types of contracts. This may create a gap in the 
understanding of the potential bidder. The civil society role in the public 
procurement is to monitor the process to ensure fairness and transparency of 
the entire process. They participate mainly at the financial bid opening stage.  
(Senior Procurement Officer, Bureau for Public Procurement, 4 May, 2011) 
Officers at the Bureau, in addition to adhering to the provisions of parts 5, 6 and 7 of 
the Public Procurement Act, 2007, are also required to exhaustively apply all other 
ancillary provisions in the Public Procurement Regulations for Goods and Works, 
2007, Public Procurement Regulations for Consultancy Services, 2007, Standard 
Request for Proposals − Selection of Consulting Firms, 2008 and the Standard 
Request for Proposals for the Selection of Consulting Firms, 2008, all of which, 
though creating a process that is both ambiguous and cumbersome, have also 
contributed to making the occurrence of corruption in the procurement process rare 
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(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007b; Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007a; 
Bureau of Public Procurement, 2008g).  
 
This research also finds that the conduct of periodic market fieldwork is another of 
the PPO’s accountability and transparency initiatives, in its goal towards achieving 
best value for money in the application of public funds for the procurement of goods 
and services, for which it had sought the approval of the Nigerian parliament. 
Furthermore, the procurement process at the Bureau benefits from an elaborate 
programme of training on the subject of public procurement, especially as it relates 
to the legal and institutional framework for public procurement in Nigeria. Being 
highly knowledgeable about the trends in the practice of public procurement, the 
PPO’s officers are able to apply the procurement process in such a way that abuse is 
minimised.  
 
Periodic market fieldwork is also an important means through which the integrity of 
the procurement process at the Bureau is assured. This research finds that market 
fieldwork is practiced at the Bureau particularly to ensure that the pricing of items or 
services it procures are neither under-priced to the disadvantage of the contractors 
nor overpriced to the disadvantage of tax payers. Asked to comment on the market 
fieldwork and price intelligence regimes at the Bureau, a group of procurement 
officers at the bureau said:  
‘…market fieldwork is being done [to] ensure that the reserve price for any 
contract item is not way above the open market price. This is one of the ways 
the Bureau for Public Enterprises enforce the provisions of the 2007 Act. 
Price intelligence is used as mechanism to ensure that prices at which public 
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contracts are awarded are comparable with open market rates. The 
assessment of the technical proposal should be more opened and not left 
completely to the procurement officers. There should be an open, transparent 
and objective verification [of] the technical bid assessment. A way out may 
be to sub-contract the procurement process to a more objective or qualified 
experts.’ 
(Senior Procurement Officers, Bureau for Public Procurement, 5 May, 2011) 
This research has also shown that in the assessment of technical specifications in 
proposals submitted to the PPO, officers in its procurement unit are open to 
collaboration with officers of other Departments of the Bureau or external 
stakeholders with particular expertise. This way, officers in the procurement unit of 
the PPO have been able to elicit accurate insights into technical issues from the 
contractors’ submitted reports from appropriate experts prior to advising government 
on the award of contracts.  
The undeveloped nature of the practice of procurement in Nigeria also affects the 
issue of the professionalism and technical skills of the procurement officers at the 
Bureau. Regardless of having operated the procurement process since the inception 
of the Bureau from 2007 to date without incidences of corruption and abuse, the 
officers were still of the view that procurement activities involving technical 
specifications should be sub-contracted to consultants with particular special 
expertise. As in the other case studies, the officers handling procurement activities in 
the PPO are mainly accountants and other allied professionals who do not have the 
necessary procurement training, having been recruited to the procurement unit of the 
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Bureau upon the implementation of the Public Procurement Act in 2007. A senior 
procurement officer in the Bureau said that: 
‘…most time the procurement officers lack the requisite knowledge on the 
project for which procurement is being done. Even constituting a 
procurement board may not also solve the problem of the qualification of the 
assessors within the organization to make an objective assessment. The 
existing laws need simplifications where there are so many ambiguities. The 
introduction of the procurement law is good, but it has failed to nip in the 
bud the root cause of fraud in the procurement process. There is need for 
true value reorientation in the public service. There is also the need to 
strengthen the anti-corruption initiatives as well as provide free access to 
information to the public and civil societies for independent monitoring of the 
procurement process.’ 
(Senior Procurement Officer, Bureau for Public Procurement, 6 May, 2011). 
The introduction of the public procurement law, and by extension the creation of the 
Bureau for Public Procurement, with its drive for transparency, accountability and 
best value for public funds spent in Nigeria, have reduced the rate of corruption in 
the public service (Ribadu, 2006a; Salisu M, 2006; Emma et al., 2011). Growth in 
government expenditure, particularly as it relates to the procurement of public 
works, goods and services, has made it more imperative for a holistic process of 
public procurement in order to strengthen the process against corruption, with the 
result that better value will be achieved for public funds spent through the process of 
public procurement.     
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5.6 Chapter Summary 
As a follow-up to the institutional framework of the PPP in Nigeria explained in 
chapter 4, this chapter presents evidence from the modified case studies namely; 
Public Power Company, the Rural Electrification Organisation, the Public 
Procurement Organisation and the Anti-Corruption Commission. Analysis of the 
qualitative data which were generated by the use of semi-structured interviews was 
done using the open coding method of template analysis. The analysis was carried 
out around three themes: the framework and purpose of the PPP, the PPP risk factors 
at PPC and improving the PPP and strengthening it against corruption.  
Template analysis of data from the semi-structured interviews produced a set of 
preliminary findings which were further subjected to verification through 
verification interviews conducted with prosecutors engaged in PPP-related 
corruption cases, other procurement officers and civil society members involved in 
anti-corruption reform for the PPP in Nigeria. This chapter has thus set the stage for 
a cross-case analysis chapter for a discussion of the findings, towards a conclusion 
chapter which includes a corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list amongst 
other recommendations for an accountable and transparent management of public 
procurement in Nigeria.  
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Chapter six 
Cross-case analysis 
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Chapter six 
Cross-case analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Having examined the existing public procurement framework in Nigeria in chapter 4 
and drawing from case study analysis to highlight risk factors that may have been 
associated with abuse of the procurement process to provide an explanation for the 
vulnerability of the public procurement process in Nigeria to corruption, this chapter 
now turns to a discussion of the findings with the aim of discerning possible policy 
implications and recommendations in conclusion to the research.  
 
Furthermore, drawing from the analysis in chapter 4 and the analysis of fieldwork 
results in sections 5.0 to 5.5, this section contextualises the research findings within 
the purview of the Impartiality Principle as a background to the concluding chapter.  
Following application of template analysis to the data generated for this research, the 
thematic findings listed above, which depict the risk factors in the PPP, are discussed 
below.  
 Interference by the management 
 Use of ‘shell’ companies by management 
 Lack of confidentiality in the process 
 Lack of openness in the bidding process  
 Contract-splitting, which is practiced to avoid the requirement of seeking 
approval from higher authorities 
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 Procurement officers doing the bidding of the Management 
 Unclear bidding/procurement process  
 Civil society rarely invited in; a way of keeping the process from public 
scrutiny 
 Open market prices maintained to avoid sanction by anti-corruption 
agencies  
 Price intelligence used by the management to keep contract prices within 
the open market range to make the process look transparent. 
6.2 The argument highlighted 
Because the Impartiality Principle is founded on the idea of partiality and 
wrongdoing (Kurer, 2005), it has become a fairly universal concept for explaining 
corruption in relation to accountability, equity and transparency in the context of 
government business. Application of the Impartiality Principle to the study of 
corruption in the process of public procurement in Nigeria therefore aims at 
identifying the risk factors that predispose the process to corruption in order to make 
policy recommendations that promote transparency, equity and accountability in the 
practice of public procurement. In the context of this study, the Principle of 
Impartiality is interpreted to mean the various provisions of the Public Procurement 
Act of 2007 and other statutory instruments made pursuant thereto which aim for 
equity in the public procurement process (see sections 4.2 -4.5).  
6.2.1 The PPP and the Act of 2007 
This study has shown that it is a requirement that standard documents and 
procedures be applied in all public procurement processes in order to provide a level 
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playing field for all companies engaged in the contest (bid) for public contracts 
through the procurement process. The Public Procurement Act provides that:  
 
‘[the] Procuring Entity shall use, or ensure the use of, the Public 
Procurement Organisation Standard Bid Evaluation Report for the 
Evaluation of Goods and Works to detail the specific reasons on which the 
determinations for the recommendation for the award of contract is made.’  
(Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007b. p.27). 
 
This research however has shown that the process of public procurement has been 
interfered with by the Management and officers in some of the case studies 
organisations, leading to contracts been awarded to companies against the Principle 
of Impartiality as stated above. As noted earlier, as well explained theoretically in 
section 2.2, the evaluation of all bids received towards the award of contract through 
the procurement process is required to be conducted according to pre-existing rules 
that ensure that equity and transparency are achieved in the award of contract. 
Analysis of data from the case studies has shown that some evaluation of bids for 
contracts by contractors has been carried out on the basis of a pre-conceived 
intention of favouring (a) particular company(ies).  
 
Based on the theoretical argument in chapter 2, the institutional explanation in 
chapter 4 and the evidence from the case studies presented in chapter 5, the research 
proposes the concept of conducting the evaluation process blindly,
25
 which when 
applied in the analysis of the bids towards the award of contract through the 
                                                          
25
 A process whereby the names and other information relating to the identity of the bidding 
companies are removed from the bids before evaluation process is commenced.  
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procurement process, could produce an equitable outcome to inform an impartial 
decision on the eventual award of contract. Blinding the evaluation process is 
therefore potentially the best option for eradicating corruption risk resulting from 
subjective or partial evaluation, since the companies involved in the contest for the 
contract would not be known to the evaluators. In cases where collusion among 
many members of the evaluating panel can be perceived as likely to take place, using 
third parties as evaluators, which could be civil society organisations with requisite 
technical knowledge in the particular context, may be a good option. In this case, the 
role of the civil society in the procurement process can be ensured without 
compromising standards and ethics.   
6.2.2 Transparency and confidentiality 
This research has shown that the Nigerian Public Procurement Act 2007 is strict in 
its stipulation that: Public procurement shall be conducted in a manner which is 
transparent, timely, equitable for ensuring accountability and conformity with this 
Act and regulations deriving therefrom; with the aim of achieving value for money 
and fitness for purpose (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007b. p.27). However, this 
research has shown that bids are mostly received in sealed envelopes as a formality 
to create an impression of confidentiality and transparency in the public procurement 
process.  
 
Furthermore, it is a requirement of the Procurement Act 2007 (see section 4.4.1), and 
by extension of the Impartiality Principle (2.2), to submit bids in sealed envelopes, 
however those with favoured companies always provide opened copies of their bid to 
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their cronies in the institutions. The cronies,
26
 as this research has discovered, even 
though they are in the employment of the procuring entities, are in effect also 
recruited informally into skewing the evaluation process in favour of their companies 
in exchange for rewards in kind or in cash (Awolusi, 2010). Furthermore, the 
research shows that this also goes for other steps put in place to ensure transparency 
and accountability in the bidding process. The complex and cumbersome nature of 
the process has introduced ambiguity which the cronies of desperate bidding 
companies have exploited to manipulate the procurement process in favour of their 
preferred companies.  
6.2.3 Splitting of tenders to evade monetary thresholds 
This research also finds that where an item of public procurement is such that the 
evaluation process will involve evaluation and scrutiny by approving authorities 
outside the procuring entity, officers and management have engaged in splitting of 
tenders.
27
 This study has shown in section 5.2 that contract splitting is done to enable 
officers and management to initiate and conclude the procurement process without 
recourse to approving authorities outside of the organisation, so that perceived abuse 
of the Procurement Act, and by implication the Principle of Impartiality, will not be 
questioned (Fabayo Joseph and Obisanya Adesile, 2011; Ogbe, 2012). In the words 
of a prosecution witness (PW) in a public procurement-related corruption case of 
Federal Government of Nigeria V Bode George and others in Nigeria: 
 
                                                          
26
 In general parlance a crony is a long-term associate or friend; in this case it refers to officers who 
compromise the procurement process in favour of companies known to them.  
27
 Dividing the contracts into several units so that the amount of money involved in each unit will be 
less than the threshold that will require evaluation and scrutiny outside the organisation 
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‘…contract splitting simply means in government parlance an intention or 
deliberate intention to bring the approval limit within the threshold of the 
approving authority instead of taking it to the higher approving authority. … 
It is a situation where for instance, a single procurement item such as a 
building is divided into three components that if added up would exceed the 
approving limit of the board. So, in order for the board to achieve the award, 
it had to split it into three, so that the sum total of each individual contract 
would fall below the approval limit of the board. So, it enables the board to 
award the contract instead of a higher authority, the Ministerial Tender 
Board or the Federal Executive Council…’ 
(Prosecution Witness, 20/10/2009). 
The splitting of tenders to enable the evasion of set monetary thresholds and bid-
rigging is prohibited by the 2007 Act (Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007b. p.27). 
Specifically, this study has shown that tender splitting is done when contracts are 
divided into smaller units to avoid the requirement to seek approval from higher 
authorities. The aim of achieving value for money through the procurement process 
has not been achieved. The problem of contract splitting as a risk factor in the public 
procurement process was restated during the supplementary fieldwork, for this 
research conducted from June to July 2012, for verification of the findings presented 
in chapter 5. An analyst from the civil society organisation during the verification 
interview said:  
‘…ordinarily the process of approving selected companies in a procurement 
process go[es] through a body of authority, say a board, this way, the 
committee authority to approve limits an individual executive power of 
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approval, but this is circumvented by splitting the tenders or projects into 
small tranches that fall within the threshold that can be approved by an 
executive with a special interest and without going through larger authority. 
When and where this is done without the intention of expediency, there is 
hardly value for money in the procurement process, as the personal interest 
would dominate.’ 
(Civil Society Officer, 26/06/12). 
6.2.4 Exercise of discretionary powers 
The Public Procurement Act of 2007, in parts 6 and 7, empowers the procurement 
officers in the procuring units to exercise reasonable discretion on issues that are 
explicitly provided for in the procurement law. The research reveals that it is a 
requirement that a standard format is used that permits the requested technical 
information for public procurement to be presented in a clear, precise and readily 
available manner and allows the client (procurement officers) to readily understand 
and evaluate the technical proposals in accordance with the established selection 
criteria, so that discretion can be exercised properly (Public Procurement 
Organisation, 2008). The guiding principle for the exercise of discretion by 
procurement officers is reasonable and best professional judgement taken 
independently, without coercion from management of the organisation or 
inducement from any of the contractors that may have interest in the contract being 
awarded through the bidding process.  
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6.2.5 Integrity of the process 
Furthermore, this research finds that the exercise of discretion by procurement 
officers in the procurement process cannot largely be viewed as genuine. The 
procurement officers exercise discretion mainly to achieve a predetermined goal of 
manipulating the procurement process in favour of companies preferred by 
themselves or their superiors. From the foregoing, it can be seen that while exercise 
of discretion by the procurement officers may provide important leeway for dealing 
with issues that may not have been explicitly provided for in the Nigerian public 
procurement law in its present state, it has been abused to confer corrupt advantages 
on some companies at the expense of others. As a civil society activist conversant 
with the implementation of the procurement law in Nigeria argued: 
‘…for every procurement process, the ideal thing is for the members of the 
procurement committee who will vet and evaluate the bids to have some level 
of technical expertise on the project or item to be procured so that their 
discretion is guided by technical objectivity, but most times, the special 
interest of the Management overrides every other technical consideration 
starting with the appointment of the members of the procurement committee 
who will be malleable and bend to the interest of the Management.’ 
(Civil Society Officer, 26/06/12). 
 
The inherent benefits pertaining to the exercise of discretion in good faith have been 
undermined because this research has shown that discretion is exercised only as may 
be necessary to implement the management’s preference so that their preferred 
companies win contracts. Furthermore, the exercise of discretion by procurement 
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officers is necessary as, even if and when the existing procurement law in Nigeria is 
reviewed, it can never provide a perfect framework that can be implemented to the 
letter as that would mean that situations not envisaged, or provided for, in the law no 
matter how trivial or minute, would necessitate a review of the law − a process that 
is not only expensive but notable for its complexities and cumbersomeness. 
6.2.6 The bidding process: clarity and transparency 
The bidding processes in all the case studies are designed by the procurement 
officers subject to management approval. Once designed, the endorsement of the 
bidding process by management is rarely refused because the management would 
have had input in the process leading up to the draft design presented to it. It is a 
requirement of the procurement law that instructions contained in the bidding brief
28
 
be clear, simple and unambiguous in order that completed bidding forms by bidding 
contractors clearly set out details of the consultant’s organisation and experience, 
methodology, work plan, work schedule, team composition and task assignments, 
and staffing schedule (Public Procurement Organisation, 2008). In practice, however, 
designing the bidding process has been used to manipulate the procurement process 
towards predetermined ends.  
 
This research finds that the bidding process in the case studies is not clear and can be 
changed at the direction of the management staff to suit the profile of the company 
favoured by them for a particular contract. In response to a request on the bidding 
process, a prosecutor knowledgeable in procurement-related cases said that: 
                                                          
28
Documents given by the procuring entity to guide bidding companies in the preparation of bids. 
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‘…the listed required organizational qualifications for participating in a bid 
process can be left opened and ambiguous to give room for a preferred 
company. In some other instances, the terms of reference (TOR) may be pre-
drafted with a company in mind, in which case it is easy for the preferred 
company to lead in the evaluation considering these requirements.’ 
(Civil Society Officer, 27/06/12). 
It therefore follows that independent participation of civil society in the PPP has not 
been given effect. Procuring entities have developed a system whereby they only 
invite civil society organisations they can influence to give a ‘yes’ verdict on their 
PPP activities. 
6.2.7 Role of civil society 
Bid opening takes place immediately following the deadline stipulated for the 
submission of bids or any extension thereof. As part of the requirements of the 
process, a register is taken of the names and addresses of all those present at the bid 
opening and the organisations they represent, which is recorded by the Secretary of 
the Tenders Board in the presence of (a) representative(s) of civil society (Public 
Procurement Organisation, 2008). 
 
The process of public procurement in Nigeria is envisaged by the Public 
Procurement Act 2007 to involve a third party, in addition to the public institution 
(procuring entity) calling for bids and the bidding companies (contractors). The third 
party is civil society. This research however finds that involvement of civil society in 
the processes of public procurement has not been consistent across the case study 
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organisations, despite their remit to act as unbiased umpires in detecting unethical 
and corrupt practices in the procurement process.  
Although the participation of civil society in the Nigerian public procurement 
process is promoted by the Public Procurement Act 2007, a source of finance for this 
is not provided to fund the expenses which civil society organisations would incur 
through their involvement. As a result, this provision of the Public Procurement Act 
(participation of civil society) has not been implemented. Regarding the imperative 
of civil society participation in the procurement process, a civil society activist 
conversant with the Nigerian public procurement process said that: 
‘…the third party participation in the form of the civil society witnessing of 
the bid opening process, as well as observing the evaluation process, is a 
way to ensure transparency and credibility of the bid process. Many 
government institutions always flout this requirement even when they have a 
list of civil society organization[s] as part of their stakeholders in their 
operational area. Many reasons informing this include exigency when 
available time for procurement is short, the inability of the civil society 
organisation to fund their participation such as transport for representatives. 
Even the process of involving a third party civil society organisation  provide 
corruption risk factor where an agency of government already has a coterie 
of civil society organisation[s] who are readily called upon to rubberstamp 
the organizations’ activities without providing any critical voice for ensuring 
compliance to ethics and standards. Another is where interested companies 
sponsored civil society organisation[s] to bid opening and evaluation process 
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to tilt the process to their favour or cause the process to be disrupted if not to 
their favour.’ 
(Civil Society Officer, 27/06/12). 
In addition to the excuse of lack of funds for civil society participation in the 
procurement process, many procuring entities also attributed the non-participation of 
the civil society to exigencies of time, where the item or service to be procured is 
needed urgently. Furthermore, this research has also shown that some procuring 
entities are also in the habit of maintaining a coterie of friendly civil society 
organisations that they call upon occasionally to give a favourable verdict on their 
procurement activities − an indication that the concept of civil society participation 
could be abused if not properly implemented with guidelines that prevent its abuse.  
6.2.8 Adhering to set monetary thresholds 
The Public Procurement Organisation sets monetary thresholds of contracts above 
which the procuring entity must seek approval from either the supervising Minister 
or the Federal Executive Council.
29
 Adhering to set monetary thresholds would mean 
that contracts above a certain financial limit are subjected to further scrutiny outside 
the procuring entity, so that the process in the procuring entity can be subjected to 
further transparency. The law particularly states that: 
‘Where the Bureau has set prior review thresholds in the procurement 
regulations, no funds shall be disbursed from the Treasury or Federation 
Account or any bank account of any procuring entity for any procurement 
falling above the set thresholds unless the cheque, payments or other form of 
                                                          
29
 Council of Ministers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which is the highest decision making body 
of the country. 
210 
 
request for payments is accompanied by a certificate of ‘No Objection’ to an 
award of contract duly issued by the Bureau (Public Procurement 
Organisation, 2008).’  
(Procurement Officer C, 28/06/12). 
 
Once set, the monetary threshold must be strictly adhered to in all procuring entities, 
as doing otherwise will result in the commission of an offence contrary to Part XII, 
section 58 of the Nigerian Public Procurement Act 2007. As a way enforcing 
adherence to the monetary threshold provision in the procurement law, the national 
treasury is mandated to request evidence of compliance before disbursing payments 
for contracts above the threshold requirements. The setting of monetary thresholds 
for procurement is hinged upon the periodic conduct of price intelligence by the 
Public Procurement Organisation in Nigeria. Asked to comment about the imperative 
of price intelligence in the Nigerian public procurement process, a procurement 
officer in one of the case studies stated that:  
‘…price intelligence (Market Survey) is conducted to ensure that open 
market prices are used as basis for fixing reserve prices for public 
procurement. The Management now make use of price intelligence to make 
sure that prices at which items are procured are comparable to open market 
prices in order to avoid procurement queries.’  
(Procurement Officer, 28/06/12). 
 
From the foregoing, price intelligence, in addition to providing the necessary market 
data needed by the Public Procurement Organisation to set and periodically review 
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the monetary thresholds for approvals of contract awards, is also used by the 
managers of procuring entities as a guide to compliance with the set monetary 
thresholds. 
6.2.9 Submission opening and evaluation of bids 
This research finds that non-specification of times between submission of bids, 
opening of bids and evaluation of bids or having such times specified at 
unreasonably widely-spaced points, can be used to manipulate the process to achieve 
the pre-determined aim of conferring favour on a particular company. As a 
prosecutor involved in cases relating to the procurement process said: 
‘…the time lag between the bid opening and evaluation process gives room 
for exigencies and factoring in inflation which most Management could take 
advantage of.  The other risk factor is that many goods and services procured 
through the public procurement process do not have fixed standard 
comparable prices in the market to use as a benchmark for procurement, 
particularly in cases of specialized consultancy services or procurement of 
goods not already available in the market or procured from outside the 
country.’ 
(Prosecutor 20/06/12) 
As shown above, there may be cases of public procurement where the goods or 
services involved are not directly available in the market. In such cases, the 
procuring entity is enabled to fix a price and then argue its justification through the 
approval processes, taking into account the code of conduct for public procurement 
which states that ‘… the Bureau shall, with the approval of the Council, stipulate a 
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Code of Conduct for all public officers’ (Public Procurement Organisation, 2008 p. 
35). Abuse of the code of conduct has attracted various sanctions, ranging from 
cancelation of the procurement process itself and blacklisting of the companies 
involved, to imprisonment of the officers involved (Obuah, 2010b; Otusanya, 2012). 
6.2.10 Strengthening the process of public procurement 
This research also finds that involvement of civil society in all processes of public 
procurement in Nigeria could be useful in ensuring that besides the contractors and 
the procuring entities participating in the process, a neutral third party whose only 
interest is the public interest is also involved. This would be even more meaningful if 
the selection process for a civil society representative were conducted outside the 
purview of the procuring entity, to ensure that they are not known by the procuring 
entity and so cannot easily be influenced by either the procuring entity or the 
contractors. The need to strengthen the Nigerian public procurement process against 
abuse through the involvement of civil society organisations that are truly 
independent was reiterated by a prosecutor (interviewed during the verification 
interview) who is also knowledgeable in the investigation of public procurement 
related cases in Nigeria. He stated that:  
‘…there is need to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives in the public 
procurement process − provide free access to information to the public and 
civil societies for independent monitoring of the procurement process. The 
mass enlightenment on the procurement laws and what constitute a violation 
and penalty is a necessity for all stakeholders. Beyond this, the enlightenment 
on the aspect of sustainability in complying with the existing rules is also 
necessary. Most organizations do not fully inform their immediate 
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stakeholders of the procurement process, laws and activities relating to their 
organization. Regular training of the procurement officers will to a great 
extent account for the existing lack of interest and low participation of 
stakeholders in the procurement process.’ 
(Prosecutor 20/06/12). 
Vigorous public enlightenment is another worthy tool that can be used to generate 
public interest in the Nigerian procurement process. As shown above, most members 
of the Nigerian public are not aware of the provisions of the Public Procurement Act 
2007, especially as these relate to the transparency of the process, as well as the 
accountability of the process and those who operate it towards the Nigerian people. 
If the people are adequately informed about the process, more stakeholders in 
Nigeria will be empowered with the necessary information needed to engender their 
participation in the process and by so doing demand accountability and transparency 
from the managers of the process. 
6.3 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, findings from the case studies have been brought to bear upon issues 
relating to the second objective of this research, which is to identify a set of risk 
factors that can be associated with corruption in the Nigerian PPP. Further, the 
research question, which asks: ‘What are the risk factors for corruption in the 
Nigerian PPP?’ has been interrogated by applying concepts developed in chapters 2 
through to 4 to the selected case studies in Nigeria. For each case study, semi-
structured interviews were conducted and the resulting data were analysed under the 
three central themes of the research. These are the institutional frameworks of the 
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PPP in Nigeria, as encapsulated in the first objective of the research, using case study 
analysis to identify a set of risk factors that can be associated with corruption in the 
PPP in Nigeria and to put forward a corruption vulnerability check-list for 
management of the PPP to achieve accountability, transparency and value for money 
in the spending of public funds through the PPP in Nigeria.  
6.3.1 Organisation of the PPP 
As shown in sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, across the four case studies the 
organisation of the PPP is based on distinct working principles. The process 
commences with the procuring entity requesting approval to procure the item or 
services for which funds have been provided by way of budgetary provision for the 
year. Upon receipt of approval from the approving authority, the procuring entity 
then proceeds to call for interested qualified contractors to submit proposals for 
consideration for the award of the contract within transparent competitive bidding 
criteria. The process, which by the dictates of the Public Procurement Act 2007 and 
its attendant Regulations (see section 4.11), has as one of its guiding principles the 
goal of achieving best value for public funds spent through the PPP to procure goods 
and services while maintaining confidentiality.  
6.3.2 The most important aspect of PPP 
This research has shown in sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 that the most important aspect of 
the PPP is the bid analysis and the discretion that may be exercised towards the 
award of contract to achieve the goal of competitive bidding and transparency, so 
that scarce resources are used to obtain the best possible quality of goods and 
services for the Nigerian people through the government. Furthermore, the 
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involvement of the civil society is another important aspect of the process, identified 
as critical to any effort at strengthening it against corruption. 
6.3.3 Key risks-factors for the PPP: a summary 
Following the case studies analyses in sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5and the cross-
case analysis in this chapter, a number of risk factors in the Nigerian PPP that can be 
associated with corruption have been identified. The provision of the 2007 Public 
Procurement Act that the PPP should be confidentially conducted has been abused. 
Contract splitting is another risk-factor of corruption in the PPP. To avoid the 
requirement that contract items above certain financial thresholds must be subject to 
further scrutiny by higher approving authorities, procurement officers and their 
management, as shown by this research, split the contract into two or several units so 
that they can initiate and conclude the awards without seeking approval from their 
supervisory authority. Exercise of discretion by procurement officers and their 
approving authorities was also revealed to be a risk-factor in the PPP; hence the need 
to develop a deliberate oversight mechanism that would ensure that the procurement 
officers exercise their discretion in a responsible manner.  
The study also revealed that because the involvement of civil society in the PPP is 
not made mandatory by the Public Procurement Act of 2007, procurement officers 
and their management have opted not to invite civil society to contribute oversight to 
the process. Another hindrance to the involvement of the civil society in the PPP is 
the provision that they be sponsored by the very procuring entity they are meant to 
oversee. A dearth of qualified procurement expertise in the country means that strict 
observance of codes of practice is unlikely without definite compliance mechanisms 
against which to measure the conduct of procurement officers. Across the case 
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studies, the interviewees reported that the PPP as currently implemented is not clear 
enough for contractors and other stakeholders in the PPP to comprehend easily. 
Furthermore, this research has shown a need to strengthen the PPP in Nigeria by 
proposing a corruption risk-factor vulnerability check-list in order to achieve 
accountability and transparency in the management of public procurement in 
Nigeria. 
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Conclusion 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter, the motivation for this study was articulated and the research aim 
and objectives stated. In chapter 2, the motivation for the research, which centred on 
the issue of corruption risk factors in public procurement, was the subject of 
theoretical reflection and contextualised through a critique of existing literature, with 
the result that the knowledge gap to which this study responds was identified. In 
chapter 3, a research methodology and the appropriate methods that fit the character 
of corruption as it relates to public procurement and in particular, the procurement 
process in Nigeria within the context of the research aim and objectives, was 
articulated to guide the research process.  
 
Following an outline of the research methodology and the data subsequently 
collected, chapter 4 analysed and presented findings from the secondary data to shed 
light on the existing public procurement framework in Nigeria. In this way, the 
institutional and legal framework for public procurement in Nigeria was articulated. 
In chapter 5, the data collected from the case studies were analysed and the resulting 
findings presented with the aim of identifying a set of risk factors that may explain 
the vulnerability of the public procurement process in Nigeria to corruption. The 
present chapter is based on chapter 6, which discussed the salient findings from the 
analysis of secondary and primary data presented in chapters 4and 5 as a basis for 
drawing conclusions from the research. In particular, the outcome of the research in 
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generating a proposal for a corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list for the 
management of public procurement in Nigeria is presented in this chapter.  
7.2 The existing framework and the way forward 
This study has shown that the existing institutional framework for public 
procurement in Nigeria, as encapsulated in the Public Procurement Law 2007 and 
other statutory instruments (see sections 4.2–4.6), is vulnerable to corruption. As a 
result, public funds allocated for specific capital and recurrent expenditures in the 
country have been diverted for the personal use of individuals (see sections 5.2, 5.3 
and 5.4). Across the case studies, the implementation of the existing public 
procurement framework, which is based on the Public Procurement Act of 2007, has 
revealed specific weaknesses in the process which have been exploited for 
corruption.  
It was also revealed that the award of contracts to shell companies is a widespread 
practice across the electricity sector in Nigeria, which is used to perpetrate 
corruption in the public procurement process. Where shell companies are involved, 
the costs of executing the contracts awarded are either deliberately inflated such that 
inordinate profits are made, or where the prices are proportionate to the services or 
works being procured, the work is poorly done or the service poorly delivered. This 
way works completed fail earlier than expected and services are often rendered unfit 
for purpose, with the result that more funds must be further allocated to correct 
defects in services rendered and works completed by shell companies at the expense 
of the tax payers and for the private advantage of the owners of the shell companies.  
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7.2.1 The need to strengthen the process 
Partly because of their multifarious nature, manifestations of corruption in the public 
procurement process have been able to defy the initiatives and strategies set in the 
current institutional and legal framework aimed at curbing them. This is because the 
associated underlying risk factors, revealed in chapter 5 and discussed in chapter 6, 
have continued to make the public procurement process in Nigeria vulnerable to 
corruption. Corruption has occurred persistently in the public procurement process 
since the coming into effect of the new public procurement framework, which is 
based on the Public Procurement Law of 2007, with the result that about $1 billion 
was misappropriated through the public procurement process in electric power-
related procurement activities alone. Because of this, there is a need for the 
authorities to begin to design and implement measures that will not only strengthen 
the procurement process to make it more transparent and accountable to deliver 
value for public funds spent to procure public goods and services, but also to ensure 
that the process is made resistant to new mutations of corruption in the process of 
public procurement in the future.  
This research therefore advocates the adoption of a corruption risk factor 
vulnerability check-list for the management of public procurement in Nigeria. This 
encapsulates a synergic collaboration involving the relevant procuring entities, the 
anti-corruption agencies, civil society stakeholders and the contractors that bid for 
contracts administered through the public procurement process. This new 
procurement management framework would drive prevention and proactive 
strategies, and forge a common synergy that would run through the system of 
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stakeholders to ensure a consistent exchange of information, ideas and learning 
towards a corruption-free operation of the public procurement process in Nigeria. 
Strengthening the public procurement framework by introducing the corruption 
vulnerability check-list test will produce an enduring, sustainable and proactive 
public contract management approach that will not only enhance the transparency 
and accountability of the process and hence, further the effective utilisation of public 
funds through the public procurement process, but will also empower civil society 
and non-governmental stakeholders (contractors) with options to seek review of 
contracts awarded, through which they can make verifiable claims of abuse of the 
process. This will reduce the rate at which public funds meant for the provision of 
public goods and services are diverted for private use.  
Having identified some set of risk factors that can be associated with corruption in 
the public procurement process in Nigeria, there is therefore a need to articulate a 
corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list for corruption-free management of 
public procurement in Nigeria.  
7.2.2 A new framework for the PPP 
It has been shown through this research that a framework for achieving corruption-
free management of the public procurement process in Nigeria must necessarily be 
based on a public contract management instrument that implements and sustains a 
corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list test. The latter should not only prevent 
existing corrupt practices but should capture new mutations of corrupt practices to 
further a sound institutional framework that ensures that the process of public 
procurement in Nigeria meets the requirements of transparency and accountability 
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and ultimately delivers value for public funds spent to procure public goods, works 
and services.  
A proactive public procurement policy should mobilise all stakeholders 
(government, contractors and civil society) in a management framework for effective 
participation and utilisation of the corruption vulnerability check-list and the 
combined administrative and procedural effects of the Public Procurement Law 
2007, to achieve a robust process of public procurement aimed at responding to any 
signs wrongdoing and developing appropriate response strategies. While procuring 
entities and the contractors that bid for contracts advertised through the public 
procurement process will engage on the basis of equity and transparency within the 
purview of the corruption vulnerability check-list, civil society will undertake 
independent review of the process as applied in every public procurement exercise so 
as to report any abuse, either actual or suspected, to the anticorruption agencies.  
 
The findings of this research have shown that there are both risk factors for 
corruption and indeed actual corruption in the PPP in Nigeria, in addition to the 
many corruption cases already in the public arena in Nigeria that have been reported 
to have been perpetrated through the public procurement process (Watts and Bassett, 
1985; Malgwi, 2004; Okogbule, 2006). Taking together three such cases, involving 
the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPO), the Rural Electrification Organisation (REO) of 
Nigeria and the Universal Basic Education Organisation (UBEO) of Nigeria, a total 
of around $1 billion is said to have been misappropriated through the public 
procurement process (Sowunmi et al., 2009; Awolusi, 2010; Bakre, 2010).  
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The cost of corruption over the past decades, as revealed by this research, has been 
exhibited in a large spectrum of negative effects on society. Most of the corruption 
cases reported have been perpetrated through the PPP in Nigeria (Shehu, 2004), 
hence the need for a new framework that can strengthen the PPP based on the risk 
factors identified, to achieve transparency and accountability in the management of 
the public contracting process in Nigeria to obtain value for public funds spent 
through the PPP.   
This research therefore advocates the adoption of a corruption risk factor 
vulnerability check-list for the management of public procurement. This 
encapsulates a synergic collaboration involving the relevant stakeholders of the PPP 
namely: the procuring entity, the contractors bidding for contracts, anticorruption 
organisations and civil society. This corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list 
will provide the framework for checks and balances for the PPP that would drive 
prevention and proactive strategies, and forge a common synergy that runs through 
the system of stakeholders to ensure a consistent exchange of information, ideas and 
learning for a corruption-free management of the PPP in Nigeria. 
7.3 Key findings and the corruption check-list 
The research as explained in detail in chapter six has produced a number of key 
findings, which are here summarised as a basis for predicating the corruption 
vulnerability check-list for a corruption-free management of the public procurement 
process in Nigeria.  
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7.3.1 The key findings and recommendations 
The research revealed that there are situations where the evaluation of bids submitted 
by contractors competing for contracts administered through the public procurement 
process is done with a pre-conceived intention of favouring (a) particular company 
(ies) that are known to the procurement officers or their superiors. Blinding the 
evaluation process is recommended as the option for eradicating corruption risks 
resulting from subjective or partial evaluation. In cases where collusion between 
many members of the evaluating panel could take place, using third parties as 
evaluators may be a better option. In this case, the role of civil society in the 
procurement process can be elevated from being only observational to an evaluator 
one. To do this, at the point where bids are evaluated, the bid tenders must all be 
anonymised so that the civil society partner invited to take charge of the process to 
evaluate all submissions against the set criteria is able to choose the winning bidder 
in an impartial and transparent way.   
Another key finding of the research is that despite the requirement to submit bids in 
sealed envelopes, some contractors with companies that are known to the 
management of the procuring entities are in the habit of providing open copies of 
their bid to their contact person in the procurement institutions, who can then skew 
the evaluation process in their company’s favour. Once recruited, the contractors’ 
contacts in the procuring entities would also work to compromise the steps put in 
place to ensure transparency and accountability in the bidding process. As reported 
in section 6.2.7, because of ineffective oversight by civil society and a dearth of 
research exposing the risk factors for corruption in the public procurement process, 
the process of public procurement in the Rural Electrification Organisation was 
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repeatedly used as a conduit through which budgeted public funds were mismanaged 
for private gains.  
To make the process of public procurement transparent, the Public Procurement Law 
2007 (see sections 4.2 and 4.3) lays out an ordinary process to be used in approving 
or selecting companies that meet the set requirements for screening. The results of 
the screening process are then considered by another body in the ratification process, 
leading to a recommendation for the final approval of the approving authority once a 
certain financial threshold is reached. However, it has been shown through this 
research that these elaborate transparency provisions put in place to prevent abuse in 
the preliminary stages in the public procurement process are circumvented by 
splitting the tenders or projects into small tranches that fall within the threshold that 
can be approved by an executive with a special interest and without going through 
the process that will involve the scrutiny of a higher authority. Where and when this 
is happens, the goal of achieving best value for public funds is compromised as 
personal interest would then take precedence over public interest. 
Another key finding across the case studies is that the majority of the officers 
involved in the procurement process came into post without the requisite training. 
This runs against the ideal situation, where members of the procurement committee 
charged with the responsibility for vetting and evaluating bids are expected to have 
some level of technical expertise relating to the project or item to be procured, so 
that their discretion is guided by technical objectivity. Furthermore, it was revealed 
that in most cases, the special interest of the Chief Executive Officer would override 
every other technical consideration, starting with the appointment of the members of 
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the procurement committee who are chosen to be malleable and pliant to the interests 
of the Chief Executive Officer. 
As explained in section 4.5, every relevant piece of information needed by the 
companies bidding for the project through the procurement process must be 
compiled and made available as a requirement for organisational qualification, which 
participating companies must meet. In reality, however, this process can be 
deliberately left open and/or ambiguous to give room for a preferred company to 
wriggle into winning the bid and by extension, the contract. This research finds that 
an extreme example of grand manipulation of the process of public procurement 
occurs when the actual terms of reference (TOR) to be used to administer the process 
for the award of a contract are pre-drafted with a particular company in mind, in 
which case it is easy for the preferred company to outshine the others on every 
indicator used in the evaluation process.  
The research also shows that the lack of third party participation, in the form of civil 
society representatives acting as witnesses to the bid opening process, as well as 
being observers of the evaluation process, is a way to ensure that the transparency 
and credibility of the bid process, which is statutorily provided for in the 2007 
Procurement Law, are rarely complied with. Across most of the case studies, these 
legal recommendations are not observed even when the procurement organisation 
maintains a list of civil society organisations as among their stakeholders in their 
operational area. Many reasons were given for this including exigencies of time, 
where available time for the procurement exercise is short and due to the inability of 
the civil society organisation to fund their in involvement in the exercise.  
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The research also revealed that the process of involving a third party, such as the 
civil society organisation in itself, could be a corruption risk factor where a Chief 
Executive Officer maintains a ready coterie of civil society organisations whom he 
or she can call upon to endorse the procurement exercise of his or her organisation 
for a fee or favour. In such cases, the civil society organisation does not represent a 
critical voice than can ensure compliance with, and standards of, transparency and 
accountability as envisaged by the procurement law. Another instance where civil 
society may be compromised is where companies engaged in the procurement 
process, and by extension, whose activities are being monitored for compliance with 
the extant procurement law, also act as the sponsor of the civil society organisation. 
Sponsoring the participation of the civil society organisation would compromise its 
moral independence to question or report non-compliance with the principles laid 
down. 
7.3.2 Corruption vulnerability check-list 
Following the evidence from case studies presented in chapter 5 and the findings 
thereof, which are also discussed in the same chapter, a number of specific thematic 
risk factor themes have emerged. These can be used as an integrity check-list to 
strengthen the public procurement process in Nigeria against abuse. These risk 
factors have been stated in the form of questions in the checklist presented in Table 
10 below. 
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Table 10: Corruption checklist 
S/N Public procurement corruption check-list questionnaire   
 Has the procurement process been interfered with by the management?                     yes no 
 Do any of the bidding companies have connections with officers of the procuring entity? yes no 
 Has the process maintained confidentiality? yes no 
 Is there evidence of contract splitting in the process? yes no 
 Have the procurement officers maintained independence? yes no 
 Is the bidding process adopted clear and unambiguous? yes no 
 Has civil society participated independently in the process and to its satisfaction? yes no 
 Is the contract price within range of open market prices? yes no 
Source: Data analysis 
In addition to the recommendations for strengthening the process of public 
procurement in Nigeria, this set of risk factors restated in the form of questions can 
be asked to cross-validate the outcome of any public procurement exercise. 
Answers where relevant in the negative or the affirmative that suggest bias or 
potential bias will mean that the process has failed the corruption vulnerability 
check and progressively, the number of such answers will be reflective of the extent 
to which the process failed the corruption vulnerability test. 
7.4 Policy recommendations 
7.4.1 Forging inter-agency collaboration in the PPP 
As Glenn et al. (2007) noted most research on corruption in public procurement and 
the policy directions elicited has focused on the amount of public money stolen and 
the methods adopted in efforts aimed at concealing them. This has meant that the 
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risk factors that pre-dispose the public procurement to corruption particularly in the 
Nigerian context has not been researched, hence the paucity of research-based policy 
directions. Following the findings of this research that corruption in the Nigerian 
public procurement process can be associated with identified risk factors, a 
corruption vulnerability check-list has been advocated to achieve transparency and 
accountability.  
Implementation of the corruption vulnerability check-list entails the adoption of a 
deliberate policy that can engender a PPP management framework that is efficient, 
transparent and accountable, and also empowers the stakeholders to work 
collaboratively in achieving the goals of getting value for government money spent 
through the PPP. Adopting this approach will also promote inter-agency working 
and participation of all stakeholders both governmental, anti-corruption and civil 
society, so that changes in society and the PPP over time can be identified for policy 
review before they develop into a risk factor for corruption in the PPP in Nigeria. 
7.4.2 Moral sanctions for corruption 
This research has shown that the corrupt are not sanctioned morally by Nigerian 
society. As Ogbe (2012) said, most Nigerians seem to have become used to the 
menace of corruption in society. The moral proscription, which had existed 
against acts of corruption before Nigeria gained independence in 1960, gradually 
eroded with the advent of the military rule. There is therefore a need for a cultural 
change so that those who get convicted by the courts for corrupt practices are no 
longer celebrated as heroes. This way, societal vigilance against corruption will be 
awakened to serve as an informal deterrent to corruption and the corrupt will be 
vilified as opposed to being accommodated.  
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7.4.3 Review of anti-corruption strategies and the PPP 
This research has shown that corruption in Nigeria and particularly in the PPP has 
been able to withstand successive efforts at combating it because past and present 
anti-corruption measures in Nigeria have been superficial and there has been 
research evidence base as to the pre-disposing factors. As a result, strategies 
aimed at addressing causes have been ineffective. Anti-corruption strategies in the 
past have targeted the commission of corruption instead of the underlying risk 
factors that provide the motivation for corruption in the first place. The PPP in 
Nigeria, as shown by this research, involves immense sums of money in annual 
turnover and because it has pre-disposing risk factors, the corrupt have 
continually exploited it for personal gain. Therefore, periodic review of public 
procurement anti-corruption strategies must both be proactive and reactive. While 
the reactive concentrates on discovering the risk factors and their changing 
mutations overtime so as to create policies that strengthen the PPP towards greater 
transparency and accountability, reactive review of policy implementation will 
aim to capture actual cases of corruption, studying them and using the findings to 
strengthen policies that make it difficult for those convicted of corruption to enjoy 
its proceeds.  
7.4.4 Equity in distribution of public opportunities 
Inequity in the distribution of the common wealth of the nation Nigeria through 
the opportunities created by access to the political process has been revealed by 
this research as a major motivation for corruption. It therefore necessary to review 
the nation’s anti-corruption policy to provide initiatives that promote a fair and 
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equitable distribution of the wealth that is accessed through the political process 
of the country, which is often made available through the PPP.  
As a first step towards achieving equity and fairness in the distribution of the 
opportunities that are opened up by access to the socio-political process and 
which can be dispensed through the PPP towards solution to the key risk factors 
noted in section 6.3.3, the following policy measures are recommended: 
i. The government, through the Anti-corruption Commission, to exhibit 
intolerance for corruption generally by ensuring that once a predisposing 
risk factor for corruption is identified, an appropriate policy review 
measure is activated against it. 
ii. Recommendations that follow the pronouncements and activities of 
stakeholders such as civil society are swiftly implemented to instil in the 
citizenry that the government is poised to identify and act against 
corruption. A situation where the government fails to implement the 
recommendations of innumerable panels of inquiry makes nonsense of the 
anti-corruption crusade (Ufere, 2010). It casts doubts in the minds of 
Nigerians on the sincerity of the government in embarking upon such 
measures.  
iii. Vigorous prosecution and enforcing appropriate sanctions in cases of 
corruption generally and in particular, those having to do with the PPP, 
will deter other Nigerian citizens from committing the same acts. A 
situation whereby those known to have looted the public treasury are 
walking about freely and some even still serve in government (see section 
1.4) makes a mess of the anti-corruption crusade as far as Nigerians are 
concerned.  
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iv. This research has revealed that the procuring entity can frustrate the 
participation of civil society in the PPP since it is saddled with the 
responsibility for providing funding to the civil society stakeholder. This 
restricts the fight against corruption in PPP in Nigeria through a broad-
based participation of all stakeholders, with the result that inappropriate 
conduct during the process may go undetected. This also creates a 
situation that leaves the fight against corruption in the PPP effectively in 
the hands of the government at the federal level to the exclusion of other 
tiers of government in the country.   
v. Another policy initiative for the promotion of transparency in the Nigerian 
PPP is the creation of a stream of funding for the civil society and other 
external stakeholders that desire to participate in the PPP. This will 
engender the active involvement of civil society and other anti-corruption 
stakeholders to watch over the PPP generally and over the activities of 
civil and public servants and the political class.  
vi. There is also a need to guarantee freedom of access to information. This is 
because for any anti-corruption campaign to be effective, necessary 
information on all aspects of the PPP should be accessible to civil society 
and other anti-corruption agencies to support analysis for the detection and 
reporting of corrupt practices.  
To achieve success in implementing the corruption vulnerability check-list 
proposal for the PPP in Nigeria in order to eliminate or reduce to the barest 
minimum their susceptibility to exploitation by the corrupt, a deliberate strategy 
must be prescribed. 
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7.5 The implementation strategy 
To achieve sustainable and effective strengthening of the Nigerian PPP through 
implementation of the new corruption vulnerability check-list, the following 
implementation principles are necessary to promote consciousness of transparency 
among all the participant stakeholders, that is, the procuring entities and their 
contractors and the involvement of civil society as necessary stakeholders in the PPP 
as opposed to the current practice in which the participation of civil society is 
optional.  
7.5.1 Complementarity of stakeholder actions 
The complementarity of stakeholders’ actions in the PPP is canvassed towards the 
implementation of the corruption vulnerability check-list for instilling transparency 
and accountability in the management of public contracts in Nigeria. A principle for 
achieving this is the empowerment of each stakeholder (procuring entity, contractors 
and civil society) for independent oversight over the other stakeholders and to report 
any perceived non-adherence to the corruption vulnerability check-list in the award 
of any contract through the PPP.  
Empowering the stakeholders to act independently in reporting corruption, which is 
at the heart of the corruption vulnerability check-list, involves providing independent 
channels through which the three stakeholders, namely the procuring entity, 
contractors and civil society as well as other persons with information about 
corruption in the PPP, can anonymously report to the anti-corruption agencies.  
234 
 
7.5.2 Participation of the people as whistle-blowers 
As shown by this study, corruption in the PPP has thrived because traditionally only 
the procuring entity, which represented the government and the contractors, has 
participated in the Nigerian Public procurement process (PPP). The participation of 
third parties in the PPP, which is restricted to civil society, is optional and the 
procuring entity has discretion as to which civil society organisation to invite. 
Furthermore, civil society is also dependent on the procuring entity for funding, thus 
putting its independence with regard to rising concerns about corruption in question. 
Therefore, empowering civil society and other people who come by information 
about corruption in the PPP will encourage their participation in the management of 
public funds set-aside for public goods and services, which has been the source of 
various corruption cases. Policy-making in respect of the management of the PPP 
should be participatory, so that all stakeholders affected by corruption in the PPP can 
have a right to demand information on the PPP and, therefore, have responsibility to 
report irregularities in the process and to do so anonymously.  
7.5.3 Training the stakeholders 
As revealed in sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 of this thesis, a dearth of technical 
skill on the part of the procurement officers and other stakeholders is a major risk-
factor impeding transparency in the PPP. There is therefore a need to train the 
procurement officers, civil society representatives and other stakeholders on a 
regular basis to enable them to champion the cause of transparency in the 
procurement process. The deployment of appropriate training programmes will 
equip procurement officers and other stakeholders with the knowledge to detect 
and report perceived corruption in the PPP.  
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7.5.4 Responding to dynamics in the PPP through policy 
In light of the above, therefore, the PPP, which is still in its nascent stage having 
commenced only five years ago with the coming into effect of the Public 
Procurement Act 2007, should be reviewed periodically to make it responsive to 
high priority issues and the need to achieve transparency, accountability and above 
all, value for money in the spending of public funds in Nigeria through the PPP. The 
priority for stakeholders in the Nigerian PPP, as revealed by this research, is the hope 
that public procurement-related corruption, which they expressed to be high and 
rampant, will be completely eliminated or at least reduced to the barest minimum. 
Their consensus is that a corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list for the 
management of public procurement that responds to issues around the procurement 
officers’ technical capacity and that of other stakeholders and periodic update and 
review of the institutional framework for public procurement in Nigeria, are 
necessary to identify the mutations of corruption in the PPP and empower the 
stakeholders through education about what constitutes partiality and inappropriate 
behaviour in the PPP with guaranteed channels through which people with evidence 
on corruption can anonymously report the same to appropriate authorities. 
7.5.5 Instilling accountability in the PPP 
As revealed by this study, accountability and transparency in the administration of 
public funds meant developmental projects through the PPP have always been at the 
heart of the belief that there is corruption in the conduct of government business in 
Nigeria. To address this, the idea that is uppermost in the minds of all stakeholders 
and the Nigerian people is that the PPP should be open to scrutiny. This way, those 
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responsible for planning and overseeing the expenditure of public funds through the 
PPP will be accountable to the people.  
7.5.6 Civil society as a stakeholder in the PPP 
As shown by this study, civil society has often been excluded from the PPP because 
of the notion that external procurement officers working for the government know 
more about the PPP and its challenges. To achieve a situation where civil society 
will embrace the campaign against corruption in the Nigerian PPP and also to engage 
in efforts towards long-term regular review of the process, to respond to the 
changing character of corruption, the policies aimed at achieving civil society 
participation should be formulated with their active participation. The inclusion of 
civil society, which is currently marginalised in the PPP, should be recognised as a 
fundamental premise of any strategy for upholding transparency in the management 
of public funds in Nigeria. Thus, the Public Procurement Organisation (PPO) and 
indeed the government should adopt deliberate measures, such as statutory sources 
of payment to enable the participation of civil society.    
7.5.7 Issues of effectiveness of implementation of the checklist:  way 
forward 
As explained in sections 1.1, 1.2 and i.4, previous attempts at curtailing corruption 
have failed even though a number of national agencies have been created for its 
implementation. This raises issues of synergy amongst agencies that must work 
together achieve the objectives of a public procurement process (PPP) in Nigeria that 
is transparent and resilient against corruption. This shows the need for collaboration 
of stakeholders to achieve the new framework for the PPP. 
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In order to achieve successful implementation of the recommendations outlined in 
7.5- 7.5.6, the PPP stakeholders are to act independently in reporting corruption. 
This involves providing independent channels through which the three stakeholders, 
namely the procuring entity, contractors and civil society as well as other persons 
with information about corruption in the PPP and indeed the Public Procurement 
Organisation (PPO), can anonymously report to the anti-corruption agencies.  
Anonymous reporting of corruption has been institutionalised in Nigeria following 
the Government’s acceptance of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Commission (ICPC)’s recommendation that an Anti-Corruption 
and Transparency Unit should be set up in all procuring entities of government in 
Nigeria (Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission, 
2013), fifty eight such Units have already been set up as at July, 2013. The setting up 
of these anti-corruption units and the combined effect of the provisions of Sections 
6-29 of the ICPC Act (National Assembly Nigeria, 2000), which places prosecution 
of corrupt practices by public officers (including those involving the PPP) within the 
purview of the ICPC, it also follows that the Independent Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offences Commission (ICPC) takes the lead in the prosecutor 
implementation of PPP related corruption cases with the active cooperation of the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission where pure Economic Crimes
30
 are 
disclosed (National Assembly Nigeria, 2004).  
 
By virtues of the enabling law of Public Procurement in Nigeria (National Assembly 
Nigeria, 2007.-b) which places responsibility for formulation of the  general policies 
and guidelines for public procurement as well as reviewing the procedures for 
                                                          
30Crimes such as advance fee fraud (419 fraud) and money laundering  
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procurement and award of contract for every public procurement entity in the Public 
Procurement Organisation (PPO), the PPO should continue to collect and collate 
data on the PPP and any judicial pronouncements to feed into its performs in terms 
of policies and regulations and for its statutory procurement audits and other reports 
due on a biannual basis to the National Assembly in conformity with the Public 
Procurement Act, 2007 (National Assembly Nigeria, 2007.-b).  
7.6 Contributions to theory and practice 
Distinctive contributions to knowledge and limitations associated with this study 
have been noted. In doing this, the research aim and objectives articulated in chapter 
1 were compared with the gap in knowledge discovered through the literature review 
and the findings from the case studies. Drawing on these findings suggests that this 
study contributes to knowledge from both a theoretical perspective and in relation to 
practical applications.  
7.6.1 Theoretical contributions 
Building upon the readings and the literature reviewed in chapter 2, this study 
examined the concept of corruption in terms of wrongdoing from perspectives of 
grand corruption and petty corruption. It explained grand corruption as that which 
takes place at the highest levels of political authority and decision making and which 
occurs at the formulation of public policies and may involve the appropriation or 
embezzlement of government funds, or the tailoring of public laws, codes and 
regulations for the benefit of particular ‘favoured’ groups in return for bribes, or 
simply to preserve political support and power.  
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It also explained petty corruption within the purview of administrative or 
bureaucratic corruption in terms of everyday corruption that takes place where 
bureaucrats meet the public directly through processes such as the public 
procurement process. Petty corruption was characterised as survival-corruption 
perpetrated by public officials who engage in corruption to meet needs that their 
legitimate income cannot take care of; as well as that which is pursued by junior or 
mid-level agents who depend on relatively small but illegal rents in the form of 
bribes in exchange confidential information to meet needs ranging from food and 
housing to the payment of fees for their children's education.  
Wrongdoing, which means using the public procurement process to achieve private 
gains contrary to the intended public gains, is the defining and also common feature 
of both grand and petty corruption. This research defined public procurement-related 
corruption in terms of any partiality in the application of the defined rules that 
govern the process of public procurement. Based on the foregoing, this research 
addressed both grand and petty corruption which in the context of corruption in the 
Nigerian Public Procurement Process is explained as any partiality occurring in the 
procurement process, in order to capture its mutative character which has enabled it 
to withstand past attempts aimed at its curtailment (see section 1.1).  
 
Furthermore, the notion of partiality (abuse of discretion) is explained as central to 
public procurement-related corruption (section 2.4.9) and can be explained in terms 
of the Principle of Impartiality − a strong principle against any form of 
discrimination in the allocation of procurement opportunities made available to 
deserving individuals by the state (Keeley, 1995; Kurer, 2005). The principle hinges 
on the prescription that in allocating public opportunities, the existing rules must be 
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followed strictly as laid down, so that none of the parties is given undue advantage 
over the others (Colombatto, 2003; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). Furthermore, the 
principle has been seen to relate to the subject of corruption in the context of 
deviations from defined norms for the administration of public resources within a 
given system (Kurer, 2005; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Rothstein and Eek, 2009).  
 
The state, in allocating public opportunities such as those allocated through the 
public procurement process, should treat equally those who deserve equal treatment 
(Kurer, 2005). This has brought to the fore the realisation that to promote 
transparency in the process of public procurement, none of the companies that 
qualify to bid through the public procurement process should be discriminated 
against (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). Because the Impartiality Principle is founded 
on the idea of partiality and wrongdoing (Kurer, 2005), it has become a fairly 
universal concept for explaining corruption in relation to accountability, equity and 
transparency in the context of government business. Application of the Impartiality 
Principle to the study of corruption in the process of public procurement in Nigeria 
therefore aims at identifying its risk factors, which will then feed into policy 
recommendations that promote transparency, equity and accountability in the 
practice of public procurement.  
7.6.2 Contribution to Practice 
The research aim and objectives seek to identify risk factors for corruption in the 
public procurement process in Nigeria as a first step towards recommendations for 
policy frameworks that promote transparency in public contract administration. This 
is because, as explained in sections 1.1 and 1.2, corruption in the public procurement 
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process in Nigeria has defied initiatives aimed at curbing it. This research has 
provided explanations for better understanding the factors that may have made 
corruption in the procurement process in Nigeria resistant to past initiatives, so that it 
may be possible to improve the management of the process and this may inform 
policy frameworks that promote transparency and ultimately secure the process 
against corruption.  
 
The research has also proposed a corruption risk factor vulnerability check-list for 
corruption-free management of public procurement in Nigeria. Applying this check-
list and implementing the other policy recommendations proposed will not only 
ensure value for money in public procurement, but monies saved by preventing 
corruption in the process will be used on other projects and the nascent practice of 
public procurement in Nigeria will be improved for greater transparency in public 
contract administration. 
 
The research was innovative in having conducted its fieldwork in two phases: the 
main fieldwork and a verification fieldwork phase. The main fieldwork was used to 
generate the primary data by way of semi-structured interviews with interviewees in 
the case study organisations selected. The verification phase of the fieldwork was 
used to test the validity of the preliminary findings from the main fieldwork.  
7.7 Limitations and future research recommendations 
However, the research is not without its limitations. This section starts by itemising 
the limitations that the researcher encountered during the course of the research from 
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the perspectives of both data collection and analysis, and ends with an account of 
possible directions for future research based on the limitations encountered. 
7.7.1 Limitations 
This research, like other case study research, has certain associated limitations. First, 
there are some methodological limitations associated with the research such as the 
representativeness of the case studies selected and of the sampling within these, and 
the potential impact of this on the research findings. Because the subject matter of 
the research is corruption in the public procurement process in Nigeria, this affects 
and/or involves a great mass of stakeholders across the country, and it would be 
impossible for a piece of doctoral research to collect data from all of them. Although 
efforts have been made to extrapolate the data and the findings to the general 
situation, the research cannot be said to be wholly representative in precise terms of 
the situation of corruption as it exists across the country.  
In terms of generalising the research findings, since the case studies seek to reveal 
risk factors and processes through which these manifested in the siphoning of public 
funds through the public procurement process, it is necessarily constrained in 
drawing general conclusions from findings based on a few case studies in one sector. 
Secondly, given the exigencies of the doctoral research, a substantial part of the data 
for the research was generated from secondary sources. This introduced the 
possibility of missing out the tacit knowledge first-hand data provides, because 
secondary data may have undergone transformation, with implications for its 
veracity.  
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7.7.2 Future research recommendations 
This study has revealed that many risk factors and indeed, instances of corruption, 
exist in the nascent Nigerian PPP through which public funds set aside for the 
provision of public services are managed. This gives rise to other questions that can 
be researched further to advance knowledge on the subject of corruption in public 
procurement within the context of public contract administration generally. The 
possible research-specific questions consequent upon this research, which can be 
studied further, are as follows: 
Firstly, what are the correlations, if any, between the risk factors for corruption in the 
Nigerian PPP and other national jurisdictions in Africa and indeed, globally? 
Secondly, are there risk factors for corruption in procurement activities that 
transcend national jurisdictions and if so, how do their manifestations across national 
jurisdictions differ? In this kind of international scenario of corruption, how can 
international jurisprudence be synergised to eliminate the factors that make 
corruption attractive to the corrupt and by so doing eliminate corruption in the PPP, 
or reduce it to the barest minimum?  
Thirdly, case study analysis and analysis of secondary data revealed that the 
existence of corruption in the Nigerian PPP has given rise to the diversion of public 
funds in Nigeria for private use by individuals and that most of the misappropriated 
funds are laundered locally in Nigeria or internationally with a view to concealing 
their sources. This suggests that monies misappropriated through the PPP have been 
laundered through financial institutions locally in Nigeria and internationally and 
calls for research on the risk factors for corruption in the movement and/or 
laundering of the proceeds of corruption nationally or internationally. This calls for 
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cross-border research into the destinations of monies misappropriated through the 
Nigerian PPP and the framework of international financial institutions that may have 
overtly or covertly facilitated it. 
Furthermore, beyond the possible research themes and questions that directly relate 
to the findings of this research, there are certain theoretical issues related to the 
literature of corruption reviewed in chapter 2 that can be further explored to broaden 
understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of corruption and the risk factors 
that predispose society to it. With regard to the theoretical underpinnings of 
corruption in general, the Principle of Impartiality has been revealed as common to 
all schools of thought on corruption, irrespective of national jurisdiction. The 
question, however, remains as to how to evolve an internationally acceptable anti-
corruption template for evaluating the PPP irrespective of national jurisdictions 
against corruption. All these questions call for further research theoretically and 
empirically. 
7.7.3 Personal reflections 
This research has broadened my view that the concept of corruption can be variously 
defined to meet set objectives. Based on this, the tern ‘corruption’ for this study has 
been defined as ‘partiality and/or abuse of power and/or discretion for profit in the 
exercise of public procurement-related discretion. In fact, this study reveals that it is 
difficult to conduct research on corruption in a country highly publicised for 
corruption like Nigeria. This made it an uphill task to gain the confidence and 
acceptance of people to participate in the study as interviewees, and the task of 
sourcing for other data both primary and secondary very challenging. This research 
has also shown that corruption in the PPP in Nigeria, especially in the electricity sub-
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sector of the economy, has withstood past efforts at resolving it because the 
underlying risk factors were not studied.  
Analyses of primary and secondary data generated for this research have revealed 
that even though there is new legislation against corruption in public procurement, a 
national strategy and a number of Anti-Corruption Agencies, corruption has still 
persisted in the procurement process because there is an absence of any basic 
systemic knowledge about the risk factors in the process on which anti-corruption 
efforts in public procurement should be built. The extreme sensitivity of the subject 
of corruption in Nigeria meant that the case studies had to be modified so that 
respondents and their associated organisations, namely the Public Power Company, 
the Rural Electrification Organisation, the Public Procurement Organisation and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission, are anonymously reported.  
Through this research, I have gained a set of new skills and improved on previous 
skills I had. I have gained the ability to use template analysis to analyse qualitative 
data in support a particular line of argument consistently for the duration of the 
study. The research has also enabled me to develop my skills for presenting my work 
and critiquing other works in a succinct manner. I have also gained the ability to 
analyse large volumes of data and periodically take advice to improve my scholarly 
work. All of these led to the achievement of the goal of this research, which is to 
identify risk factors that promote corruption in the public procurement process in 
Nigeria through case studies analysis, with the aim of contributing to evidence-based 
policy frameworks that promote transparency in public contract administration.  
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